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ABSTRACT
Examining the Dynamics of Policy Change and U.S. Narcotics Policy: Implications for the
Global Narcotics Regime
Felix Kumah-Abiwu

The prohibition approach to narcotics control has been the dominant policy paradigm of the
United States (US) and the global narcotics regime under the United Nations (UN) for more than
a century. In recent years, however, key questions have been raised on the existing prohibition
policy approach, which many consider as ineffective and unchanging from a broader perspective.
It is based on this appearance of unchanging policy that this study seeks to investigate whether
the US narcotics policy is undergoing any type of change or not. The study also seeks to explore
the implications of US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime. It draws on three
domestic policy theories: agenda-setting, partisan ideology, and policy paradigm theory (orders
of change) to examine the dynamics of US narcotics policy change since 1993. The research
study employs these theories as competing explanations and concludes that the narcotics policy
process has largely undergone Hall’s (1993) conceptual second order change in policy. In
essence, Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept of policy paradigm theory (orders of change) offers a
persuasive explanation for the changing nature of the US narcotics policy. For the global
implications of US policy change, the study finds that the US is more likely to influence and
shape similar policy changes on the global narcotics regime because of its dominant influence on
the regime.
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Chapter 1
Narcotics Control Policy Process
Introduction
The problem of illicit or narcotic drugs has been one of the major policy issues
confronting both advanced and developing countries for many decades. In fact, the global
narcotics prohibition regime, which constitutes one of the institutional frameworks of the United
Nations (UN) with the mandate to control global illicit drugs, has been in existence for more than
a century (UNODC, 2010).1 In recent years, however, key questions have been raised on the
existing prohibition policy approach to narcotics control. For many, particularly in the United
States (US), the existing narcotics policy does not only appear ineffective, but also unchanging
from a broader perspective. It is based on this seemingly unchanging nature of the policy that
this study seeks to investigate whether the narcotics policy process is undergoing any form of
change, and what might be the likely implications of policy change in the US on the global
narcotics regime.
In essence, this study has two basic objectives. First, it seeks to investigate the changing
patterns or nature of US narcotics policy process over time. Three domestic policy theories
(agenda-setting, partisan ideology and paradigm change/orders of change) are employed as the
main theoretical frameworks of the study. Second, the study explores whether a US policy
change or resistance to change is likely to shape the global narcotics regime with a similar
change or resistance to change considering the dominant role of the US on the regime. For a
conceptual explanation of the US influence and leadership of the global narcotics regime, the
1

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) World Drug Report (WDR) 2010. United Nations
Publication Sales No E.10.XI.13.

1

study employs the theoretical concept of regime theory (Young, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1977:
Keohane, 1984, 2005) with specific reference to the hegemonic stability theory (Ikenberry, 1989;
Kindleberger, 1981) to help with our understanding of how the US shapes issues concerning the
global narcotics regime. Although the broad ideas of the hegemonic stability theory are applied,
my interpretation of a hegemon, in the case of the US, is not in the original sense of the theory
(see chapter two), since the US was not a global hegemon in the early 1900s. The term
(hegemonic stability) is therefore broadly applied in this study to demonstrate the influential and
leadership role of the US (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a) in key global issue areas such as narcotics
control.
Before the end of the 19th century, the use and trade in narcotic products were generally
lawful in many countries, including the United States. However, with the discovery of opium
derivatives and the hypodermic needle, coupled with the expansion of trade in opium, the level
of addiction became rampant in the early 1900s, and this gave rise to a global demand for some
level of control (Waddell, 1970). For example, the concern over the opium epidemic in China
and its likely impact on other countries, particularly the US and other European countries, was
one of the major issues that ignited the need to control narcotic drugs during the early years of
the twentieth century. According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report (WDR),2 the Chinese
opium epidemic brought about the first global concerted action from great powers such as the
United States, Britain, and China to discuss the Chinese opium problem from a multilateral
perspective. Consequently, the 1909 International Opium Commission (IOC) meeting held in

2

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) World Drug Report (WDR) 2010 United Nations
Publication Sales No. E.10.XI.13. p.7.
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Shanghai, China, became the first such international gathering to discuss the modalities of a
global narcotics control. The meeting also marked the genesis of subsequent international
collaborations and concerted efforts within the international community toward an establishment
of a global drug prohibition regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a).
As with other countries, the United States was not only concerned with the Chinese
opium problem, but the US was the main convener of the Shanghai meeting. The US also played
a very key role in the early discussions on the global methods and approaches of narcotics
control. For Buxton (2008), the first global meeting did not produce any concrete international
agreement on the strategies of narcotics control, but it was equally significant for two main
reasons. First, the role of the US as the main convener of the Shanghai meeting marked an
important milestone in its successive role and efforts in the evolution of the global narcotics
prohibition regime. Second, the US emerged as the leading country during the initial
negotiations, which eventually helped its successful definition of the drug problem and control
strategies toward a prohibition approach. Having assumed the leading role in shaping the
evolution of the global prohibition regime, the question of why the US became so much
interested in efforts toward a global narcotics control is an important part of the discourse worth
addressing.
For Waddell (1970:11), the involvement of the US in the multilateral collaboration
against illicit drugs can be explained from two main perspectives. First, the US was influenced
by its disdain for the widespread use and trade in opium by many immigrants from Asia,
particularly among Chinese migrant laborers living in the US. Generally, the widespread use of
opium and other narcotic drugs among these migrants changed the “respectability image” once
associated with the use of these drugs (Sinha, 2001). For Sinha (2001: 5), the smoking of opium
3

was now viewed by many Americans as a “Chinese scourge” or a curse with a link to
immorality, criminality, and general social decay, hence the US role in the control of these drugs.
The second explanation for the active involvement of the US in the global narcotics
control occurred after the acquisition of the Philippines. Bishop Charles Brent, the Protestant
Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, and other missionary groups were said to be appalled by the
widespread use of narcotic drugs, particularly opium in the Philippines and across the US. With a
strong influence from Christian missionary organizations, the US authorities prohibited the
import, sale, and use of opium, except for medical purposes, across the Philippines in the early
years of the 1900s (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Buxton, 2006). Following these early
successes, Bishop Brent and other leaders not only became the leading advocates for the global
prohibition of other narcotic drugs, but they also played very prominent roles as key
representatives of the US during the initial negotiations on the establishment of the global
narcotics control regime (Buxton, 2006).
After the 1909 Shanghai Conference, several other international meetings were held to
further discuss the strategies for global narcotics control. For example, the Hague Convention of
1912 was a follow up to the Shanghai (1909) meeting where the first international narcotics
convention was actually signed into a binding agreement. As Bayer and Ghodse (2000) argue,
the Hague Convention was unique because it was the Convention that set the actual institutional
and legal frameworks for the establishment of the current global narcotics control regime. Unlike
the Shanghai meeting, the Hague Convention clearly outlined the rules and regulations that
prohibited the manufacture, trade, and use of narcotic drugs, such as opium and cocaine, except
for medical purposes. Subsequent multilateral treaties followed the Hague Convention as shown
in table 1.1.
4

Table 1.1

Chronology of Multilateral Conventions on Global Narcotics Control (1909-1988)
Date and Place Signed

Title of Convention

Entry into Force

26
February
1909
Shanghai, China
23 January 1912 The
Hague, Netherlands
11
February
1925
Geneva, Switzerland
19
February
1925
Geneva, Switzerland
13 July 1931 Geneva,
Switzerland
27 November 1931
Bangkok, Thailand
26 June 1936 Geneva,
Switzerland
11 December 1946 Lake
Success, New York,
USA

Final Resolutions of the International Opium Not Applicable
Commission
International Opium Convention
11 February 1915/28
June 1919
Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal 28 July 1926
Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium
International Opium Convention
25 September 1928

Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and
Regulating the Distribution of Narcotics Drugs
Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the
Far East
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic
in Dangerous Drugs
Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and
Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded at The Hague
on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925
and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok
on 27 November 1931, and at Geneva on 26 June
1936
19 November 1948 Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs
Paris, France
outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931
for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the
Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11
December 1946
23 June 1953 New York, Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation
USA
of the Poppy Plant , the Production of, International
and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of, Opium
30 March 1961 New Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
York, USA
21
February
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
Vienna, Austria
25 March 1972 Geneva, Protocol amending the Single Convention on
Switzerland
Narcotic Drugs,1961
20 December 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Vienna, Austria
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

9 July 1933
22 April 1937
26 October 1939
11 December 1946

1 December 1949

8 March 1963

13 December 1964
16 August 1976
8 August 1975
11 November 1990

Source: Sinha Jay (2001:8). Also see, UN Narcotics Treaty Collection
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=6&subid=A&lang=en Retrieved on 09/12/10.
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Signatory countries were also encouraged to enact domestic laws to prohibit these narcotic drugs
(Buxton, 2008; Bewley Taylor, 2001).
In order to ensure a coordinated effort towards a global system of narcotics control, the
administration of the global regime became part of the League of Nations (LON) after the
League was created in 1919. Since then, the global narcotics control regime has been
administered by various agencies under the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN).
Presently, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB)3 are the two main bodies that serve as the guardian for the
global narcotics control regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Sinha 2001). Similarly, UN-backed
multilateral agreements on the global narcotics control are governed by three major international
conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. These are the three main international agreements that currently define
and shape the strategies of the existing global narcotics regime (Bayer and Ghodse, 2000;
Bewley-Taylor and Fazey, 2003). Although these Conventions do have some leeway for member
states to fashion their domestic drug policies based on their own political, socio-cultural, and
economic realities, such flexibility is limited by the strong prohibition policy framework of the
global narcotics regime (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Sinha, 2001).
Clearly, the prohibition of narcotics production, trafficking, and use has been the core
underlying principle of the global drug control system since the regime was created. As Buxton
(2008:1) observes, there has been some level of global commitment to eliminate the production,
distribution, and consumption of harmful drugs, with the prohibition approach as the overriding
3

The two organizations are located in Vienna, Austria.
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policy option. Generally, the prohibition policy option or the supply-side approach to narcotics
control involves the use of law enforcement (criminal justice system) to arrest illicit drug
producers, traffickers, sellers, and users for criminal prosecution (Fisher, 2006; Nadelmann,
1990). The harsh punishment of this strategy is meant to deter and discourage the production,
trafficking, and use of these narcotic drugs.
For many years, the US authorities have not only been influential in pushing for a
prohibition policy option within the domestic narcotics policy domain, but also on the global
narcotics regime as a result of its emergence on the global scene as one of the great powers. As
noted, the US became engaged in addressing the opium issue after assuming responsibility of the
Philippines following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish American War of 1898 (Buxton
2006:30). The US has since, as Bewley-Taylor (2003, 1999a) observes, succeeded in
externalizing its prohibition approach of narcotics control across the globe with almost every
country following the same prohibition strategy. On their part, Musto (1999) and Sinha (2001)
argue that the passage of the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act, which marked the first federal
narcotics control law in the US with a strict prohibition option, became the policy framework for
the existing (domestic and global) narcotics control policy.

Research Problem
Although there has been some level of global commitment to control narcotic drugs as
previously noted, many scholars, political leaders, and ordinary citizens are divided on the best
strategies for narcotics control. In fact, the existing prohibition policy has been commended and
condemned by proponents and opponents alike. For the advocates of the existing prohibition
control, drug use has generally created many social ills to both society and government. In
7

essence, public morality will continue to triumph as long as illicit drugs are prohibited in the US
and across other countries. Opponents of the existing regime argue that illicit drugs of all types
such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin are not only becoming more readily available and
cheaper, but also that the drug trade has reached alarming proportions as one of the biggest and
most lucrative enterprises. The trade has also led to increases in drug related crimes and violence
across many parts of the world (Mexico) despite the prohibition approach to narcotics control
(Fazey, 2003; Fish, 2006). A good case in point is the increasing drug-related crimes of murder,
violence, and rape across the US and Mexico border in recent years. For the critics, the existing
narcotics regime (prohibition) at the national and international levels are not only
counterproductive, ineffective, and a policy failure, but these prohibitive policies are equally
confronted with policy contradiction, fragmentation, and inaction on the part of many
governments across the world, particularly the US (Fazey, 2003; Fish, 2006).
In view of this, many questions have been raised on the effectiveness and the apparent
lack of progress in the global efforts to control narcotic drugs. For opponents of the existing
strategy to narcotics control, a shift in policy towards a more liberal or demand-side approach to
narcotics control should be the focus of countries (Levine, 2003; Bewley-Taylor, 2003;
Nadelmann, 2005). In fact, the demand-side strategy (harm reduction, harm minimization,
decriminalization, or legalization) has been around for some time. Most of its roots can be traced
to the drug policies of the Netherlands. Inciardi and Harrison (2000:2) define harm reduction as
the public health or socio-medical approach to drug policy, with emphasis on decreasing the
negative consequences of drug use. The objective of the approach is to identify and support
people who use psychoactive drugs in order that they can be assisted with treatment to minimize
the harm of addiction and also to provide them with health support to quit the habit. The ultimate
8

goal of many proponents of the liberal approach is to affect policy change towards the
decriminalization of the use of narcotic drugs currently classified as illicit.
As earlier noted, the problem of narcotics control is intertwined with national and global
policy issues confronting many countries (Levine, 2003), but the US has taken the lead in global
narcotics control due to its influence within the international system (Nadelmann, 1990; Levine,
2003). As a result, the domestic narcotics policy in the US has evolved alongside the global drug
control conventions, with the US becoming the de-facto watchdog in ensuring the enforcement
of the prohibition strategy at home and abroad (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Andreas and Nadelmann,
2006). Broadly, the existing prohibition approach has been subjected to many criticisms because
of the seemingly unchanging nature of the approach for more than a century of its
implementation. In essence, the social and economic consequences associated with the
implementation of the existing approach to narcotics control has become a major public policy
problem confronting almost every country in the world, particularly in the US.
Similar to any public policy problem, the scholarly literature on the US narcotics policy
process broadly focuses on policy definitions, initiatives, and policy solutions within the broad
context of policy goals, contents, and policy instruments. Scholars often describe this scenario as
policy dynamics. Central to the discussion on policy dynamics within a policy process is the
concept of policy change. For many, public policies, particularly within the American
policymaking system, are dynamic and these policies undergo changes over time. For Bennett
and Howlett (1992), policies change in various ways and dimensions. While some policies
radically change because of the introduction of new policy options, others are just an incremental
refinement of older policies. Besides, the question of why policies change in the first place, why
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some changes are rapid and others are slow, and why others do not change as rapidly as expected
are some of the critical questions that continue to engage the attention of policy scholars.
The key question that emerges in relation to the US narcotics policy is whether Bennett
and Howlett’s (1992) interpretation of policy dynamics in terms of policy change (radical or
incremental) fit any aspect of the narcotics policy process. In other words, is the US narcotics
policy undergoing any form of change? Indeed, this question is an important empirical one that
this study seeks to investigate. In effect, the main puzzle is whether US drug or narcotics policy
has changed or undergoing some types of policy change (radical or incremental) over time. The
next part of the main research question is to explore whether the US narcotics policy change is
likely to influence similar change (s) on the global narcotics regime as a result of the dominant
role of the US on the regime. In summary, the main research questions this study seeks to
explore are:
(1)

Is the US narcotics policy changing?

(2)

What are the types and nature of these changes?

(3)

Who are the main actors that drive these policy changes?

(4)

What are the implications of US narcotics policy change on the global
drug prohibition regime?

Broadly, the main goal of the study is to examine policy change within the context of the
US narcotics policy goals, instruments, and settings of the policy instruments. In terms of
conceptual definition, I draw on Goldberg’s (2004:551) definition of narcotics policy as a
political decision taken by a country in relation to the problem of production, trafficking, and
consumption of psychoactive substances. For policy change, I adopt Studlar’s (2009:73)
definition of policy change as “the movement of policy over time.” This view is shared by
Capano and Howlett (2009) and Skogstad (2009). For them, policy change involves the trend of
10

how policies arise and develop over time. In terms of measurement, policy change is measured
within the context of tempo (speed), mode (type of change), and scope (coverage) of the policy
change process (Studlar, 2009). The study’s focus on investigating the likely implications of the
US policy change on the global drug control regime is a particularly significant one because of
the dominant influence of the US in the evolution and maintenance of the global drug prohibition
regime.
Although the study covers earlier periods of US narcotics policy development, the period
1993-2009 constitutes the main scope of the study. This period is important for three main
reasons. First, it provides an opportunity to examine the dynamics of US narcotics policy change
in an era characterized by the dominance of the US in the international system. Second, the
period represents two different political administrations (Democratic and Republican) with
different orientations toward narcotics control. By examining the drug policies under the
administrations of President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and President George W. Bush (20012009), it is expected that the analysis of the two different administrations will provide some
understanding of how partisan ideological differences shape the US narcotics policy process.
Third, this study extends the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) on the US drug policy
change over time. In their classic work, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, the authors
examined the US drug policy among other public policies from 1900 to 1990 through the
theoretical lens of the punctuated equilibrium theory. Their study concludes that the US drug
policy, like similar public policies examined in the study, underwent changes at different times
and periods. To my knowledge, based on the review of the existing literature, the work of
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) on US drug policy has not been extended beyond 1990. My goal
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is to fill this gap by systematically examining the trends of policy change in the US narcotics
policy process from 1993 to 2009.
Generally, this research is grounded in the traditions of comparative public policy and
international relations literature. It basically draws on three main theories of the policy process.
The first is agenda-setting, with focus on conceptual models such as issue definition and
redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The
second is partisan ideology (Stratmann, 2000; Imbeau et al. 2001; Studlar, 2002), and the third is
Hall’s (1993) paradigm change (orders of change). Basically, these three theories are employed
as competing explanations of the narcotics policy process, with each examining the different
dimensions of policy and policy change over time. Specifically, agenda-setting theory looks at
policy agendas as the dependent variable, while partisan ideology examines campaign rhetoric
and policy proposals. Paradigm change explores policy adoption and implementation. To
investigate the likely implications of US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime
as previously stated, the regime theory (hegemonic stability) is employed for the analysis.
In terms of methodology, the study is grounded in a qualitative research method (Patton,
2002; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), with emphasis on documentary analysis and elite
interviewing of policy experts involved in US narcotics policymaking. Specifically, many policy
advocates, policy entrepreneurs, and other policy elites within many policy advocacy
organizations whose main objective is to shape policy change from the existing prohibition
narcotics policy towards a more liberal approach were interviewed.
By using these theories and the methodological approach, this study not only contributes
to the existing literature for better understanding of the US narcotics policy change process, but
has also enriched the political science literature by blending the theoretical fields of public policy
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and international relations. Finally, by employing these theories as competing explanations, the
study concludes that Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept of orders policy change provides a
persuasive explanation for the changing nature of the US narcotics policy since 1993. The
findings of the study also reveal that policy change in the US is more likely to affect similar
policy change on the global narcotics prohibition regime as a result of the dominant influence of
the US on the regime.

Overview of Chapters
The rest of the research is structured in five chapters, besides the introductory chapter.
Chapter two examines the main theoretical framework of the study and reviews some major
scholarly works in the literature on narcotics control. The chapter also outlines the research
questions, the hypotheses, and the variables of interest of the study. Also included in this chapter
is the discussion on the methodological approach to the study in terms of data collection and
analysis.
The third chapter examines the historical background and the evolutionary process of the
US narcotics policy through three major phases. These phases of the policy development process
are also discussed within the key theoretical frameworks guiding this study. The discussion is
primarily based on the documentary analysis of the US and the UN drug policy documents,
reports, and other existing literature on their narcotics policymaking since the early 20th century.
Chapter four constitutes the main empirical chapter of this study. It entails the key
analysis of the US narcotics policy change since 1993 through the theoretical lens of the study.
The narrative of chapter four combines the analysis of the results from the primary data gathered
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from the elite interviews with the secondary documentary data analysis4 of key policy documents
to support my arguments. The significance of this chapter is the empirical testing of the main
theoretical frameworks outlined in the study.
Chapter five extends the discussion of chapter four by illustrating the implications of the
US narcotics policy change for the global narcotics regime. The chapter employs the hegemonic
stability theory, particularly the influence and dominance of the US in shaping the global
narcotics regime. Similar to chapter four, the analysis integrates the results of the primary data
gathered from the elite interviews with secondary documentary analysis to support the arguments
in the study.
Chapter six concludes the study by discussing the general findings. The chapter also
discusses whether any possibility exists for a third order change (major policy change) to the
existing global narcotics prohibition regime. These findings are examined through the
perspective of the research questions, hypotheses, and the theoretical framework of the study.
The chapter also outlines the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study to the broad
political science literature.

4

The documentary analysis involves the examination of US narcotic laws, budgets, policy agendas and reports.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
Introduction
This chapter examines the theoretical literature of comparative public policy and
international

relations

by

specifically

drawing

on

agenda-setting

theory

(issue

definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship), partisan ideological
explanation, and the theory of orders of policy change to explain the narcotics policy change
process in the Unites States. The study employs these theories as competing explanations in
order to establish the one that offers the best explanation for the narcotics policy change since
1993. The chapter also examines the broad concept of regime theory with emphasis on the
hegemonic stability (Keohane, 1983; 1994) and its relation to the hegemonic influence of the US
on the global narcotics regime. Simply put, this chapter sets the theoretical framework for the
analyses in chapters three, four, and five of the study.
In addition, the chapter outlines the underlying hypotheses, research questions, and the
methodological approach of the study. Before I focus on the theoretical discussion, I will first
undertake a critical review of some major scholarly works in the field of narcotics control.

The Narcotics Control Literature
The literature on narcotics control is vast and complex, covering many scholarly fields.
These fields include political science, history, sociology, policy studies, criminology, law,
psychology, public health, and journalism. In view of the vast and complex nature of the field,
my discussion of the literature will only focus on scholarly works in the literature that are
relevant to this study. As previously stated, narcotics policy in the Unites States is inextricably
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linked to the institutional framework of the global narcotics control regime through multilateral
treaties. Similarly, the US is also linked to other countries on the basis of bilateral relations and
agreements on narcotics control. On the basis on this linkage, my review of the existing literature
will focus on scholarly works on narcotics policy within the US policy domain on one hand, and
works on the interactions between the US and other countries on narcotics control on the other
hand. Broadly, the narcotics policy literature is defined by two broad areas of perspective:
supply-side control and demand-side control.

Supply-Side of Narcotics Control
The supply-side of narcotics control, as noted in the introductory chapter, focuses on law
enforcement (criminal justice system) with strict prohibition of drug producers, traffickers,
buyers, and sellers with the war on drugs at the center of this approach of narcotics control
(Fisher, 2006; Nadelmann, 1990). In fact, the so-called war on drugs was declared by President
Nixon in the early 1970s. Ever since the war on drugs was declared, the United States’ efforts
toward a global campaign against illicit drugs has expanded and intensified in many dimensions.
As Goldstein and Kalant (1993) observe, a declaration of war on a policy issue often represents a
useful metaphor in the sense of declaring an actual war. This is because wars are generally used
to mobilize social forces, material resources, and to set national priorities for common attainable
goals and objectives. From Goldstein and Kalant’s (1993) interpretation, it is possible to argue
that President Nixon’s purpose of declaring the war on drugs was an attempt to gain public
support and to elevate the drug issue to the national policy agenda. Since the Nixon era, the
narcotics issue has enjoyed a consistent attention from successive presidents of the United States
regardless of their partisan ideological orientations. The drug issue has also captured the
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attention of the public, political institutions, and other attentive advocacy groups (Bertram et al.
1996; Musto, 1999). Until recently when the Obama administration’s appointed drug czar, Gil
Kerlikowske, signaled the need for a shift from the emphasis on the war on drugs,5 the drug war
metaphor has been associated with not only past political administrations as mentioned above,
but also with most presidential contenders in major presidential campaigns across the United
States (Bertram et al., 1996).
For Gerber and Jensen (2001), the war on drugs is not only restricted to the US, but also
within the global system for many decades following the relentless efforts by the US to
externalize the prohibition regime to other countries. There has however been a growing
dissatisfaction among scholars, policymakers, and ordinary people across the world, particularly
the US, about the limited progress and success with the war on drugs. Sharing similar views,
many scholars (Nadelmann, 1990; Gray, 2000; Husak, 2002; Fish, 2006; Fisher, 2006) argue that
although the prohibition policy has been in existence for decades, the strategy has generally been
unsuccessful in reducing the production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs. In his recent book,
The Political Power of Bad Ideas: Networks, Institutions, And Global Prohibition Wave, Schrad
(2010:4) argues from a similar perspective regarding the inability of the US to win the so-called
war on drugs. For Schrad (2010), a prohibition policy, which is aimed at altering behavior, in
most cases, run the risk of failure as was clearly evident during the prohibition of alcohol in the
1920s. In Schrad’s (2010) view, the current prohibition strategy of narcotics control reflects a
similar case to alcohol prohibition and the likelihood of the failure of the existing narcotics
policy along the same lines as alcohol seems possible.

5

This claim was reported in the May 14, 2009 edition of The Wall Street Journal. Article by Gary Field.“White
House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs.’ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124225891527617397.html Retrieved
on 06/24/2010.
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In a related argument, Fish (2006:1-4) agrees with Schrad (2010:5) that the consequences
of a non-working policy (prohibition) not only create the incentive for an expansion of black
markets, but incidents of crime waves, acts of corruption, and disrespect for the law also
increase. For Nadelmann (1989) and Lee (1993), the existing emphasis on prohibition of
narcotics control has only succeeded in stigmatizing drug users as criminals rather than taking a
public health approach to dealing with drug abuse. Similarly, Baggins (1998) contends that
criminalizing the use of narcotic drugs has not, after all, helped reduce drug availability as
intended, but rather succeeded in compounding the drug problem through huge expenses
annually incurred by the federal, state, and local government agencies involved in the
implementation of the policy. Akiba (1997) and Thoumi (2009) also reflect on the global
narcotics regime from a similar perspective. According to them, the global prohibition regime’s
option for restrictive laws on narcotics mandates member states to enforce the law with little or
no other option for policy modification towards a more liberal approach to narcotics control. As
Thoumi (2009:76) observes, many of these countries have flexibility towards stricter criminal
laws against illicit drugs, but no flexibility of modifying their narcotic laws toward a more liberal
policy option because of the dominant policy preference for the prohibition approach by the
global narcotics regime.
For many observers, the existing drug policy, particularly in the US, is ineffective and
misguided in many ways. In an article published in the New York Times titled “Drugs Won the
War,” Nicholas Kristof (2009)6 reflects on similar issues about the ineffectiveness of the war on
drugs. Kristof (2009) argues that since the war on drugs was declared about four decades ago,

6

This article was written by Nicholas Kristof and published in the June 14, 2009 edition of the New York Times.
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/opinion/14kristof.html, Retrieved 10/10/2010.
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trillions of dollars have been spent prosecuting the war, while victory seems illusive. For him,
the emphasis on criminalizing drugs has resulted in perpetuating three major social consequences
for the United States. First, the increasing proportion of the prison population in the US for
drugs felony charges alone is said to be nearly five times the world’s average. Husak (2002)
shares a similar claim and contends that the current drug laws in the US and abroad not only
created a personal suffering for families of jailed drug victims, but these conditions have also
increased the level of corruption within the law enforcement agencies as well as providing
incentives for organized criminal activities in many countries. In the US, for example, nearly half
a million drug offenders are currently languishing in jails, with this number accounting for more
than the total number of prisoners in 1980 alone, and more than the entire European Union (EU)
prison population (Husak, 2002).
According to Kristof (2009:1-3), the second major social consequence facing the United
States as a result of the drug war is that most criminals involved in narcotic drugs have been
engaged in other criminal activities such as money laundering, terrorism, rape, and murder. The
third social consequence is that there has been a steady increase in the overall cost of fighting the
drug war. For example, huge tax dollars are spent each year by the government on the drug war
in key areas such as interdiction, policing, prison expenses, and other aspects of law
enforcement. Besides the domestic cost of fighting the drug war, the US government also
provides huge financial aid packages in the form of expensive and sophisticated military
equipment (military helicopters) to Andean countries such as Colombia and Bolivia in their
collaborative efforts with the US on the global war on narcotics control (Kristof, 2009). For
example, Wyler (2009:5) reports that the US government has requested an amount of $15.1
billion for federal drug control programs for the 2010 fiscal year alone. Of the total amount, 41
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percent, or $6.2 billion has been requested for the United States’ efforts in international narcotics
control.
In reference to the Andean region, it is important to note that the region has for decades
been one of the major sources of supply of illicit drugs (cocaine, marijuana, and heroin) into the
US drug market (Drexler, 1997; Friesendorf, 2007). For some, the region represents the
“epicenter” regarding the external dimension of the war on drugs (Drexler, 1997; Friesendorf,
2007; Crandall, 2008). Following the importance of the region, as well as the importance of other
Latin American countries on the war on drugs, it is not surprising that these countries have for
many years taken center stage within the US on political discourses and debates on the drug war.
Although many successive governments and presidential candidates in the US have always
invoked the drug war metaphor for political support, especially during presidential campaigns as
previously noted, only a small fraction of success is often achieved in reducing the flow of these
drugs into the US (Bertram et al. 1996). For example, during one of his 1988 campaign speeches,
President George H.W. Bush said that “the cheapest and safest way to eradicate narcotics is to
destroy them at their source” (Andean region)…….We need to wipe out crops where they are
grown and take out labs wherever they exist.” Subsequent leaders have also made similar
pronouncements concerning narcotics control over the years with little or no successes (Bertram
et al. 1996:14).
A few scholars (Drexler, 1997; Hinojosa, 2007; Friesendorf, 2007; Crandall, 2008) have
examined narcotics control cooperation between the US and other Latin American countries such
as Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico. Drexler’s (1997) work, for example, provides an in depth
analysis of relations between the US and Colombia on narcotics control. For Drexler (1997), the
lack of effective narco-foreign policy by the US and Colombia can be explained by what he calls
20

the “clash of interests” between the US and Colombia on narcotics control policies. According to
Drexler (1997), the inability of the American policy makers to clearly understand Colombia and
the region as a whole created the ineffective narcotics policy formulation in both countries
towards each other. For instance, while the US government made clear its preferences and
insisted that the Colombian government devotes US foreign assistance exclusively to fighting the
war against narcotics, the Colombian government on the other hand, recognizes the problem of
violence, and not drugs, as the main threat to their national interest. This created what Drexler
calls the “clash of interests” between the US and the Colombian authorities (Drexler, 1997:159).
Drexler sums up the argument this way:
No two countries have harmed each other so severely while maintaining friendly governmental
relations as the United States and Colombia have done in buying and selling cocaine
(Drexler, 1997:1).

Another important part of the narcotics literature focuses on the global influence of the
US on narcotics control. Bewley-Taylor’s (1999a:5) work is among few in the literature that has
systematically examined the hegemonic role of the US in the evolution and maintenance of the
global narcotics regime since 19097 and the efforts by the US to expand its global reach and
crusade against illegal drugs. Within the broader literature on global narcotics control, few other
works have examined the increasing criticisms on the existing prohibition approach. For these
scholars (Nadelmann, 1990; Levine, 2003; Fazey, 2003; Bewley-Taylor, 2005; Bewley-Taylor
and Woodiwiss, 2005; Huggins, 2005),8 the continuous existence of the prohibition approach has

7

As noted in the introductory chapter, the first international meeting was held in 1909 in Shanghai, China, to discuss
the Chinese opium epidemic in terms of control. The United States was the main convener of the meeting. The
meeting laid the basic foundation for the international narcotics control regime.
8
Huggins’ (2005) work “Drug War Deadlock: The Policy Battle Continues” is an edited volume with a collection of
different perspectives regarding the debate on prohibition/criminalization and decriminalization and harm reduction.
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only succeeded in creating many incentives for the increasing trade and use of narcotic drugs
across the world. According to the 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on
international drug control policy, the illegal drug trade generates an average estimated global
proceeds ranging from about $100 billion to more than $1 trillion per year (Wyler, 2008:1).

Demand-Side of Narcotics Control
Unlike the supply-side approach, the demand-side control (harm reduction, harm
minimization, decriminalization, or legalization) focuses on decreasing the negative
consequences of drug use among addicts. The demand-side also provides treatment services for
addicts and other educational programs aimed at preventing drug use (Inciardi and Harrison,
2000). While the debate on the prohibition approach of narcotics control continues to take center
stage within the US narcotics policy domain, the drug control literature has seen an increase in
other scholarly works in recent times on alternative narcotic policy options, with emphasis on a
more liberal policy approach (demand-side approach) to narcotics control. New ideas on policy
solutions are constantly emerging on the drug policy agenda, with constant demands for policy
shift from the existing policy. For instance, many policy advocates, particularly those advancing
the demand-side option, have emerged alongside groups that continue to also favor the
prohibition approach. In fact, the ongoing campaign for policy alteration from prohibition
strategy towards a more permissive policy option is not new to some countries (Levine, 2003;
Ferraiolo, 2007).
Since the 1980s, for instance, the Netherlands has successfully administered a system that
has decriminalized the sale of cannabis in a regulated manner (Levine, 2003:150). Other
countries such as Switzerland, Canada, and Australia are also experimenting with the Dutch
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approach on a limited basis. Similarly, about fifteen states and Washington DC (see table 4.1) in
the US have enacted laws to allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes, such as pain relief
for nausea, cancer, and other forms of debilitating diseases (Ferraiolo, 2007). Although these
laws, as they currently stand, conflict with the existing US federal laws on narcotics control,
there are also some discussions on the economic benefits of legalizing marijuana in some key
states in the US. The state of California, for example, is one of the leading states where measures
are being considered for an outright legalization of marijuana for the purpose of raising tax
revenues as a way of coping with their budget and other economic problems confronting the state
in recent times. Although Proposition 19 (outright legalization of marijuana use) was defeated in
November 2010 elections, many advocates of the Proposition argue that the state of California
could have mobilized close to $1.4 billion in taxes if marijuana were legalized.9
In a similar claim, Elliott and colleagues made a case for decriminalizing illicit drugs
from a cultural perspective. For these authors, the use of all kinds of drugs that have now been
criminalized has not been a problem for traditional native systems such as Bolivia, where the
livelihood of many people have always centered on the chewing of coca leaves for many
generations. For them, harm reduction intervention should be aimed at promoting easier access
to care and support for drug addicts (Elliott et al. 2005:109-110). In a related argument, Husak
(2002) finds it very problematic when illicit drugs continue to take the center stage, while many
people die each year from tobacco smoking and the use of other tobacco products as compared to
illicit drugs.
As many tobacco control scholars (Studlar, 2002; Mamudu, 2005; Asare, 2007; Cairney,
2009) indicate, millions of people die each year from cigarette smoking and the consumption of
9

New York Times, July 29th 2010 Edition:
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/m/marijuana/index.html Retrieve on 10/15/10.
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other tobacco products rather than from illicit drugs. In fact, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) reports that “more deaths are caused each year by tobacco use than by all
deaths from human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), illegal drug use, alcohol use, motor vehicle
injuries, suicides, and murders combined.”10 The CDC also notes that cigarettes smoking,
including the exposure to second hand smoke, are responsible for about 443,000 deaths (one in
every five deaths) each year in the US.11 Although restrictive regulatory policies exist in many
advanced industrialized countries and some developing ones to reduce the incidence of tobacco
smoking, the use of tobacco products has not been criminalized or prohibited as the case with
illegal drugs, irrespective of the high annual increase in tobacco-related deaths. For many prochange advocacy groups and individuals, it is incomprehensible and ironic why illegal drugs
should not be treated in the same way as tobacco products. Nadelmann (2006),12 however, shares
a different interpretation on the tobacco debate. For him, the recognition of the dangers of
smoking as reflected in a recent nation-wide poll (Zogby International), where about 57 percent
of Americans between the ages 18 to 29 favor making cigarettes smoking prohibited within the
next five to ten years, appears revealing and may create some problems in the long term. From
Nadelmann’s (2006) perspective, keeping tobacco legal is perhaps the best policy option because
any attempt to prohibit tobacco products might end up becoming like the current ineffective and
fragmented illicit drug policy.

10

The overview page of CDC website contains this information.
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_related_mortality/index.htm
Retrieved on 1/28/2012. Also see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. How Tobacco Smoke Causes
Disease: The Biology and Behavioral Basis for Smoking-Attributable Disease: A Report of the Surgeon General.
Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 2010.
11
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and
Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 2008; 57 (45):1226–8).
12
This article was published in the Huffingtonpost.com (2006). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ethannadelmann/keep-cigarettes-legal_b_32477.html Retrieved on 10/15/10.
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As we have discussed thus far, it is clear from the preceding review of the literature that
the broad trend of the scholarly works have largely addressed the inability of the existing
prohibition policy to effectively control the production, trafficking, and use of narcotic drugs.
Although most of these works tend to favor a shift in policy towards a more liberal approach, it
must be noted that a few other works have addressed the need to maintain the existing narcotics
prohibition policy. In the next few pages, I will attempt to briefly examine some of these
arguments.
Most of the key federal agencies in narcotics control in the US such as the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Justice Department, Bureau of International Narcotics at the
State Department, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy and other agencies involved in
narcotics policymaking are among the strongest advocates for maintaining the existing
prohibition strategy. In a recent report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to the US
Congress, Liana Wyler (2008), the principal author, raised some critical issues as a response to
some of the criticisms leveled against the prohibition approach and the increasing push to
legalize narcotic drugs. For Wyler (2008:30-36), legalizing illicit drugs could lead to several
negative consequences that may outweigh many of the positive gains that have been achieved
with the existing prohibition policy. For example, the possibility of an increase in the demand for
and use of illicit drugs as well as the level of addiction will be extremely high when narcotic
drugs are legalized. Besides, the unrestricted access to these drugs by way of legalizing them will
undoubtedly increase many societal problems such as gang violence, murder, armed robbery,
money laundering, rape, terrorism and other problems associated with narcotic drugs. It is also
likely to reduce the perception of the social and health risk factors associated with drug abuse.
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As Wyler (2008:30-36) and other scholars (Bennett, 2005; Wilson, 2005; Walters, 2005)
indicate, there are critical and complex regulatory and legislative issues that might create serious
problems if narcotic drugs are legalized. Some of the critical concerns, for instance, involve
fundamental questions such as: What type of narcotic drugs need to be decriminalized and where
will these drugs be bought and sold? There is also the concern about whether the production and
distribution of the ‘legalized’ drugs will be under private or government control. Another area of
worry is the kind of regulatory, quality control, and safety measures that will be adopted after
these drugs are legalized. There is also a concern about whether these drugs could be taxed or
not.
The debate13 over whether drug use has generally been on the increase or decrease,
particularly in the US, has also been part of the broader discourse on narcotics control.
Establishing the trends of decrease in narcotics use is extremely important to many of the federal
agencies in order to continue to make the case for the prohibition policy strategy. A 2011 policy
statement, Successes in the Fight Against Drugs (2000 through 2010), by the DEA indicates that
marijuana use among American teenagers has dropped by 9 percent while the use of
methamphetamine fell by about 60 percent from 2000 to 2010. During the same period, the
report indicates that cocaine use among high school seniors dropped by 38 percent, while crack
cocaine use also decreased by 30 percent during the same period under review. In addition, drug
use in the work place remains at one of the lowest levels in more than 20 years, according to the
report. Besides, the level of positive drug tests in many work places have fallen from 13.6
percent in 1988 to 3.6 percent in 2010. Similarly, cocaine use in the American work place has

13

DEA report on the “successes in the fight against drugs, impact on demand from 1999-2009” claims with
supporting evidence that drug use has generally been on the decrease.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/success_in_fight_against_drugs.pdf Retrieved 08/10/11.
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declined from unprecedented figure of 68 percent between 2006 and 2010. The data also reveals
that marijuana use in the workplace decreased by 12.5 percent in 2010 as compared the year
2006.14
Overall, it is clear from the preceding discussion that two main narcotics control
perspectives dominate the literature: the prohibition strategy of narcotics control (supply-side)
and decriminalization (demand-side) of narcotics control. The review of the literature also
reveals that quite a number of scholarly works show unchanging trends of the US narcotics
policy from the prohibition option over time. As noted in chapter one, whether policy change is
occurring or not is an empirical question that needs to be explored. Simply put, is policy change
occurring within the US narcotics policy domain? To better answer this question, it is extremely
important to first lay out the theoretical framework to help explain and understand the main
research questions of the study. In essence, the next section will examine the main theories
(agenda-setting, partisan ideology, orders of change, and regime theory) underlying this study.

Overview of Policy Change Theories
The theoretical field of public policy has advanced considerably within the past few years
following the development of major theoretical concepts and models in explaining the
policymaking process. Similar to other political systems, public policymaking in pluralistic
political systems, such as in the United States is not only complex, but a very difficult process
(John, 2003). In view of this complexity, John (2003) observes that many policy scholars have
always faced a daunting intellectual task of constructing parsimonious theories that can fully
explain the complexities of the policy process. Nevertheless, some scholars have developed
14
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major policy theories such as the Stages Model (Lasswell, 1956; Jones, 1970), Agenda-Setting
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier and JenkinsSmith (1993), Multiple Streams Approach (Kingdon, 1995), and Policy Paradigm Change (Hall,
1993) in explaining the policymaking process.
Generally, theories are very important conceptual tools that help scholars to reduce the
complexities of a phenomenon for better understanding of the specific area of study (Robinson et
al. 2004; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Lowry, 2006). According to John (2003), theories are
based on verifiable claims of human actions, interactions, and power relationships that seek to
provide coherent and consistent explanations for a given phenomenon. The same logic permeates
the field of policy science research as scholars seek to understand why, for example, policies
change or stay stable over time (John, 2003:482). As previously mentioned, public policies are
dynamic and change over time, but why change occurs is the subject of many empirical studies
in the political science literature (Lowry, 2006).
Similar to the accumulation of any scientific knowledge in other fields of discipline, the
more recent theories of the policy process are grounded in the previous scholarly works in the
field of political science. For example, the stages or heuristic model is one of the earlier theories
employed by political scientists to understand the policymaking process. As Sabatier (2007:6-7)
observes, the stages model has dominated the field in explaining the steps of the policymaking
process before the mid-1980s. The model, which was advanced by scholars such as Lasswell
(1956), Jones (1970), Anderson (1975) and Brewer and deLeon (1983),15 basically describes the
policy process as a discrete system of stages or cycles. These stages generally include: agenda
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The reference to the early work of scholars of the stages model was quoted in Sabatier’s (2007) edited volume
(Theories of the Policy Process).
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setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation, and evaluation. Each stage has become
the focus of different research agendas over the years (Sabatier, 2007).
While the stages model has provided a useful theoretical grounding for recent policy
theories, as previously mentioned, it is important to indicate what distinguishes the more recent
theories from the stages model. First, unlike the stages model, which focuses on analyzing the
policy process from a linear perspective, the more recent theories such as the ACF, Punctuated
Equilibrium (PE), Multiple Streams, Orders of Change, among others, seek to understand the
policymaking process from a fluid perspective. Second, the more recent theories, particularly the
Punctuated Equilibrium concept of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) integrate both incremental and
non-incremental elements in their theoretical concept in explaining policy stability and change
over time and space. This marks another important difference between the stages model and the
new policy theories. In fact, the concept of incrementalism is an important one in the policy
literature (Lowry, 2006). Borrowing the ideas of Lindblom (1959) and Wildavsky (1964),16
Robinson et al. (2004) argue that incrementalism is a gradual change that occurs to a given
policy, especially with budget allocations. Based on similar ideas, Breunig and Koski (2006:366)
share Padgett’s (1980) view that incrementalism involves a marginal change in policy outcomes
that are relative to some base policy. Non-incremental change or a third order change (Hall,
1993) involves a radical change to a stable (equilibrium) policy process (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993).
Clearly, the concept of policy change in terms of incremental and non-incremental is
central to the study of policy dynamics. For Mintrom and Vergari (1996:420), policy change
either explicitly or implicitly takes the center stage in the discussion of major theories of the
16

The reference to the early works of Lindblom and Wildavsky on incrementalism was quoted in Robinson et al.
(2004) “Explaining Policy Punctuations: Bureaucratization and Budget Change.” p:140.

29

policy process. For them, many scholarly works in the field have specifically addressed
important theoretical questions on the conceptual definition of policy change, how it occurs, as
well as who often constitutes the drivers of these changes.
For this study, I draw on the broad definitions of policy change by Capano and Howlett
(2009), and Studlar (2009). For Capano and Howlett (2009:3), policy change means “something
(policy) inherited from the past that has undergone transformation.” Likewise, Studlar (2009:73)
defines policy change as “the movement of policy over time.” The interpretation of these
definitions suggests that public policies evolve, persist, and change over time depending on the
factors that drive these changes. Similar ideas on policy change as involving the shifting nature
of policy over time are shared by Hall (1993), Cairney (2007a), Skogstad (2009), Howlett and
Ramesh (2002), Schmidt and Radaelli (2004) and Givel (2010).
While considerable literature exists on the theoretical explanation of policy change, only
a handful of studies have specifically examined policy change within the context of
regulatory/prohibited control policies such as tobacco control (Studlar, 2009; Cairney, 2007),
alcohol prohibition (Schrad, 2010), and illicit drug control policy (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993:152). Few studies have also examined the dynamics of the policy process within the
context of policy change and the US narcotics policy. In his book The Politics of Sin: Drugs,
Alcohol and Public Policy, Meier (1994) examines the policy process by investigating the
politics of morality policymaking in the US, but with focus on drug and alcohol policies.
Excluding tobacco control policy, the author discusses the politics of narcotics and alcohol
policy change over time. Meier’s (1994) work is one of the few that has systematically examined
the competing domestic forces (political, economic, social, and cultural) that shape the politics of
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drug and alcohol policymaking in the US. This work is particularly significant to my study for
two reasons.
First, my work draws on this study in terms of the domestic forces (political and
economic) and other players involved in the politics of narcotics policymaking in the US and
how their actions shape policy change. Second, my work extends his study by examining how
domestic forces drive or resist narcotics policy change. Broadly, Meier (1994) concludes, among
others, that the US narcotics policy adoption and change is largely driven by political reasons.
Sharp’s (1994) study, which examines the US narcotics policy through the theoretical lens of
Kingdon’s (1984) three streams concept, also provide a useful theoretical grounding to this
study. Although Manderson‘s (1993) work falls within the broader literature on policy change
and narcotics policy, his work is still useful because of its comparative analysis of narcotics
prohibition in Australia and other advanced industrialized countries. A few other useful works
are Erlen and Spillane (2004),17 and Musto (1999), which focused on the narcotics policy process
from a historical perspective. Having laid out the broad theoretical background for the study, my
next task is to examine each theory in detail and outline how they might best explain the
dynamics of the US narcotics policy change over time.

Agenda-Setting Theory
McLendon (2003:482) defines agenda-setting theory as the process by which an issue
moves from relative obscurity to become a priority issue as a result of a serious attention being
given to the issue by political actors in a policy process. Studlar (2002:65) however reminds
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Erlen and Spillane (2004) is an edited work, with contributions from other scholars with the general trend showing
the evolutionary process of the US federal drug control policy.
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scholars to distinguish between agenda setting as a stage, which involves the process by which
political actors address policy issues from agenda-setting theory, which basically explains why
governments act as they normally do on policy issues. As many scholars (Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993; McLendon, 2003; Studlar, 2002; Sinclair, 1986) share, the centrality of key
questions such as how issues become issues, how issues are usually defined and redefined, how
they gain prominence, and how they change over time underline agenda-setting theory.
Essentially, scholarly works on agenda -setting research tend to manifest in many forms
and varieties. Most studies follow a longitudinal research design with the purpose of determining
the rise and fall of policy issues or trends of change over time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:4647; Pralle, 2006:987). Considering the different varieties of the theory, my discussion of agendasetting in this study will focus on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) version of agenda-setting
theory-punctuated equilibrium-with further application of conceptual models such as issue
definition/redefinition,venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship to explain the dynamics of the
US narcotics policy change in chapters three and four.
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) introduced the concept of punctuated equilibrium to the
political science literature in the early 1990s. Drawing on the biological theory of punctuated
equilibrium (Givel, 2010), the model integrates insight from the agenda-setting literature with
elements of incrementalism and institutional theory to develop a conceptual framework capable
of explaining both stability and change in the American policymaking system (Mortensen, 2007).
Although some other major theories exist in the field, the last ten years has seen numerous
scholarly works that have employed the PE theory as a useful theoretical concept to study many
policy areas (John, 2003). The central argument of the PE theory states that the American
policymaking process is characterized by a long stability of policy, often interrupted by a sudden
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or a brief burst, which create the avenue for changes in policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993,
Jones and Baumgartner, 2005, Jones, Baumgartner and True, 1998).
For Baumgartner and Jones (1993:5-7), the American government structure is highly
disaggregated among policy subsystems, with public policy outcomes the result of many actors
and interests who tend to oppose each other. Quite simply, the PE theory seeks to account for
both long periods of stability and short but violent periods of change in the policymaking process
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True, Jones and Baumgartner, 2007). Although the theory is
primarily grounded in the American pluralistic political system, it has been applied to nonAmerican political systems, with some findings consistent with the theory while others appear
inconsistent (Howlett, 1999; Soroka, 1999). Nevertheless, quite a number of scholars (Bressers
and Lulofs, 2009; Mortensen, 2007; Worsham, 2006; John, 2003) share the view that the PE
theory is distinguished from other policy theories because of its power to explain stability and
change in a given policy process. However, the key puzzle that has engaged the attention of
scholars is to understand how policy change occurs and the role that actors (political parties and
interest groups) play within the broad system of the policy process in shaping change. Perhaps
the dynamics of the subsystem politics may provide some explanation of why and how these
policy changes occur.

Subsystem Dynamics and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
One of the theoretical pillars through which Baumgartner and Jones (1993) discussed the
workings of their model is through the subsystem politics. The literature on subsystem politics is
vast and complex, and certainly beyond the scope of this study. However, I will broadly discuss
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subsystem politics through the lens of the PE theory and its applicability to narcotics policy
change in the US.
Drawing on the ideas of Thurber (1991) and Meier (1985),18 Baumgartner and Jones
(1993:6) contend that the policymaking process centers on decision-making systems that are
organized around specific programs and policy issue areas. These policy issue areas are often
characterized by a single dominant interest, group of interests, or policy entrepreneurs,19 with the
goal of establishing a system of monopoly (subsystem) in a policy area. In other words, the
underlying idea of subsystem politics rests on the assumption of a system that is characterized by
struggle for influence and control within a complex policy environment, with different actors and
interests. For Worsham (1997: 1), a subsystem emerges as a solution to the complex nature of the
American policymaking process where the display of “action” politics takes place.
Broadly, the subsystem, as noted, is characterized by a system where policy monopolies
are regularly constructed and destroyed because of the desire by each monopoly to dominate the
system through strong institutional structures and policy ideas.

In most cases, policy

monopolies, in an attempt to protect their turf or territory, restrict opposing interest groups and
other actors in gaining access into the subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; McCool,
1998; Worsham, 1998; Givel, 2006; Mortensen, 2007). For Givel (2006), one of the ways that
policy monopolies dominate the subsystem is to use resources such as lobbying, litigation, and
other mechanisms to prevent change from occurring within the system. Baumgartner and Jones
(1993) describe the systemic maintenance of the system as a negative feedback mechanism that
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These scholars’ ideas on subsystems were cited by Baumgartner and Jones (1993:6).
Mintrom and Vergari (1996:422) define policy entrepreneurs as policy advocates who undertake specific actions
and perform certain key roles that affect the policymaking process as business entrepreneurs do for the market place.
In essence, their main goal is to design new ideas, push for these ideas for radical policy change to occur.
19
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operates as a self-correcting system with institutional arrangements that favors the preservation
of the status quo. However, when external pressure is exerted for change on the negative
feedback system, the system reacts to such forces by making incremental policy adjustments
(Worsham, 2006:438; Robinson et al, 2007; John, 2003). Besides, Baumgartner and Jones
(1993:16) argue that issue redefinition and expansion to previously disinterested members also
create avenues for policy changes.
On the other hand, positive feedback occurs as a result of an escalation of change
occurring within the system due to major outside forces or critical junctures, which create the
avenue for a major policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Robinson et al. 2007). In fact,
Brisbin and Hunter (2007)20 made a similar observation on how policy punctuations and critical
junctures create policy revision or change. For them, besides policy punctuations and critical
junctures, policy change also occurs as a result of long policy conflicts and accumulated negative
feedback processes, which create a window of opportunity for policy revisions to stable policies.
Building on the ideas of policy punctuations, critical junctures, and the psychological models of
decision making, Brisbin and Hunter (2007) proposed a theoretical concept of panic
policymaking21 to explain policy change. For Brisbin and Hunter (2007:2), policy change in the
contest of panic policymaking occurs within a short time limit as a result of decisions often made
through urgent or panic situations.
Worsham (1997:3-6; 1998) has also advanced the field of subsystem politics by
identifying three main typologies of the subsystem (dominant, transitory, and competitive). For
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Brisbin and Hunter’s argument is made in a paper presented on the topic “Panic Policymaking: Canine Breed Bans
in Canada and the United States” at the 2007 Western Political Science Association Conference, Las Vergas, 2007
21
Brisbin and Hunter (2007) define panic policymaking as the “speedy creation of new laws and regulations or new
duties for governmental and private institutions in a situation of sudden, unreasoning, and excessive fear and anger.”
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him, the dominant system resembles the iron triangles, while the transitory system is fluid, where
dominant coalition members do break up into different interests. The competitive system
comprises new coalitions capable of challenging the existing policy monopolies and the
institutionalized ideas and dominant groups within the subsystem (Worsham, 1997; Givel 2006).
Drawing on the logic of the PE theory in explaining subsystem variations, Worsham (1997:7-8)
contends that if policy monopolies are formed as a result of strong institutionalized structures
and powerful supporting ideas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), it is likely that one can also
explain subsystem change by identifying the challenges to the institutional structure(s) and the
underlying idea(s) to the system for policy change. Worsham (1997) concludes his study by
arguing that the American subsystem politics, particularly the financial subsystem since the
1990s, depicts the nature of a wavering equilibrium (a concept that distinguishes between three
types of subsystem politics) rather than a punctuated equilibrium.
Undoubtedly, subsystem politics, as most scholars (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993;
Worsham, 1997; Givel, 2006) agree, is characterized by the politics of influence and control. The
competitive system identified by Worsham (1997), appears to dominate most contested policy
areas such as narcotic and tobacco control policies. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, 1993) also
advanced the study of subsystem politics with their theory of Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF). As earlier noted, this study does not intend to test the validity of the ACF with this
research project. It is certainly beyond the scope of this study. However, the ACF is still useful
and will broadly and briefly be discussed within the concept of the subsystem politics to
understand the nature of the US narcotics policy subsystem.
Grounded in the pluralist system of policymaking, the ACF assumes that policy making
and change are the result of the interactions among key policy actors, interest groups, political
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parties, and government agencies within a given subsystem. The model identifies belief systems
that are categorized into deep core and policy core within a subsystem. For Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1999), coalitions are often organized on the basis of dominant and minority
groups, with the objective of dislodging the status quo interest, while others seek to maintain the
status quo (Birkland, 1997:135).
Applying the ACF model to the US narcotics policy, it is apparent that the dominant
actors are the pro-prohibitionist groups whose objective is to keep the status quo prohibition
policy in place with limited change or no change at all to the existing policy. Baumgartner and
Jones (1993:154) identify the federal narcotics enforcement agencies as the dominant coalitions
within the US narcotics policy subsystem. These groups have for a long time dominated the
system with strong established institutions and policy ideas based on the prohibition model of
narcotics control. Outside interest groups with links to the dominant coalition groups in the
subsystem also help to preserve the status quo policy. Natural allies of the federal drug
enforcement agencies such as the Anti-Saloon League (ASL) and the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union (WCTU) have been very active in past years in their efforts to preserve the
existing narcotics prohibition model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). As Sabatier and JenkinsSmith (1999) observe, groups with deep core beliefs about the system find it difficult in most
cases to affect major policy changes to the system.
On other hand, the minority coalitions are the reformist groups such as many policy
advocacy groups, think tanks, and policy entrepreneurs whose primary objectives are to shape
policy change. In the case of US narcotics policy, anti-prohibition policy advocacy organizations
such as the Drug Policy Alliance, Marijuana Policy Project, Law Enforcement Against
Prohibition, and the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation constitute the main minority coalition
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groups involved in shaping the existing prohibition policy towards a more public health approach
to narcotics control.
As revealed in the analysis of the subsystem and PE concepts, a radical policy change can
occur when exogenous forces impact the subsystem, thereby creating a window of opportunity
(Kingdon, 1984) for other coalitions to influence policy change. Similarly, changes can also
occur as a result of a focusing event.22 For example, Birkland (1997) argues that pro-change
groups often use a focusing event to elevate their issues into the policy agenda. However, this
study assumes that it may be extremely difficult for a focusing event to occur within the
narcotics policy domain, unlike other policy areas such as energy, health, and transportation. It is
unlikely that a sudden change in the form of a focusing event might occur with the narcotics
policy to warrant a drastic policy change to the existing policy. Perhaps the relentless efforts by
some of these pro-change advocacy groups (national and transnational) might be the effective
channel through which the existing prohibition policy regime will experience a drastic change. In
fact, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) study has examined the important role of transnational advocacy
networks in shaping global policy change. Policy change is more likely to be driven by these
advocacy networks because of their concerted efforts, shared ideas, values, and the common
goals and strategies they often employ to effect policy change. This is equally true for the
domestic advocacy groups, particularly those in the narcotics policy domain whose objective is
also to affect policy change.
The preceding analyses of the PE theory and the subsystem politics have clearly shown
that these concepts could explain the dynamics of the US narcotics policy change from a broader
perspective. While this broader perspective might be useful to some extent, one could argue that
22
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the concepts of issue definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship, which
constitute an important framework of the agenda-setting theory, might offer a better explanation
for the US narcotics policy change over time. The next section will examine these concepts and
their theoretical usefulness in shaping the US narcotics policy change.

Issue Definition/Venue Shifting and Policy Entrepreneurship
For students of agenda-setting theory, the concepts of issue definition/redefinition, venue
shifting, and policy entrepreneurship are crucial in understanding the dynamics of policy change
within the broader theoretical framework of agenda-setting (Howlett, 1997; Studlar, 2002; Pralle,
2006; Princen, 2007). Baumgartner and Jones (1993:23) define issue definition as a purposeful
process by which political leaders accomplish certain goals and objectives. In their book: The
Politics of Problem Definition in Shaping the Policy Agenda, Rochefort and Cobb (1994) argue
that problem definition has to do with what the public and political leaders choose to identify as
public issues and how people generally think and talk about those issues. As Baumgartner and
Jones (1993) put it, issues are defined and redefined through the construction of policy
monopolies and the destruction of other monopolies.
As revealed in the discussion on subsystem politics, the overriding goal of a policy
monopoly is to dominate the policy subsystem with their ideas and institutional frameworks to
sustain the system, while others with alternative ideas and interests also strive to infiltrate the
system with their issues and ideas. In fact, the system can either be sustained or changed based
on how an issue is defined or redefined, and more importantly, how an issue can be expanded to
previously disinterested groups (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2006). Recounting
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Schattschneider’s (1960)23 idea on the enlargement of political conflicts and policy change,
Baumgartner and Jones (1993:11) share a similar view that the essence of political conflict does
not only facilitate the scope of participation, but in most cases, contentious policy issues have
always attracted more disinterested people than those closely involved with the issue. This is
equally true for the existing narcotics prohibition policy. Applying this concept to the broad
narcotics policy process, it is clear that the US narcotics policy issue has been defined and
redefined from many perspectives over the years. The third and fourth chapters will examine the
details of this argument with evidence to support the theoretical significance of issue
definition/redefinition to this study.
Venue shopping or shifting is another concept within the broader agenda-setting theory
that explains the dynamics of policy change. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993:32),
“policy venues are the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning
a given issue.” For Pralle (2006:172), venue shopping entails the search for alternative policy
arenas by policy entrepreneurs with the purpose of moving decision-making authority to new
venues. In a similar study, Pralle (2003) contends that advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs
choose venues not only for the purpose of a short-term strategic interest, but for their new
understanding of an old issue, with the possibility of affecting change on the issue.
As Pralle (2006, 2003) observes, venue shopping, which is intertwined with issue
redefinition and policy entrepreneurship within the broad framework of agenda-setting, is
significant for understanding the policy process from two main perspectives. First, a vital aspect
of venue shifting also involves a redefinition of the image of an issue. Second, venue shopping
has become an essential driving force for policy change. In the narcotics policy case, for
23
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example, the evidence of venue shifting in explaining policy change was evident in the
successful change in venue of the medical marijuana issue to the state level following the
introduction of the ballot initiative in some parts of the US in the early 1990s (see Chapter four).
Similarly, policy entrepreneurship also constitutes another important concept within the
broad agenda-setting theory in explaining policy change. In Studlar’s (2002:180) terms, political
or policy entrepreneurship is “the ability to take advantage of circumstances to push an issue
onto the public and government agenda.” For Mintrom and Vergari (1996:422), policy
entrepreneurs undertake specific actions and perform certain key roles that affect the
policymaking process as business entrepreneurs also do for the market place. Like the business
entrepreneur, the policy entrepreneur is often willing to invest their resources, time, reputation,
energy, and money for a window of opportunity to be opened for the promotion of a policy
change (Kingdon, 1984; Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Crow, 2010).
In fact, Kingdon (1984) has not only pioneered the use of the term policy entrepreneurs,
(Mintrom and Norman, 2009) in his theoretical concept of multiple streams, but has also
discussed the importance and the role of these entrepreneurs in pushing their “pet projects” or
favored policy solutions onto the central agenda for action. More recently, other scholarly works
(Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Bakir, 2009; Crow, 2010) have shown the importance of policy
entrepreneurs as vital agents in promoting policy change. Besides individual policy
entrepreneurs, groups, as Crow (2010:301) argues, have also been shown to have the ability to
act as entrepreneurs due to their size, resources, and political influence in shaping policy change.
Clearly, the concept of policy entrepreneurship provides a theoretical utility in explaining the
dynamics of US narcotics policy change (see chapter four) over time. In fact, the role of
individual policy entrepreneurs, such as George Soros, Montel Williams, Ethan Nadelmann, and
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the recently instituted Global Commissioners on Drug Policy (see appendix six) with the purpose
of shaping the US and the global narcotics policy are good examples.
The preceding analysis clearly suggests that the agenda-setting theory with the
punctuated equilibrium version can be widely applicable to study the narcotics policy process.
More importantly, the specific versions of issue definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and
policy entrepreneurship provide a better explanatory power for the US narcotics policy change
over time (see chapters three and four). Yet still it is apparent through the reviewed literature
that the US narcotics policy has undergone changes in the levels of attention on systemic and
institutional agendas24since the 1900s. For example, the narcotics issue, according to
Baumgartner and Jones (1993:153-160), were not a primary concern for the media during the
first few years of the twentieth century. While some level of attention (systematic and
institutional) occurred in the 1930s, 40s, and 1950s, it was not until the mid-1960s to the early
1970s that the drug issue surged in public attention, particularly in the media, as a result of the
increasing use of narcotics, the role of Anslinger and enforcement agencies, and Nixon’s socalled declaration of war on drugs in the early 1970s (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Sharp,
1991).
In view of this, the question of whether similar changes are occurring to the narcotics
policy since 1993 is of interest to the scope of the study. As previously noted, the key question
this study seeks to explore is whether change is occurring with the US narcotics policy in terms
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Systemic (public or media) agenda involves the domain of the general public, where policy issues are discussed
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is where policy problems are given serious attention by decision makers (Cobb, Keith-Ross & Ross, 1976:1-2;
Anderson, 2003).

42

of nature, type, and scope. In essence, the two main hypotheses that emerge based on the
examined theories are:


The scope of the US narcotics policy has widened and is undergoing incremental policy
change.



The rise of drug liberalization advocacy groups/policy entrepreneurs has led to changes
in the US narcotics policy since the 1990s, particularly at the state level.

Partisan Ideology
Partisan ideology is another theoretical concept that has been used to explain policy
outcomes (Stratmann, 2000; Imbeau et al. 2001; Wright and Schaffner, 2002; Studlar, 2005),
hence its possibility of explaining the US narcotics policy outcomes. As Wright and Schaffner
(2002) have observed, political parties are widely considered as necessary for a modern
democratic system of government. Unquestionably, political parties are rooted and clearly
distinguished by their stable ideological orientations or system of beliefs and principles that
permeate the very wide spectrum of policy issues. In most cases, political elites tend to reflect
their partisan ideology either through their voting records, policy actions, or policy inactions
(Stratmann, 2000; McCarthy el at. 2006).
Although there are considerable variations in liberal and conservative positions within the
Democratic and Republican parties (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984) in the US political system, it is
apparent that Democrats are generally liberal in their ideological orientation while Republicans
are generally conservative in theirs (Entman, 1983; Schmidt, 1996; McCarthy el at. 2006). For
McCarthy et al. (2006:1), the ideological divide between Democratic and Republican parties
have, over the past years, made them desert the political center in favor of their extreme wings
(left or right).
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While partisan ideology appears to be widely applicable in explaining differences and
similarities in policy outcomes, Studlar (2002: 72) contends that there is no uniformity of
opinion among scholars on how policy outcomes are shaped by partisan ideology. As Studlar
(2002) argues, students of policy legacy theory (Rose and Davies, 1994; Rose, 1990) share the
assumption that new policy outcomes are largely driven by policy inheritances (past policies).
The interpretation of this assumption is simple. Most policies are inherited by new governments,
who in most cases continue with the policies of the past government without often making huge
changes to the existing policies. Although this argument is useful to the broader theoretical
policy debate, many scholarly works (Entman, 1983; Schmidt, 1996; Imbeau et al. 2001;
Stratmann, 2000; Studlar, 2002; 2005) have also shown with convincing evidence that policy
outcomes are sometimes driven by partisan ideology. This has clearly been evident in the case of
the US narcotics policy process over time. For example, while the Republican ideological
approach has tendencies towards a more restrictive or dominant prohibition approach (emphasis
on law enforcement) the Democratic ideology has tendencies towards a more permissive policy
approach (emphasis on treatment and public health) to narcotics control (see chapters three and
four).
Although some minor variations do occur over time and space within the two parties, in
principle, the strict ideological division on narcotics control remains intact (Bertram et
al.1996:140-141). In view of this theoretical analysis, this study hypothesizes that:


Democrat presidents and legislators (Congress) are more willing to effect changes to the
existing narcotics policy away from the strict prohibition policy regime than Republican
presidents and legislators.
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Policy Paradigm Theory (Orders of Change)
This section examines Hall’s (1993) theory of policy paradigm change (orders of change)
in understanding the dynamics of change within the narcotics policy process. Hall’s (1993)
theory has gained momentum in recent years following the way in which the theory has shaped
the thinking of the policy literature (Howlett and Ramesh, 2002:33; Breton et al. 2008:353;
Skogstad, 2009:94). Quite a number of studies (Capano, 2003, 2009; Howlett and Ramesh, 2002;
Skogstad, 2009, Studlar, 2009; Cashore and Howlett, 2007; Hausermann, 2009) have applied
Hall’s concept to study different policy sectors. Similarly, my study draws on these works,
particularly on Hall’s (1993) theoretical ideas to explain change within the US narcotics policy.
The central argument of Hall’s theory is that policy change occurs in stages or orders.
Hall (1993:281-285) conceptualized the policy change process into a typology of first order,
second order, and third order changes. For Hall (1993:278), the policymaking process involves
three fundamental components:
(a) The overall goals of a policy.
(b) The techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals.
(c) The precise settings of the policy instruments.
For example, “if the goal of the policy is to alleviate the financial problems of the elderly, the
chosen instrument might be an old age pension, and its setting would be at the level at which
benefits were set” (Hall,1993:278). Hall’s (1993) argument rests on the basic idea that change
can best be understood when each component parts of a policy (policy goals, policy instruments,
and the settings of policy instruments) are separately examined. In fact, Capano and Howlett
(2009) have advanced Hall’s (1993) conceptual ideas and termed it policy compartmentalization.
For them, the policy process is complex and multi-dimensional, and what actually change in a
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policy is not simple the policy as a whole, but it is the specific component parts of a policy that
experience the change.
According to the concept, first order change in policy occurs when the settings of a policy
instrument changes. In other words, first order change occurs when the settings of an existing
policy instrument are adjusted to attain some specific set of policy targets. In most cases, these
changes are incremental (Lindblom, 1959) in nature. For example, changes in the annual
budgets, personnel, or minimal severity in punishment regarding a particular narcotic prohibition
laws. Besides, a change to increase the safety or emission requirement for an automobile
manufacturer is another good example of a first order policy change (Cashore and Howlett,
2007:535). While these changes occur to the settings of the policy instrument, the policy goals
and the policy instrument itself generally remain unchanged. For Hall (1993:278-281), internal
bureaucratic experts, with minimal or no external influence, constitute the main driving force for
the occurrence of a first order change in policy.
A second order change involves an alteration to the priority of a policy instrument. This
process of change can also involve the introduction of a new policy instrument. In essence, the
policy instrument is what actually experiences the change in a second order change in policy. In
other cases, an innovative priority could be made to the existing policy or a new instrument
added during the process of a second order change. An example that Cashore and Howlett (2007)
provide to illustrate the occurrence a second order change is again useful here. For instance, a
change from one policy instrument of an administered emission standard to another instrument
of an emission tax may constitute a second order change in policy (Cashore and Howlett, 2007).
In the case of narcotics policy, a shift in policy instrument towards a more restrictive policy
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option or towards a more permissive policy approach demonstrate a clear evidence of a second
order change in policy (see chapters three and four).
It must also be noted that while changes occur to policy instruments during a second
order change, the overall policy goals generally remain unchanged. In terms of the factors that
often ignite these changes, Hall (1993) argues that a second order change might occur as a result
of a general dissatisfaction with an existing policy instrument. In addition, the external influence
of key policy advocates such as bureaucratic experts with a strong leaning for a policy change,
particularly in the executive branch of government, could facilitate and drive a second order
change in policy.
A third order change involves a major paradigm change or a radical shift in a policy
(Hall, 1993; Studlar, 2009; Breton et al.2008). From Hall’s (1993) conceptualization, a third
order change occurs with concurrent changes to all the three component parts (settings of policy
instruments, policy instruments, and policy goals) of a given policy. According to Hall (1993),
the radical change from Keynesianism to monetarism as a system of economic policymaking in
Great Britain during the 1970s and 1980s clearly demonstrate a very good case in point. While
the existing US narcotics policy is yet to experience any evidence of a third order change (see
chapter four and five), the dramatic change of tobacco policy from agriculture and economic
policy domain, to public health and regulatory policy subject (Studlar, 2009), is a very good case
in point of a third order change in policy.
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Table 2.1
Hall’s Theoretical Typology of Policy Change
Orders of Change
Description of Change
First Order Change: Change occurs in the settings of the policy instruments. The decision
making process is routine and happens from the experiences of bureaucratic officials with new
knowledge and ideas. External influence is limited in the decision making process.
Second Order Change: Change in the priority of the policy instruments (policy tools) with
the introduction of new policy instruments. Policy instruments are often altered in response to
past experiences, new knowledge and ideas, or for strategic reasons, but within the same
policy goals.
Third Order Change: A fundamental paradigm (radical) change in the policy goals, policy
instruments, and the settings of the instruments (all the three components), e.g from
Keynesianism to monetarism in the UK (1970-1989).
Source: Adapted from Breton et al. (2008:353 and Studlar, 2009:73) with some modifications.

A close observation of Hall’s typology (table 2.1) reveals that both first order and second
order changes in policy are generally incremental in nature (Lindblom, 1959). As noted in the
introductory chapter, the theoretical goal of this study is to employ the three domestic policy
theories (agenda-setting, partisan ideology, and policy paradigm theory or orders of change) as
competing explanations for US narcotics policy change. The purpose is to determine the theory
that offers the best explanation for the changes. As we will see in chapter four, Hall’s (1993)
theory appears to provide that persuasive explanation for the US narcotics policy change since
1993.
Clearly, the preceding discussion reveals that the underlying theories of this study
provide useful tools in understanding the US narcotics policy process over time. It must,
however, be noted that while the broad punctuated equilibrium version of agenda-setting theory,
with conceptual variations (issue definition/definition, venue shifting, policy entrepreneurship),
and the concept of partisan ideology provide very helpful theoretical tools in explaining the US
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narcotics policy change, this study argues that these theories (agenda-setting and partisan
ideology) are limited in providing a complete explanation for the US narcotics policy process,
particularly on the nature, tempo, and scope of the US narcotics policy change. In essence, my
argument is that the change occurring within the US narcotics policy domain is largely
incremental in nature and can best be explained by Hall’s (1993) orders of policy change.
In essence, this study argues that Hall’s (1993) orders of policy change offers a more
persuasive explanation to the changes occurring within the US narcotics policy process in terms
of nature, tempo, and scope, particularly from 1993. In view of this theoretical assumption, I
hypothesize that:


The nature of US narcotics policy has largely been a second order change.



The tempo of US narcotics policy change has been one that is slow.



The scope of US narcotics policy change has widened over time and space.

Theoretical Overview of International Regimes
International regimes have occupied a prominent place in the international relations
literature ever since Ruggie (1975) first articulated the concept of regime dynamics (Hasenclever
et al. 1997; Krasner, 1983) in the early 1970s. Various theoretical explanations exist on the
emergence, continuity, and change of international regimes. In his early work on regime
dynamics, Young (1983:93) defines international regimes “as social institutions governing the
actions of those interested in specified activities or accepted sets of activities.” For Jervis (1983),
international regimes have the primary responsibility of governing the relationship among states
in an issue area through agreed principles, norms, and procedures. In Krasner’s (1983:20) view,
regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around, which actors’ expectation converge in a given area of international relations.” Clearly,
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the expectations of states that converge through networks of rules and procedures, which regulate
their behavior (Young, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1977) cover many global issue areas such as
tobacco control (Studlar, 2002, 2004, 2005; Mamudu, 2005; Asare, 2007), illicit drugs
(Nadelmann, 1990: Bewley-Taylor, 1999), environment (Young, 1999), monetary and trade
(Lipson, 1982; Krasner, 1983; Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 493).
As mentioned, the evolution, maintenance, and change of international regimes have been
explained from different theoretical perspectives in the international relations literature. For
Hansenclever, et al. (1997:1) and Krasner (1983:10), the emergence of international regimes can
be examined from three main theoretical perspectives (interest-based, knowledge-based, and
power-based). Grounded in neo-liberal assumption,25 the interest-based explanation argues that
international regimes emerge when states with shared interests foster cooperation at the
international level on issue areas of concern to them. The knowledge-based explanation
emphasizes shared normative ideas, causal beliefs, and institutionalism as the most important
incentives for regime formation among states.
The power-based explanation of regime formation and maintenance is linked to the
presence of a hegemonic state in the international system (Hansenclever, et al. 1997). This
explanation draws much from the realist and neo-realist theories of international relations. One
of the central assumptions is that the structure of the international system is anarchical,26 and
states survive through self-help with power capabilities (military, economic, technology), which
tend to shape and drive their behavior in the system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001).
25

The neo-liberal assumption is within the context of the concepts of global interdependency and cooperation.
The international system is anarchic because it lacks an authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules
of behavior. Simply, the anarchy nature of the global system is a self-help system (Keohane, 1984, Mearsheimer,
2001).
26
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Although the system is anarchical in nature, states do cooperate among themselves (Keohane,
1984). The structural explanation for the conduct of states in the international system has,
however, been challenged by emerging scholarly works on the theoretical concept of domestic
explanations of foreign policy decision making (Hagan, 1994, 2001) and the recent field of
psychological determinants of foreign policy decision making (Crichlow, 2002; 2005; Hermann
and Hermann, 1989; Schafer and Crichlow, 2002) in the international system. As Crichlow
(2002:694) rightly noted, the research on political psychology has shown with compelling
evidence that individual psychological characteristics, leaders’ cognitive complexity, and their
worldview, tend to shape their foreign policy decision-making process and their overall relations
with other countries in the global system. Notwithstanding, the centrality of the structural
explanation with emphasis on hegemonic influence in regime formation and maintenance
continues to dominate the regime literature.

Hegemonic Stability Theory
The hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a well established research tradition in the
regime literature. As noted in chapter one, my definition and application of the broad ideas of the
theory is not in the original sense of the term since the US was not a global hegemon before
1909. This study applies the term in a broad sense to illustrate the leadership role of the US
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999a) in global issue areas such as narcotics control since 1909. The obvious
question is: what is a hegemonic stability theory and what are its basic tenets? According to
Gilpin (1987:72), the conceptual idea of a hegemonic stability theory was set forth by Charles
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Kindleberger27 “although he preferred the term leadership or responsibility.” Originally applied
to the world economic system, Gilpin (1987) argues that the theory advocates and supports the
existence of a hegemonic or a dominant power in maintaining order in an open and chaotic
liberal world economic system. Expounding on the basic ideas of the theory, Keohane (2005:31)
notes that the HST has two principal tenets. First, the theory assumes that order in the global
political system is typically created by a single dominant power. Second, the theory claims that
the maintenance of order in the international economic system requires the continuous presence
of a hegemonic power.
In Cronin’s (2001) terms, a hegemonic dynamic reflects in unequal power relations
among states where one state becomes so powerful to exert control and influence over other
states in the global system. For Ikenberry (1989), the necessity of a great power with the ability
to create and maintain order in the international system is what constitutes the central assumption
of the hegemonic stability theory. For example, the “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana28 both
represent historical eras when a hegemonic power held sway and use its dominant position to
ensure an orderly and peaceful international system” (Ikenberry, 1989:377). By implication,
many regime scholars such as Ikenberry (1989), Gilpin (1987), Young (1983), and Krasner
(1983) agree that a hegemonic power has the capacity to establish and maintain norms and rules
for order within the global system. In his classic work, After Hegemony, Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy, Keohane (1984; 2005), however, contends that
international regimes do emerge by state actions in order to promote cooperation and mutual

27

The original idea of hegemonic stability theory was in Kindleberger’s work (1973). This information was quoted
in Keohane (2005:31).
28
Pax connotes a period of relative stability and peace in the international system with a hegemonic power in control
of the system. Great Britain in the nineteenth-century is a very good example. Also see Keohane (2005:31).
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benefits. Keohane (1984; 2005) also argues that a hegemonic power may not necessarily be a
sufficient condition for the evolution of cooperative relationships among states.
As previously noted, the US did not attain a hegemonic status when the global concern
over narcotics (Chinese opium problem) emerged on the international stage in 1909. However,
the US acted in that capacity by not only convening the first international meeting, but became
very instrumental in the evolution of the global narcotics regime. In fact, Bewley-Taylor (1999a)
and Cronin (2001:115) agree that the leading role by the United States in global narcotics control
intensified after the US attained a hegemonic status in 1945 (post-World War II era) and in the
1990s (post-Cold War era).
Without doubt, the US has played and continues to play such a leading role in many
international issue areas, including global narcotics control for the past several decades (Andreas
and Nadelmann, 2006; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a). There is also a growing perception among some
scholars (Clark, 2009; Russett, 1985:208) about America’s vanishing hegemonic influence,
particularly when competing economic power bases such as Germany and Japan emerged in the
post World War II era. The debate over the decline of America’s dominant power has actually
increased in recent years, particularly over the perception of America’s inability to maintain a
global systemic order following the recent global economic turmoil (Dieter, 2009).
On the contrary, other scholars (Nye, 2010; Huntington, 1999:36; Brooks and Wohlforth,
2002) maintain that the US is not in absolute decline in hegemonic status as has been argued by
some scholars. For these scholars (Huntington, 1999:36; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002), the US
in the post-Cold War era is still the sole country with the preeminence of major power
capabilities (economic, military, ideological, diplomatic, technological, and cultural), and the
only nation with global reach in promoting its interests and influence. Applying the hegemonic
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stability theory to the global narcotics regime, it is apparent that the theory reflects a similar
behavior of the US as the dominant power on the existing global narcotics prohibition regime.

Global Narcotics Regime
While considerable scholarly works exist on the theoretical evolution and maintenance of
many international regimes, only few have applied regime theory to analyze the global narcotics
prohibition regime. Drawing on the broad regime theory, Nadelmann (1990) first introduced the
concept of global prohibition regime into the regime literature. His work traces the emergence of
norms in the international system that prohibit issues such as piracy, slavery, counterfeiting in
national currencies, aircraft hijacking, and the production, sale, and trafficking of controlled
psychoactive substances (Nadelmann, 1990: 479).
Under the global narcotics regime, production, trafficking, sale, possession, and use of
narcotic drugs, hallucinogens, barbiturates, amphetamines and tranquillizers, except for scientific
and medical purposes, are prohibited and punished with criminal sanctions in almost every
country in the world (Nadelmann, 1990:503; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, 2003; Levine, 2003) with
the US as the lead country involved in the regime. In fact, the assumption that a hegemonic
power shapes international regimes to reflect its interests and values (Levine, 2003; BewleyTaylor, 1999a, 2005; Hinojosa, 2007; Coulkins et al. 2005; Friesendorf, 2007) is a very wellestablished argument in the regime literature. Clearly, the rise of the US to great power status, by
the middle of the twentieth century, greatly shaped the maintenance of the global narcotics
control regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, 2005). As Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) posit, the
internationalization of policing across the globe in the form of global regimes reflects efforts by
generations of Western powers, including the US, to export their own interpretation of crime in
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the form of prohibition norms and values on the rest of the world. In a related argument, Bruun et
al. (1975:273-274) contend that the international narcotics control regime, for example, cannot
be said to be truly international in dimension, but it is a reflection of the ideas and norms of the
dominant member (United States) in the global system.
Bewley-Taylor (1999a) has rightly captured this argument in his study on the role of the
US as a hegemonic power in the evolution of the global drug prohibition regime. Grounded in
the regime theory (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984), Bewley-Taylor’s (1999a:5) work examines
what he called the “American international crusade against illegal drugs and the central role
played by the United States in the creation of the contemporary global drug prohibition regime.”
Room and Paglia (1999:310) share a similar view that the US has not only pursued a domestic
prohibition strategy of narcotics control, as previously stated, but has extended the same strategy
to the rest of the world because of its globally dominant position.
The preceding theoretical discourse regarding the influential role of the US on the global
narcotics regime (see chapter five) clearly supports this study’s argument that the global
narcotics prohibition regime has largely been influenced by the US towards its preferred
prohibition option of narcotics control. This argument is consistent with the existing literature
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Bruun et al., 1975) on the influential
role of the US on the global narcotics regime. In view of this assumption, one might argue that a
policy change or resistance to change within the US narcotics policy domain is more likely to
have a similar pattern on the global narcotics policy regime. In essence, this study hypothesizes
that:


The US has successfully resisted pressure for third order policy change within the
global narcotics regime as a result of its dominant influence on the regime.
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Variables
The dependent variable is the US narcotics policy change and the implications for the
global narcotics regime. The independent or explanatory variables are the drivers of the US

domestic narcotics policy change. These variables include: policy entrepreneurs, institutions,
political parties, ideas, bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, media, congress, and the president.
It must be noted that these variables are not distinctively examined, but rather discussed as part
of the broader debate on the dynamics of US narcotics policy change over time.

Research Questions
The main research questions are:
(1) Is the US narcotics policy changing?
(a) What is the nature of the change?
(b) Who are the drivers of the change?
(2) To what extent are these changes driven by internal or external factors?
(3) To what extent do parties and partisan ideology (Liberal or Conservative) shape the US
narcotics policy process?
(4) What are the likely implications of US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics
prohibition regime?

Methodology
Purposeful qualitative research methodology is the main approach employed for this
study. In their work Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inquiry in Qualitative Research, King et
al. (1994: 4) observe that the underlying goal of qualitative research is to get an in-depth
understanding of a given phenomenon. This outcome can be achieved with a focus on one case
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or small number of cases with the use of a thorough interview or an in-depth analysis of
historical documents (King, et al.1994; Peters, 1998; Patton, 2002).
Similarly, Eisenhardt (1989:535) argues that case study research is useful in
accomplishing a similar pattern of other research outcomes, such as generating a theory,
providing in-depth explanation of a phenomenon, or testing a given theory. For this study, I
employed the case study approach with single case analysis of the US narcotics policy domain in
order to get an in-depth understanding of the US narcotics policy change over time.

Methods of Data Collection
According to Dexter (1970), Richards (1996) and Berry (2002), elite or specialized
interviewing through purposive sampling is one of the useful methodological approaches in
gathering data for analysis. The data for this study was obtained from two main sources (primary
and secondary). The elite interviews I conducted constitute the main source of the primary data.
Documentary analysis of existing literature on narcotics policy, academic research reports,
policy reports from advocacy groups and narcotics control agencies, newspaper stories, and other
relevant documents constitute the main source of the secondary data. The combination of elite
interviews and documentary analysis was to ensure a high degree of consistency in the study of
the US narcotics policy process. As Merriam (1998) and Berg (2004) observe, purposive
sampling gives the researcher the opportunity to seek a deeper understanding and discovery of a
social phenomenon by carefully selecting a sample from which most of the valuable information
in the form of data could be obtained.
Based on this understanding, I employed a snow ball sampling method of selecting my
sample size of elites with the specialized knowledge of the US narcotics policy arena for the
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interviews. The interviews were conducted in the United States. It started in August 2010 and
ended in May 2011. Once the policy experts were selected, email and telephone contacts were
made with them for their approval for the interviews. However, as a result of the difficulty of
scheduling time for the telephone interview, most of the interviewees opted for an email
communication with me. The survey questionnaires (see appendix five) with an authorization
letter from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at West Virginia University to conduct the
interviews were sent through email attachment to the respondents. Ten successfully completed
questionnaires were returned and used for the analysis. Appendix five contains the list of persons
interviewed for the study.
In terms of measurement, the study draws on Rose’s (1984) measurement of public
policy as consisting of laws, personnel, and budgets. I employed these empirical indicators to
apply to the US narcotic policies in the form of narcotic laws, personnel, and budgets. For
methodological lucidity in measuring policy change, the study draws on Studlar (2009), Capano
and Howlett’s (2009) measurement of change as consisting of tempo (speed), mode (amount of
change) and scope (coverage). These measurement criteria were integrated into the survey
questionnaires (see appendix five) in gathering the data on the US narcotics policy change since
1993.

Summary
The preceding discussion in this chapter has systematically examined the theoretical and
methodological ground work for the study. The underlying element of each theoretical
framework was critically examined within the broad context of the existing literature on
narcotics policy and policy change. The chapter also examined the likely implications of the US
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narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime through the theoretical lens of the
hegemonic stability theory and the role of the US as a hegemonic power in shaping the regime.
Finally, the chapter laid out the underlying hypotheses, research questions, and the
methodological approach to the study.
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Chapter 3
Evolution of US Narcotics Policy (1906-1992)
Introduction
This chapter examines the historical evolution of the US narcotics policy process within
a broad structure of three main phases29 (1906 to 1992). Each phase is examined through the
three domestic theories (agenda-setting, partisan ideology, and orders of policy change) of this
study. Although chapter four constitutes the main empirical section where the validity
(explanatory power) of the theories will be examined in terms of the narcotics policy process,
this chapter broadly employs the three domestic theories as competing explanations for the US
narcotics process over time and space. Additionally, the three domestic policy theories will be
examined within the context of different dimensions of policy, and therefore policy change.
The first dimension looks at agenda-setting theory within the broad context of narcotics
policy agendas. My discussion will specifically focus on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) version
of agenda-setting theory (punctuated equilibrium) with further emphasis on conceptual models
such as issue definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship in explaining
the US narcotics policy change. The theory of partisan ideology examines the policy dimension
of campaign rhetoric and policy proposals in the narcotics policy process. Hall’s (1993) theory of
paradigm change (orders of change) explores narcotics policy adoption and implementation.
Like other studies of this nature, my rationale for examining the historical background of
the US narcotics policy process is grounded in the concept of policy legacy (Rose, 1990; Boyum

29

I draw on McWilliams’ (1992) categorization of the US narcotics policy development into phases with some
modifications to reflect the focus of my study. The three phases of chapter three will examine narcotics policy
development from 1906 to 1992. The fourth chapter will be broadly examined under one phase, which is categorized
as the fourth phase (1993-2009) of the US narcotics policy development. In essence, the fourth phase is not
discussed in this chapter (three), but will be extensively covered in the next chapter (four).
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and Reuter, 2005). Since policy legacy provides a useful tool in understanding an existing public
policy from the perspective of a past policy, it is pertinent to examine the past US narcotic
policies for a better understanding of the existing narcotics policy process, especially the scope
(1993 to 2009) of the study. Although the three phases interconnect, each phase is different and
generally shaped by policy agendas, policy proposals, milestone of narcotics legislations, key
players involved in the passage of these legislations, campaign rhetoric, policy adoption and
implementation, and the trends in narcotics policy change. For the purpose of justifying the
differences of each phase (evolution of narcotics policy), I have categorized each of them under a
broad theme that reflects the patterns of US narcotics policy development since 1906. For
example, the first phase reflects the evolution of punitive narcotics policy, the second phase
demonstrates the emergence of the war on drugs, and the third phase indicates the escalation of
the war on drugs as shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1
Phases/Chronology of Milestones of US Narcotics Control (1906-1992)
Years
1906
1909
1912
1914
1915
191924
1922
1929

1930
1932

Phase 1: Evolution of Punitive Narcotics Policy
United States enacts the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
US federal law regulates opium importation, except for medical purposes.
Hague Treaty restricts the manufacture, trade, and use of opium and cocaine except for medical
purposes. United States pushes for prohibition with strong domestic laws for narcotics control.
Congress enacts the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act. The Act mandates federal involvement in
illicit drug control.
IRS agents (162) put in the Miscellaneous Division of Treasury Department to enforce revenue
provisions of Harrison Act.
The Narcotics Division of the Treasury Department pushes for the prosecution of over 25,000
doctors for the violations of the Harrison Act.
The Supreme Court declares the prescription by doctors for cocaine addicts as unlawful.
Colonel Levi Nutt resigns as head of Narcotics Division of the Treasury Department on charges
of drug misconduct. The scandal provides an opportunity for the creation of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics (FBN).
Government establishes the Federal Bureau of Narcotics within the department of Treasury.
Harry Anslinger assumes the responsibility as head of the FBN.
Harry Anslinger transforms the FBN into a strong bureaucratic agency with full control and
influence over the drug policy subsystem.
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1937
1941
1942
1951
1956
1960s
1966
1968

1969

1970

1971

1972
1973

1974
1975
1976

1977
1978
1979
1980

1981

Congress enacts the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.
The discovery of Methadone.
The FBN establishes itself as the main law enforcement agency of US drug control. FBN pushes
for the prominence of narcotics on both systemic and congressional agendas.
Congress enacts the Boggs Act. The Act imposes compulsory prison sentences for all drug
offenders, including first time drug related offenders.
Congress enacts the Narcotics Control Act. The Act introduces the death penalty for the first
time, especially for drug offenders caught selling hard drugs to minors.
Recreational drug use rises in the US. Social stigmatization previously associated with drugs
decreases.
Government creates the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC), with 100 agents and the police
to control the supply of “dangerous drugs” (amphetamines and barbiturates).
President Johnson submits the Reorganization Plan No.1 to Congress. The Plan consolidates the
FBN and BDAC into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), under the
authority of the US Department of Justice.
Phase 2: Emergence of the War on Drugs
President Nixon declares narcotics abuse as “a national emergency afflicting both the body and
soul of America.” He subsequently declares the war on drugs. The issue (narcotic drugs)
becomes salient on the presidential agenda.
Congress enacts the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act with emphasis on both law enforcement
and treatment towards narcotics control. The Act provides for the establishment of Schedules of
Controlled Substances. Congress also enacts the Organized Crime Act. The National
Organization for the reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) emerges on the scene.
By Executive Order, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention to oversee treatment,
rehabilitation, education, and research program was created. Majority of the funding was
provided for treatment, rather than law enforcement. It was the only time this happened in the
history of the war on drugs.
President Nixon creates the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) and the Office of
National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) to focus on street “pushers” of drugs.
President Nixon submits the Reorganization Plan No. 2. The Plan consolidates the BNDD,
ODALE, ONNI, and Customs Service Drug Investigation Unit into Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) with 2,000 agents and a half (1/2) a billion DEA budget.
President Nixon resigns. The issue (narcotic drugs) receives less war-like attention in the Ford
and Carter administrations.
Ford administration releases a White Paper on Drug Abuse. The White Paper names marijuana
as “low priority drug” in contrast to heroin, amphetamines, and mixed barbiturates.
President Carter proposes for the decriminalization of marijuana. Carter favors the relinquishing
of federal criminal penalties for the possession of up to one ounce of marijuana. Anti-drug
parents’ movement begins.
Media continues to glamorize cocaine use.
Bourne resigns as Carter’s chief policy advisor on narcotics. Resignation led to major narcotics
policy setback for the Administration.
NIDA household survey indicates a total of 9.7 million people had used cocaine in 1978. About
15.4 million Americans have tried it at least once. Cocaine trade becomes increasingly violent.
Supply of cocaine to the US estimated by Government at 40 to 48 metric tons. Operation
Greenback begins to trace money laundering operations.
Phase 3: Escalation of the War on Drugs
The war on drugs reemerges and escalates under Reagan. The drug issue attains high attention
on his presidential agenda. Congress repeals the century-old prohibition (Posse Comitatus Act),
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1982

1983
1984

1985
1986

1987
1988
1989
1990

1991
1992

which forbids the involvement of the military in civilian law enforcement. All branches of the
military became involved in the war on drugs. Spraying of herbicides on illegal drug crops in the
source countries intensifies under the International Security and Dev. Act. United States and
Colombia ratify a bilateral extradition treaty.
President Reagan announces the formation of the Vice President cabinet-level task force (South
Florida Drug Task Force) to control massive drug smuggling along the US borders. An
Executive Order by Reagan also includes the involvement of the CIA in the drug war.
Government creates many offices of the Drug Enforcement Agencies in six border cities to
coordinate drug interdiction.
Congress enacts the Crime Control Act of 1984. Nancy Reagan launches her “Just say No” antidrug campaign. President Reagan signs a proclamation for National Drug Abuse Education and
Prevention Week.
IRS reports that US financial institutions launder about $80 billion per year in illegal drugs
money. Crack cocaine appears on the scene for the first time.
Reagan signs the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which provides about $1.7 billion to fight the
drug war. Reagan also signs an Executive Order on Drug-Free Workplace. The Administration
makes a proposal for a mandatory drug testing of all federal employees and federal contractors.
US Magistrate, Peter Nimkoff, resigns in partial protest over the so-called government abuses of
power regarding the war on drugs. The US initiates the Certification Process (US presidents to
report to Congress every year on the efforts by other countries on narcotics control).
Colombia annuls the extradition treaty with the US. The war on drugs escalates.
President Reagan signs the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
President W.H. Bush creates the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and appoints
William Bennett as his first “drug czar.” United States invades Panama (Dec.1989).
President W.H. Bush proposes a 50% increase in military spending on the war on drugs by
requesting additional $1.2 billion to the annual drug war budget. General Manuel Noriega
surrenders to US authorities for drug trafficking (Jan.1990).
DEA makes the largest seizure of heroin in US history in San Francisco. Over 1,000 pounds of
Southeast Asian white heroin, with an estimated wholesale value of more than $ 1 billion.
Government rejects the petition by the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II (for medical use) of the
Controlled Substance Act.

Sources30

30

I compiled the data and information from many sources to create my own chronology table.
Wisotsky, Steven. 1986. Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs. NY: Greenwood Press. Appendix 2, pp.249256. Belenko, Steven. 2000. Drugs and Drug Policy in America. Westport: Greenwood Press
Thirty Years of American Drug War: A Chronology, Frontline-Public Broadcasting Service
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 Also in Huggins, Laura (ed.) 2005. Drug War
Deadlock: The Policy Battle Continues. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. pp: 17-30
Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence 1973-2008.
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The Politics of the Early Narcotics Policy Process
For more than a century, the issue of drug abuse and the policy responses from
governments in controlling the production, trafficking, and use of narcotic drugs has remained
one of the key public policy issues on the agenda of many countries, particularly the United
States. Although the drug issue has experienced low levels of attention at various points in time,
the general awareness about the dangers of illicit drugs to society has never diminished
completely (Belenko, 2000). In essence, the US narcotics policy process has not only waxed and
waned on the systemic (media) and institutional (governmental) agendas, but the issue also has
been defined, redefined, and shaped by many key players, such as the federal and state
government institutions, political parties, bureaucratic agencies, advocacy groups, and policy
entrepreneurs for the past decades (Belenko, 2000).
As in other parts of the world, until the late 1890s to the early 1900s, drugs such as
opium, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, among others, were all legal substances that were
accessible to anyone who wanted them (Bertram, et al.,1996; Musto,1999). In the US, for
example, these drugs were not only widely available, but were either prescribed by medical
officers or could easily be bought at any grocery store. Moreover, these drugs were so common
to the extent that they were found in several unregulated medicines for the treatment of regular
ailments such as stomach aches, headaches, and common colds. Cocaine for example, was a
favorite ingredient for the production of Coca-Cola until 1903 when caffeine was substituted for
the use of cocaine (Meier, 1994:22). It was also used as an important ingredient for the
production of medicines and food additives (Bertram, et al., 1996:61; Meier, 1994:22).
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As Meier (1994:22-23) observes, the production, sale, and prescription of these narcotic
drugs, including hallucinogenic drugs, during the late nineteenth century, became one of the
lucrative businesses for many physicians and pharmacists. Besides cocaine and opium, marijuana
was, perhaps, the most commonly used drug in the US during the period under review. The hemp
plant (marijuana), which was first introduced to the American colonies, especially in Virginia in
1611, became so widely used that George Washington, the first president of the United States,
was believed, through his diary records, to have grown marijuana (Meier, 1994:22; Benavie,
2009:21). The widespread use of these drugs led to higher levels of addiction across many parts
of the country. For example, Meier (1994:23) recounts that about 200,000 to 275,000 Americans
were drug addicts in 1915.
The history of America’s narcotics control policy has been characterized by important
changing trends. These trends range from the cocaine and opium scares of the early 1900s, to the
marijuana concerns in the 1920s, to the heroin addiction problem in the 1960s, and to crack
cocaine in the mid-1980s and 1990s (Belenko, 2000). In addition to key narcotics legislations
that were enacted in almost every phase, other notable milestones have been part of the US
narcotics policy development since 1906 (see table 3.1).
As noted, the US narcotics policy has undergone many different phases since the
involvement of the federal government in the narcotics policymaking in the early years of the
twentieth century. The broad literature on the evolutionary process of the narcotics policy
development is basically categorized into key historical phases (McWilliams, 1992:8). My study
draws on a similar categorization of these phases for my analysis as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1

Historical Development (phases) of US Narcotics Policy (1906-1992)
Phase 1
1906-1968

Phase 2
1969-1980

Phase 3
1981-1992

Phase 4
1993-2009
(Focus of Chapter 4)

The three phases (1, 2, and 3) are the main focus of
chapter 3

Source: Adapted from Jones (2002:119) with some modifications.

According to Boyum and Reuter (2005:5), US anti-drug laws were, for the most part,
within the domain and jurisdiction of states and local authorities until the early twentieth century
when the federal government became an important player in drug policymaking. Prior to the
passage of the Harrison Act of 1914, two important legislations (narcotics) were passed by the
US Congress (Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and the 1909 Law on Opium). The passage of
these anti-drug laws clearly shaped the starting point of the early years of the US narcotics policy
process.

First Phase: Evolution of Punitive Narcotics Policy (1906-1968)
The passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act was the first major federal legislation
on narcotics control in the US following the concern over the abuse of narcotic drugs. In fact,
these early years (1906-1929) of phase one also represents what this study describes as the
formative years of punitive narcotics policy development. Although the first major federal law
(1906 Pure Food and Drug Act) was short of fully addressing some important issues of nonmedical use of these drugs, certain key provisions of the law still prohibited the misbranding of
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pharmaceutical and other patent medicines containing drugs such as heroin, opium, cocaine, and
marijuana. The law allowed the sale of pharmaceutical products containing these drugs, but only
on a condition that these products were clearly and properly labeled by name (Meier, 1994:23).
The second piece of legislation was the 1909 Act (Opium Act). The law prohibited the
importation of opium except for medical purposes. Unlike the 1906 Act, the main provision of
the 1909 law was exclusively restricted to opium prohibition. In fact, the year 1909 was also
particularly important to the US for two main reasons. First, it was the first time that the
international community met in China, as earlier noted, to discuss the Chinese opium epidemic.
Second, the US was not only a participant at the conference, but was also the main convener of
the meeting. According to Sharp (1994:20), Meier (1994:24) and Musto (1999:3), the 1909 US
federal law prohibiting opium smoking had a direct connection to the China opium conference,
in which the US convened and was also instrumental in influencing other countries to regulate
opium use.
Clearly, the key question of why the US federal government became actively involved in
both domestic and global narcotics control by the mid-1900s is an important part of the drug
policy debate. Several arguments have been advanced for the emergence of the narcotics policy
on the federal government’s agenda. As generally shared, the widespread drug abuse among
many Americans was primarily responsible for the genesis of many anti-drug laws enacted in the
early years of the twentieth century. As narcotic drugs became readily available, the addiction
rate increased in high proportion, and the fear of foreigners led to a widespread public outcry and
the subsequent demand for change.
Attitudes by the public negatively changed toward drug users once the public
understanding of the drug issue deepened. McWilliams (1992) argues that the rise of the
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Progressive Movement (PM) was particularly responsible for the shift in public attitudes against
drug users. For example, the Movement, according to McWilliams (1992), expressed worry
about what they called the weakening nature of the American moral society and other cherished
values following the increasing use of narcotic drugs and alcohol. In order to affect policy
change, the Movement pushed for strong punitive anti-drug and alcohol laws as the solution to
restoring the strong moral values of the American society. In fact, Baumgartner and Jones’
(2009) theoretical interpretation of agenda-setting framework provides a useful insight into
understanding how a shift in public attitude can affect the outcome of a policy issue.
For Baumgartner and Jones (2009:153), policy outcomes are determined by the extent to
which an issue is defined as a private issue or a public one. According to them, when an issue is
defined as a private one, there is often no pressure or demand for government intervention. On
the other hand, an issue that is defined from a public perspective, which might cause harm to
others, tends to attract quick demand for government action. This was clearly the case with the
drug abuse issue in the early 1900s. As Baumgartner and Jones (2009) observe, the problem of
drug abuse, particularly before the 1900s, was defined as a private problem that demanded no
government intervention. When the same problem was, however, redefined from a societal
perspective by the mid-1900 (narcotics control laws-1906 and 1909 laws) and considered
potentially dangerous to others, societal pressure became intensified for government action on
the drug issue. For example, once the use of narcotic drugs was deemed to affect the level of
productivity, social control of minorities, and the likely linkage to acts of criminal behavior,
government intervention was immediately sought by the public for policy action. To
Baumgartner and Jones (2009), the problem of drug abuse, like any other public policy issue, had
floated between the two perspectives (private and public definition of issues) for decades.
68

Another important argument advanced for the emergence of the US anti-drug laws was
the prevalent use of narcotic drugs among many poor African-Americans and Chinese immigrant
communities. In the words of McWilliams (1992:9), the use of cocaine, for example, in many
immigrant communities was considered “a more unsavory clientele who wanted only to
experience euphoria, as opposed to those who relied on cocaine as a source of increasing
productivity in the workplace.” Clearly, the racial undertone of this argument became apparent
when many poor Blacks and Chinese immigrants were targeted as the main culprits responsible
for the drug problem across America. Once these groups were defined in this way, it became
easy for those opposed to the widespread use of these drugs, such as the Progressive Movement,
to add more support for the passage of the anti-drug laws. Scholars such as Musto (1999), Meier
(1994), McWilliams (1992), argue that the racial dimension that emerged in the early years of
the US narcotics policy process has since become an important element of the US anti-drug
policy outcomes in recent years.
While many scholars share the view that narcotic laws of 1906 and 1909 have provided
the foundation for the subsequent US anti-drug laws, others argue that it was the Harrison Act of
1914 that clearly set the parameters for the US narcotic policy goals. For these scholars, (Musto,
1999; Sharp, 1994; Zimring and Hawkins, 1992), the 1914 Act not only marked the starting point
of the major anti-drug legislations, but the Act also became the model in which many future
narcotic policies were based.

Harrison Act of 1914
As noted, the Harrison Act of 1914 represented an important piece of legislation in the
development of the US narcotics policy. Not only did the Act shape the narcotics policy process,
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but also transformed the course of the policy landscape for many years (Inciardi et al. 1996;
Meier, 1994; Oppenheimer, 1993). As Faupel (1991) rightly noted:
The long-term result of the legislation was dramatic. Narcotics use was transformed from a
relatively benign vice practiced by some of society’s most respectable citizens to an openly
disdained activity prohibited by law, relegating the narcotics user to pariah status in most
communities.31

Named after Francis Harrison, a New York Democrat who was very instrumental in the passage
of the law (Meier, 1994:2), the Act required those in the medical and other allied health
professions such as physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and other health related agencies to:
(a) Register with the federal government.
(b) Keep proper record of all transactions on narcotic drugs.
(c) Pay special tax on their transactions.

The legislation was largely framed in a form of taxation or a revenue act to be
administered by the officials of the Treasury Department (Oppenheimer, 1993:196; Boyum and
Reuter, 2005; Jonnes, 1996:47; Spillane and McAllister, 2003; Bertram, et al. 1996:68). Not only
were health professionals targeted in the implementation of the law, but the law also was
extended to cover producers, importers, and the manufacturers of opium, and all coca products.
The major rationale behind the law was to ensure that narcotic drugs were produced and
prescribed only for medical purposes (Bertram, et al. 1996). In the case of marijuana, Meier
(1994:25) and Musto (1999) observe that it was part of the initial draft of the legislation, but was
later excluded in response to the strong resistance from the pharmaceutical industry. The industry

31

Faupel’s (1991) statement about the transformative role of the 1914 Harrison Act in changing the nature of the
narcotics policy process was cited by Inciardi et al. (1996:5).
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argued that marijuana was only used in veterinary medicines and other non-intoxicating uses that
did not necessitate its inclusion with other dangerous drugs such as opium and cocaine.
The bill was successfully passed into law, but the implementation faced some difficulties
between the agents of the Internal Revenue Bureau (IRB) and many health practitioners. The
disagreement centered on the interpretation of some of the key provisions of the law. For
example, Inciardi et al. (1996:5) observe that under certain provision of the law, doctors were
allowed to “prescribe, dispense, and administer narcotics to their patients for legitimate medical
purposes in the course of their medical practice.” The interpretation of this provision by the
medical establishment was based on its framing of the drug addiction problem as a disease that
needs treatment. On the contrary, the IRB interpreted this provision of the law differently and
considered the prescription of narcotic drugs to addicts as unlawful (Inciardi et al., 1996). For
many IRB agents, narcotics users were thus helpless addicts who needed a strong punitive
punishment for their rehabilitation (Oppenheimer, 1993:197).
Not long after that, the IRB consolidated its enforcement powers under the law by
establishing strong bureaucratic structures, procedures, and other policy strategies for a long
lasting trend of narcotics enforcement policy. Examining some of the strategies employed in the
enforcement of the Harrison Act, Meier (1994:27) points out how the IRB agents relied on two
main tactical methods in the implementation of the law. First, officials of the agency used
misinformation and propaganda mechanisms to label narcotic users as one of the most dangerous
social evils facing the American society. Second, the agency, in an attempt to showcase its socalled successes over the drug problem, managed to frame itself as being fully in control of the
increasing drug problem.

71

The unresolved differences of interpretation between the medical profession and the
punitive law enforcement agents led to the deepening of mistrust between the IRB agents and
many health professionals. The mistrust was followed by numerous allegations and massive
accusations leveled against many health professionals by IRB agents, especially doctors who
were accused of unlawfully prescribing illegal drugs to addicts. Meier (1994:27) describes this
scenario as an additional strategy used by the IRB agents in the enforcement of the Harrison Act.
What happened next was very devastating for many in the medical community. Quite a number
of physicians and other health professionals faced constant arrests and detention by IRB agents
(McWilliams, 1992:11; Oppenheimer, 1993:197). According to Sharp (1994:20), between 1915
and 1938, for example, more than 25,000 physicians were under the radar screen of the IRB
agents who were determined to enforce the Harrison Act. During the same period, about 5,000
doctors and other health professionals were fined, convicted, or jailed for many violations of the
law. Two key rulings by the US Supreme Court regarding the Harrison Act further strengthened
the bureaucratic tactics and enforcement apparatus of the IRB.
The first case was the 1919 ruling (Webb v. United States), where the Court held that it
was against the law for narcotic drugs to be prescribed by a doctor to a drug addict (Sharp, 1994;
Bertram, et al. 1996). The second case was the 1922 ruling (United States v. Behrman). Like the
1919 ruling, the second case made the prescription of narcotic drugs to any addicts by a
physician unlawful, even if prescribed as part of a cure program (Inciardi et al., 1996). In the
midst of constant harassment and the threat of arrests of those engaged in the lucrative drug
business, an incentive was created for various acts of bribery and corruption among many law
enforcement agents (Meier, 1994: 30). The first recorded case of a federal agent convicted of a
corruption act was in 1917. Subsequent corruption scandals were recorded among many IRB
72

agents from 1917 onwards. Overall, the consensus among scholars such as Inciardi et al. (1996),
McWilliams (1992) and Erlen and Spillane (2004) is that the 1914 Harrison Act set the stage for
the long decades of a law enforcement strategy of narcotics control policy in the US.
Clearly, the preceding discussion of the punitive formative years (1906-1929) of the first
phase reveals some evidence of agenda-setting theory in the development of the narcotic policy
process, particularly on the shifting nature of public opinion and activities of interest groups in
shaping the policy process. As Studlar (2002), Kingdon (1984), and Baumgartner and Jones
(2009) observe, public opinion plays an important role in agenda-setting theory. The discussion
shows a major shift in the American public opinion on narcotic drugs. For example, prior to the
passage of the first federal anti-drug laws, the use of narcotics was generally accepted by the
public as a normal practice. As previously mentioned, many of these drugs during the late 1800s
to the early 1900s were lawful. Public opinion, however, shifted to the de-normalization of these
drugs following the increasing abuse and the societal problems associated with them. Discussing
similar issues, Ferraiolo (2007:152) contends that the widespread negative view of drug use was
primarily responsible for the shift in attitudes of many Americans against these drugs.
As opinions changed toward these narcotic drugs, the issue moved from a systemic
agenda to a formal or institutional agenda (Kingdon, 1984; Cobb, Keith-Ross, and Ross, 1976),
for government attention and consideration. The federal government’s response in terms of
policy change was the passage of the federal narcotic legislations in the early years of the
twentieth century. In fact, Kingdon (1984) describes avenues for policy change as windows of
opportunity. Indeed, it was the window of the apparent problems and dissatisfaction associated
with the narcotics use that created the opportunity for the emergence of the three major anti-drug
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legislations (Pure Food Act of 1906, Opium law of 1909, Harrison Act of 1914) in the early
1900s.
Similarly, the influence of organized interest groups, such as the Progressive Movement,
in shaping the early years of the narcotics policy process has demonstrated evidence of interest
group activities in agenda-setting and subsystem politics. As Worsham (1997) argues, the
question of influence is at the heart of understanding the policy process. It is also clear that the
US narcotics policy process had experienced a first order change in policy in the early years of
the policy development. As Hall (1993) argues, a change in the settings of a policy instrument
constitutes a first order change. Applying Hall’s (1993) concept to the early years of the policy
process shows an incremental change in the anti-drug laws from a less restrictive Food Act of
1906, to a more punitive 1914 Harrison Act. On partisan ideology, there was no evidence to
support the assumption that partisanship played a role in shaping the early years of the narcotics
policy development.

Consolidation of Punitive Narcotics Policy (1929-1968)
The second part of the first phase is another important dimension in the evolution of the
US narcotics policy process. I categorize this period as the era that consolidated the punitive
approach to narcotics control. The period was dominated by the passage of three important
legislations (Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Boggs Act of 1951, and Narcotics Act of 1956). While
the era deepened the punitive approach to narcotics control, it was the establishment of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and the role played by Harry Anslinger, the head of the FBN,
that defined and distinguished this phase from other phases. As Sharp (1994:22) observes, the
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1930s throughout the 1960s marked a different era in narcotics control because of the strong
bureaucratic control of the narcotics policy subsystem by the FBN.
The creation of the FBN stemmed from the disagreement and mistrust between many
IRB agents and members of the health community, especially doctors, over the interpretation of
some provisions of the Harrison Act. As noted, the American medical establishment favored a
treatment option for drug addicts over a punitive law enforcement strategy. However, many state
governments and other local authorities pressed for an exclusively punitive law enforcement
approach over the treatment option (Spillane, 2004:25). Once a punitive policy approach was
firmly secured, the law enforcement powers of many bureaucratic agencies such as the IRB were
strengthened, expanded, and institutionalized towards the implementation of these laws (Ryan,
2001:19).
What happened next was perhaps not widely expected. The consequence of the punitive
policy option created an underground illegal market for these banned drugs for many people who
needed them. Likewise, a number of IRB agents were also exposed to all forms of bribery and
corruption (Meier, 1994). As noted, a well-known case occurred in 1929 involving the family of
Levi Nutt, who was the head of the Narcotics Division Unit at the Treasury Department
(McWilliams, 1992: Meier, 1994). While Nutt lost his position because of the scandal, the
situation provided an opportunity for the reorganization of the Narcotics Division Unit,
particularly the office of the IRB. This led to the creation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics on
July 1, 1930 (Musto, 1999:208), with the appointment of Harry J. Anslinger as the first
Commissioner of the FBN (Whiteside, 1997:58). In fact, aside the FBN, which was mandated
with the responsibility of regulating narcotic substances, the Food and Drug Administration
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(FDA), which was also created as a result of the reorganization, was tasked to regulate nonnarcotic drugs (Spillane, 2004).
The narcotics policy landscape was quickly transformed into full-fledged bureaucratic
influence and control over the US drug policymaking soon after Anslinger took the reign of the
FBN. Meier (1994:32) and McWilliams (1992:14), for example, argue that the FBN under
Anslinger created a policy niche for the agency to the extent that the agency succeeded in
establishing a powerful narcotics policy subsystem by the late 1930s. In fact, Baumgartner and
Jones’ (1993, 2009) concept of policy monopoly provides an important theoretical guide in
understanding the emergence of the FBN as a powerful force in the evolution of the narcotics
policy subsystem. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 6-7) argue, the basic goal of interest groups,
policy entrepreneurs, and bureaucratic agencies, such as the FBN in a policy subsystem, is to
establish a policy monopoly at any opportunity for the purpose of control and influence over
policymaking. For them, a policy monopoly is often sustained by two very important elements:
a strong institutional policy structure and a powerful supporting idea.
In the case of the narcotics policy domain, the FBN was the strong institutional structure
over drug policymaking. When it comes to the supporting ideas, punitive or prohibitive policy
option was the dominant policy preference of the agency. The supportive interest groups were
the federal narcotics law enforcement agencies and their natural allies such as the Women’s
Christian Temperance Union (WTCU) and the Anti-Saloon League (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993).

A good example of how the FBN successfully established its monopoly over the

narcotics policy process is discussed in the next section. The discussion will show how the
bureaucratic agency had redefined the drug issue, controlled the policy agenda, and influenced
other players over the passage of the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act.
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Marijuana Tax Act (MTA) of 1937
The battle to outlaw the use of marijuana except for medical purposes dates back to the
previous efforts by the federal government to control narcotics use. Although the importation of
marijuana was prohibited, except for medical purposes under the Pure Food Drug Act, it was not
covered by the Harrison Act, because of the lack of a strong organized support for the inclusion
of marijuana (Meier, 1994:33; Bertram et al., 1996:80). Consequently, the use of marijuana from
the late 1920s throughout the early 30s became widespread in many parts of the US. The
literature reveals two major reasons for the widespread use of marijuana during the period under
review. First, marijuana use became prevalent as the recreational demands for the drug increased,
especially among many young people. The second reason was the influx of many agricultural
workers from Mexico to many southwestern states in the US. Their use of marijuana was said to
have been very widespread (Meier, 1994; McWilliams, 1992). For Kornblum (1993:120),
marijuana became popular in many poor communities because the drug was legal, relatively
cheap, and pleasurable to use in many social settings, while alcohol was prohibited during the
same time.
Irrespective of the public resentment over the marijuana problem, the pervasive use of the
drug continued, with no concrete legislative action at the federal level to control the drug
problem. For some, the inability to enact a federal legislation against marijuana use was
primarily due to the inadequate attention and priority given to the drug problem by Anslinger and
his agency (Ferraiolo, 2007). The likely explanation for the FBN’s inaction might be the fact that
the drug problem was already being handled at the state level, while the agency wanted to focus
on hard drugs (heroin and cocaine) instead of marijuana, which was generally considered as a
soft drug. Likewise, the inability of the FBN to push for legislation against marijuana might be
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due to the constitutional challenge that had confronted the implementation of the Harrison Act.
Perhaps the FBN wanted to avoid any further litigation that could arise with a federal antimarijuana law. Instead, the FBN endorsed the passage of the Uniform State Narcotics Act under
the jurisdiction of many state laws in the early 1930s (Ferraiolo, 2007).
The FBN’s approach of policy inertia did not work in favor of the agency for a very long
time. The bureau became the subject of public criticism because of the constant media reports on
crimes reportedly associated with marijuana use across the country. The attention of some
lawmakers was quickly drawn to the persistent public resentment against the policy inertia of the
FBN. The bureau’s annual budgetary allocation was subsequently reduced from $1.7 million in
1932 to $1.0 million in 1934 (Meier, 1994:33), as one of the measures for an expected action
from the agency. Faced with the barrage of challenges and the fear of completely losing its
public trust, the FBN responded to these challenges by directing their attention to the marijuana
issue. As Meier (1994) observes, the reason for the FBN’s decision to actively get more engaged
with the marijuana issue was to regain its public trust and some level of control over the drug
policy process. The policy outcome of FBN’s active role was the passage of a federal law
(Marijuana Tax Act), which prohibited the use of marijuana (McWilliams, 1992:15).
Soon after the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act (MTA), key questions began to emerge
on some of the campaign strategies that were used by the FBN in getting the marijuana law
enacted. Not only was the agency involved in drafting the legislation for passage, but Anslinger
also personally mounted a gruesome media campaign linking marijuana use to increasing crime
across America (Zimring and Hawkins 1992; Bertram et al., 1996; Kinder, 1992). For example,
during one of the Congressional hearings on the bill (Marijuana), Anslinger gave a testimony
citing numerous cases where he linked marijuana users to serious criminal activities such as sex
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crimes and murder. He also cited cases where marijuana use was responsible for incidents of
insanity and addiction among many young people across America (Carroll, 2004:74; Sharp,
1994:21).
In one of these famous cases linking marijuana use to criminal activities, Ferraiolo
(2007:154) and McWilliams (1992:16) recount how Anslinger in his congressional testimony
mentioned a case involving a twenty-one year old Victor Licata of Florida, who was reported to
have killed his parents, two brothers, and a sister while under the influence of marijuana.
Anslinger also cited Chicago and Baltimore as examples of other cases of marijuana-induced
crimes to the Congressional committee. He, for example, indicated that: “In Chicago, recently
two boys murdered a policeman while under the influence of marijuana…Recently, in Baltimore,
a young man was sent to the electric chair for having raped a girl while under the influence of
marijuana.”32 As clearly revealed, Anslinger led the campaign for the prohibition of marijuana
by amplifying his horrific cases in an attempt to frame the marijuana issue to the advantage of
his agency. Undoubtedly, these gruesome stories had a strong impact in reinforcing public
opinion against marijuana use, hence the massive public support for the marijuana law.
Regardless of the overwhelming public and congressional support, it is also important to
note that the bill was not without some ardent critics. In fact, Dr. William C. Woodward, the only
outspoken opponent and a representative of the American Medical Association (AMA),
questioned the credibility of Anslinger’s Congressional testimony that linked marijuana use to
many criminal activities across the country (Carroll, 2004; Ferraiolo, 2007). Dr. William C.
Woodward and other critics of Anslinger accused him of presenting incomplete and inconsistent

32

These cases were part of the recorded testimony during the Congressional hearing of Anslinger on the marijuana
bill. Cases cited by Ferraiolo (2007) and McWilliams (1992).
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stories regarding the connection between marijuana use and criminal activities. For example,
McWilliams (1992) observes that although the famous Licata case cited by Anslinger appeared
factual, the complete story was not told by him. According to McWilliams (1992:16), few days
after the alleged murder, it was also reported that Licata was earlier diagnosed with some mental
problems, and the criminal act committed might not necessarily be linked to marijuana use.
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the bill, the Marijuana Tax Act was passed
into law as a revenue act in 1937 (Carroll, 2004; Musto 1999; Zimring and Hawkins, 1992). The
law, which was modeled on the provisions of the 1914 Harrison Act, prohibited the possession
and use of marijuana in any form, except for medical purposes (Sharp, 1994). Although the law
was framed as a revenue tax (Carroll, 2004; Musto 1999), Benavie (2009:22) argues that the real
objective of the MTA was not primarily concerned with revenue collection. Instead, the law was
strictly aimed at enforcing the prohibition of marijuana under the guise of a revenue act. For
example, some of the provisions of the law for physician compliance were not only complex, but
were too extensive for simple comprehension (Ferraiolo, 2007:154).
Moreover, the interpretation of the law was also subject to diverse administrative
discretion by the enforcement agencies. A similar provision of the law included a prohibitive tax
of $100 for unlicensed transactions in marijuana. Failure to pay these taxes or any violation
related to the taxes on marijuana attracted a steep fine of $2,000 or arrest and imprisonment up to
five years (Benavie, 2009). As expected, the passage of the MTA not only allowed Anslinger
and his FBN to regain their bureaucratic control and dominance over the narcotics issue, but the
law also intensified the punitive option of narcotics control across many parts of America.
With the strong bureaucratic control by the FBN in shaping the implementation of the
MTA, two policy-related outcomes occurred. First, the FBN’s reliance on law enforcement
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powers to persecute marijuana users facilitated the development of a strong punitive law
enforcement-oriented approach to the US narcotics control policy (Ferraiolo, 2007; Sharp,
1994:22). The emphasis on an exclusively law enforcement strategy not only shaped the three
decades of Anslinger’s reign as head of the FBN, but also the strategy became the cornerstone of
subsequent anti-drug policies in the US and in many other countries. During his early years in
office for example, Anslinger was quoted to have urged many American judges to “jail
offenders, then throw away the key” (MacWilliams, 1992:17).
The second policy outcome that occurred was the shrewd implementation strategy that
was adopted against many marijuana users by the agency. In many instances, FBN agents were
accused of using propaganda media campaign to demonize drug users. Baumgartner and Jones
(1993:152) share a similar argument on how the punitive option of narcotic drugs received a
considerable emphasis against other policy options (treatment) during the 1930s. For them, the
law enforcement policy option under Anslinger was much more severe than the period of alcohol
prohibition in the 1920s. Moreover, from the 1940s throughout the 1960s, the FBN had
successfully eliminated any existing recognition of marijuana as a viable medicinal option for the
treatment of some chronic diseases (Bertram et al., 1996). In 1941, for instance, the United States
Pharmacopeia33 excluded marijuana from its list of recognized medical substances for the first
time since 1850, because of a directive from Anslinger to do so (Ferraiolo, 2007:155; Bertram et
al., 1996:81).
By the early 1950s, the FBN was firmly in control of the US narcotics policy subsystem
with considerable support from the general public and some members of Congress. As Sharp
(1994:22) argues, the FBN also attracted further support from key organized groups, such as the
33

The US Pharmacopeia is an official public standards-setting authority for the quality, purity, identity, and strength
of all medicinal drugs. http://www.usp.org/aboutUSP/ Retrieved 08/24/11.
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General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC),Women’s Christian Temperance Union
(WCTU), and the World Narcotics Defense Association (WNDA).34 Clearly, this kind of
subsystem policy arrangement became apparent within the US narcotics policy domain by the
1940s. As students of subsystem politics (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2009; Worsham, 1997;
McCool, 1989; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) argue, a dominant policy subsystem (iron
triangle) often develops among three major players that exercise influence over the course of a
policy process. These include: bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, and congressional
committees. As we have seen, the theoretical concept of subsystem politics was particularly
apparent in the US narcotics policy sphere from the mid 1940s throughout the late 1960s. On one
side, for example, was the bureaucratic influence of the FBN over the narcotics policy process.
On the other side were powerful interest groups, such as the GFWC and the WCTU among
others. The congressional subcommittees (subcommittee on Improvement of the Federal
Criminal Code) with oversight responsibilities on narcotics were also involved within the
narcotics subsystem. Broadly, their shared belief and policy ideas generally favored a law
enforcement approach to narcotics control. These core policy ideas were well-institutionalized
with limited avenues of policy change, other than incremental changes in policy (McWilliams,
1992; Bertram et al., 1996).
Essentially, the punitive anti-drug laws did not end with the passage of the 1937
Marijuana Law. Considering the strong subsystem dominance and the increasing public support
against these drugs, the FBN went a step further and redefined narcotics use as a national crisis.
By the early 1950s, further tougher penalties were proposed for offenders (McWilliams, 1992).
The important question to ask is: why has the drug problem been redefined and reframed by the
34
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FBN as a national crisis? Indeed, the answer to this question will be helpful with some
theoretical exposition for better appreciation of the policy process. In this regard, I will draw on
the theoretical concept of policy image 35of Baumgartner and Jones (1993:25-26) to explain this
scenario.
According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), policy image is “how a policy is understood
and discussed.” Examining this concept under the broad punctuated equilibrium theory,
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) contend that the public understanding (policy image) of a policy
tends to shape the overall outcome of such a policy. Worsham (1997:11) makes a similar
argument when he examines the concept of issue salience in his work on subsystem politics. For
Worsham (1997), it can be very difficult to restrict public participation in policy domains that are
non-technical, such as narcotics policy, unlike technical policies (economic, nuclear, and space),
which might be difficult for quick public understanding of the key issues. In most cases, the
media serves as the main channel in stimulating public debate on key policy issues. This was
particularly the case with the narcotics policy. Once the public interest and participation in the
drug debate intensified, the FBN saw the public interest as a good opportunity to redefine and
expand the image of the issue by linking it to key national concerns at the time (Bertram et al.
1996). Perhaps, their purpose was to attract the attention of previously apathetic groups
(Schattschneider, 1960) to the drug issue.
For example, the FBN exploited the Cold War politics at the time to create fear and
insecurity by linking drug trafficking and use to communism. Communism was said to have
infiltrated the American society through illegal drug trade (Bertram et al., 1996: McWilliams,
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1992; Caroll, 2004; McWilliams, 1990). Musto (1999: 231) adds that the FBN used infamous
stories that Red communist China had secret plans to destroy Western societies, particularly the
US, by injecting large amounts of narcotic drugs into these countries. Once the conscience of the
American public was “tainted” with these scare tactics of linking narcotic drugs to communism,
the narcotics policy image became successfully reframed as an urgent national issue. Many
Americans became convinced of the need to support the adoption of tougher anti-drug legislation
at the expense of other options (treatment) in narcotics control (Ferraiolo, 2007).
In addition to the usefulness of policy image in explaining the emergence of the tougher
punitive anti-drug laws, two other perspectives exist in the literature in explaining the adoption
of the punitive anti-drug laws in the 1940s throughout the 1960s. First, the FBN expressed
dissatisfaction with the existing penalties for narcotic violations, which they considered as
inadequate to deter users and likely users from these drugs. Second, the judicial system was
considered too soft and unwilling to impose long prison sentences on drug offenders
(McWilliams, 1992). Once the policy recommendations for tougher anti-drug laws were
articulated by the FBN with strong public support, Congress took serious notice of the problem
as well. Congressman Hale Boggs (D-Louisiana) was among many legislators who were key
allies of the FBN in Congress, and shared similar supporting ideas for tougher anti-drug laws.
Subsequently, Congressman Boggs with the support of other members of Congress, introduced a
tougher anti-drug bill, which led to the passage of the Boggs Narcotics Act of 1951.
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Boggs Act (BC) of 1951
In his book the Protectors,36 McWilliams (1990:108) examined Congressional records to
determine the number of legislators who introduced key legislation for stiffer drug control policy
during the 1950s. The results of the study are very revealing. In 1951 for instance, twenty six
bills (twenty two in the House and four in the Senate) were introduced in Congress, and many of
those proposed bills were related to law enforcement regarding illegal drugs alone. Some of the
proposed bills ranged from a stiffer penalty for drug offenders to the deportation of foreign
nationals living in the US who were drug addicts (McWilliams, 1990).
Regardless of the criticisms leveled against the Boggs bill due to its stiffer provisions, the
bill was successfully passed into law with an overwhelming support for stiffer and a more
punitive federal drug control (Meier, 1994; Gray, 2000; McAllister, 2004). One of the main
provisions of the Boggs Act created a compulsory prison sentence for all first time drug related
offenders. In addition to the compulsory prison sentence, a fine of $2,000 was also imposed on
offenders. For first offenders, the law provided a penalty of a five-year jail sentence with a
minimum of a two-year mandatory sentence.
For second offenders of the same offense, the law provided a mandatory prison sentence
of five to ten years, with no opportunity for probation or for a suspended sentence (McWilliams,
1992). In fact, the suspended prison sentence, which was part of the previous narcotic laws, was
completely eliminated in the Boggs Act. Third, those guilty of the same offense also faced a
prison term of ten to twenty years, with no provision for a suspended sentence (McWilliams,
1992:19). For some scholars (Oppenheimer, 1993: 197; Courtwright, 2002:3; White, 2002:139;
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Fisher, 2006:58), the Boggs Act set the stage for one of the toughest, if not the toughest, federal
anti-drug laws ever passed in the US. Clearly, these calibrations appear to fit Hall’s (1993)
conceptualization of a first order change in policy. Although the narcotics policy instrument
(punitive approach) did not change, the settings of the instrument (severity of the punishment)
experienced change from one level to another. Hall describes this scenario as a first order change
in policy. Still, the FBN never gave up on its efforts in promoting a tougher punitive legislation
against illegal drugs even after the passage of the Boggs Act. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956
was the outcome of their efforts.

Narcotics Control Act (NCA) of 1956
Like the previous anti-drug laws, the FBN made every attempt to continue with its
criminalization and tougher punishment for narcotics producers, traffickers, and users. Similarly,
quite a number of opponents from key interest groups and individuals who were opposed to the
criminalization of narcotic drugs, especially the mandatory prison sentences imposed in the
Boggs Act, never ceased to campaign against these stiffer laws (Sharp, 1994). The American
Medical Association (AMA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) were among the few
professional interest groups who raised serious objections to the stiffer penalties under the Boggs
Act. These groups appealed to Congress to reevaluate the mandatory provisions of the Boggs Act
(Meier, 1994). In response to these demands, Congress in 1955, set up a Congressional hearing
committee to reevaluate some of the existing narcotic laws across America. The country wide
hearing was under the chairmanship of Senator Price Daniel, a Texas Democrat (Sharp, 1994).
The question of why these interest groups succeeded in drawing the attention of Congress
to a revision of the mandatory sentence under the Boggs Act might be of a theoretical interest to
86

any student of the policy science, including the author of this study. Typically, the strength of
resources (numbers and financial) of some interest groups, whose goal is to shape and influence
public policy (Studlar, 2002) in a pluralistic democracy, such as the US, constitutes an important
explanatory factor for the reason why the AMA and ABA succeeded in drawing the attention of
Congress to the issue. As Studlar (2002:69) contends, organized groups such as the AMA and
the ABA’s close relationship with government is an important part of interest group theory as
well as subsystems politics.
Sharing similar views with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), Studlar (2002:70) argues
that actors in a policy subsystem usually form coalitions, which are based on shared set of beliefs
and ideas. Subsystem players, including interest groups, also do engage in a coordinated activity
in order to achieve their policy goals. Applying this theoretical concept to the activities of these
interest groups (AMA and ABA) suggests that these groups shared similar set of beliefs and
ideas against the mandatory prison sentence under the Boggs Act. The implication of the
coordinated efforts by these groups, as the theory suggests, may have provided a strong influence
on Congress’ decision to reexamine the law.
The country wide hearings, which were conducted by the Senate Judiciary subcommittee
on behalf of Congress, heard a total of 345 witnesses, including drug addicts and other ordinary
people within the entire segment of the American population. A total of 8,667 pages of testimony
were generated and submitted to Congress for review. Some of the revelations from the report
conveyed gruesome pictures of how drug addiction had affected many people and the likely
consequences of drug abuse on the American society.37 It was also revealed in the report that the
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US alone had about 60,000 more drug addicts than all the other Western countries’ combined in
the early 1950s. The rate of increase, the report noted, was about 1,000 per month. Interestingly,
the final report from the hearings also linked drug addiction to criminal activities across many
parts of the country. The report, for example, noted that drug addiction constituted about 50
percent of all crimes committed in major US cities and 25 percent of all crimes committed in the
entire country. However, some critics expressed skepticism about the pattern of the
congressional report, which they believed was similar to the tactics used by the FBN in shaping
public opinion against the drug problem.38
The policy implication of the report was the passage of the Narcotics Control Act in
1956. In fact, scholars (Gray, 2000; Musto, 1999; Sharp, 1994; Fisher, 2006) observe that many
provisions of the NCA ended up being more punitive than expected. Many key provisions of the
law doubled the existing penalties under the Boggs Act. More importantly, for the first time in
the history of the US narcotics policy, the death penalty was introduced for offenders caught
selling hard drugs, such as heroin to minors (Balenko, 2000). A major policy change regarding
the prison sentence was clearly evident in the passage of the NCA as compared to the Boggs Act.
Unlike the previous provisions on the prison sentences, the provision on the prison sentence
under the NCA, for example, increased from 5 to 10 years for first offenders, and from 10 to 20
years for second offenders.39 The implementation of the law also received some considerable
enhancement for effective enforcement from the agencies. For example, while the processing of
drug offenders was simplified for police officers and state prosecutors (Gray, 2000), the
discretionary powers given to judges to postpone sentences for probationary periods were
completely eliminated (McWilliams, 1992). Again, the nature of these changes shows a clear
38
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evidence of changes in the settings of the punitive policy instrument, but not with the policy
instrument itself. In essence, these changes largely represent a first order change in the narcotics
policy.
The overall implications of the new anti-drug laws (Boggs Act and NCA) had farreaching consequences for the US narcotics policy outcomes. Two specific policy-related
outcomes occurred between the early 1930s to the late 1960s. First, the influence of the FBN, as
previously discussed, created a powerful narcotics policy subsystem with a punitive supporting
idea (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1997; Ferraiolo, 2007). The second policy
implication was the emergence of a strong personalized leadership influence within the drug
policy arena. Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993:85) describe this
kind of personal leadership as policy entrepreneurship.40 In fact, Anslinger exemplified the
entrepreneurial role by way of the personal efforts he exerted in shaping the narcotics policy
process for about three decades (1930s to 1960s). Besides Anslinger, the personal entrepreneurial
efforts by Congressman Hale Boggs and other congressional leaders in the passage of the Boggs
Act also showed further evidence of how policy entrepreneurs shape the narcotics policy process.
From a broad theoretical standpoint, one can argue that agenda-setting theory (issue
definition/redefinition, policy image, issue salience, framing, and policy entrepreneurship) was
evident in the first phase of the US narcotics policy development. The politics of attention, a
major theoretical element in agenda-setting, was also apparent in the phase. For example, the
focus of attention on the drug issue came from key domestic groups of actors, such as the
Congress, the media, the American public, bureaucratic agencies, policy entrepreneurs, and key
interest groups in shaping the narcotics policy process. Although the drug issue received a high
40
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level of attention from these key policy actors, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that
the issue received a high presidential attention during this phase. While partisan ideology was
less dominant in the policy process in this phase, subsystem politics, on other hand, played an
important role in shaping the narcotics policy process.
More importantly, the preceding discussion reveals that the narcotics policy process has
generally undergone a first order policy change. As laid out in chapter two, a change in the
settings of a policy instrument with no change occurring in the policy instrument itself, let alone
the overall policy goals, constitute a first (incremental) order of policy change.
In the case of the narcotics policy, the policy instrument of punitive and law enforcement
approach did not change, but the severity of the anti-drug punitive laws changed in an
incremental mode. For example, there were changes in the prison sentences, fines, and in the
administrative procedures and practices (McWilliams, 1992; Meier, 1994; Gray, 2000;
McAllister, 2004) aimed at facilitating the implementation of the policy instrument (punitive
policy). Although a treatment policy option existed as an alternative strategy, its application was
very limited in scope and practice. Quite simply, the policy instrument during the first phase was
generally punitive and law enforcement focused (Meier, 1994). In fact, the degree of severity of
the anti-drug laws increased from one level to another. This was clearly revealed in the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, the Boggs Act of 1951, and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. In
essence, Hall’s theoretical model of a first order change in policy provides a compelling
explanation for the nature and type of the US narcotics policy process.
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Second Phase: Emergence of the War on Drugs (1969-1980)
The US narcotics policy process during the second phase took a totally different direction
and focus as compared to the previous phase. The phase is shaped by the emergence of the war
on drugs in the Nixon era and the de-escalation of the so-called drug war during the
administrations of Ford and Carter. Unlike the previous phase, the narcotics policy issue in the
second phase received a high presidential attention especially in the Nixon era, which led to the
issue being sustained on both the systemic and institutional agendas for quite some time.
In fact, Sharp (1994: 23) describes the Nixon era as “one of the most dramatic episodes
of drug policymaking in American history.” Broadly, the second phase extends the discussion on
the US narcotics policy development by examining the underlying explanations for the war on
drugs, key narcotic legislations enacted, presidential agenda-setting dynamics, and the patterns of
policy change from Hall’s (1993) perspective. The interplay of partisan politics in narcotics
policymaking will also be analyzed in this phase. For a better understanding of the Nixon era, it
is imperative first to examine the drug situation prior to the declaration of the so-called war on
drugs.
Soon after his inauguration in January 1969, President Richard Nixon redefined the drug
problem as America’s number one public enemy and subsequently declared an all-out “war” on
drugs (Wisotsky, 1986; Meier, 1994; McWilliams, 1992; Musto, 1999; Krogh, 2002). While
some share the view that Nixon’s initial approach to the drug issue was a candid policy response
to the deteriorating drug situation in the country, others believe that the so-called war on drugs
was an attempt by Nixon and the Republican party to fulfill their “law and order,” or toughness
on drugs promises they made to the American people during the presidential campaign (Bertram
et al.1996: 105). In any case, scholars such as Thoumi (2003), Massing (2000), and Spillane
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(2004) agree that the abuse of psychoactive substances substantially increased from the late
1950s throughout the 1960s, and may have been a more likely reason for Nixon’s declaration of
the war on drugs. What accounted for the widespread use of these drugs is, however, a subject of
many debates and different interpretations among scholars. I will attempt to examine some of
these explanations in the next few paragraphs.
According to Boyum and Reuter (2005:5), the inability of the federal government to
provide enough budgetary and logistical support for the implementation of the earlier drug laws
may have accounted for the widespread use of these drugs. For Boyum and Reuter (2005), in
spite of the so-called public and institutional fanfare that characterized much of the anti-drug
legislation of the 1930s throughout the late 1960s (MTA of 1937, the Boggs Act of 1951, and the
NCA 1956), the implementation of these anti-drug laws suffered many budgetary constraints. On
the contrary, Musto (1999) offers a different view regarding the factors responsible for the drug
menace during the 1960s. For Musto (1999:247), economic, socio-cultural, and political factors
best explain the drug phenomenon. Advancing his argument, Musto believes that the surge in
drug use among many Americans was directly connected to the expanding economic wealth of
the US during the 1960s where increased national productivity, coupled with the availability of
money, created a large market for consumer goods. In effect, anything that promised to make
people feel comfortable, including narcotic drugs, was easily accessible. Although narcotic drugs
were unlawful and socially unacceptable, it soon became associated with the rich and famous,
and a symbol of pride among the so-called successful Americans (Musto, 1999).
From a socio-cultural perspective, Musto (1999) contends that the increase in drug use
was due to the generation of “baby boomers” who had reached their adolescent years (15 through
24) in the 1960s. Caulkins et al. (2005:12-13) share a similar cultural view and argue that the
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increase in drug use epitomized the prevailing cultural forces of “anti-establishment” attitudes
and sentiments among many young people during the 1960s. Strangely, illegal drug use was seen
as a way to counter the established culture and the political establishment at the time (Ferraiolo,
2007; Caulkins et al., 2005; Sharp, 1994). Likewise, many college students were dissatisfied with
the Vietnam War and joined the “drug counter culture movement” to express their dissatisfaction
with the political establishment (Musto, 1999:248; Caulkins et al., 2005:12). In actual fact,
marijuana use was not only glorified in movies and in popular songs, but the drug became
directly associated with the anti-war movement (Ferraiolo, 2007:157; Sharp, 1994). The drug
subsequently attained an important political significance in the 1960s. The escalation in the
number of marijuana related arrests across many cities and towns in the US showed the overall
effect of the drug problem.
A national survey report during the late 1960s revealed that close to 24 million
Americans over the age of 11 had used marijuana at least once since 1965 (Musto, 1999). It was
also revealed that the use of marijuana was not only popular among many minority groups, but
the drug use also widened in scope from the so-called rich and famous to those in the middle
class. Another survey by the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (NCMDA) in
the late 1960s revealed that about 5.14 percent of college students reported to have tried heroin at
some point in time in their lives. This figure was up from 3.2 percent from the previous year.
Also, from 1960 to 1966, the lifetime use of marijuana among young people, ages eighteen to
twenty-four, saw a dramatic increase of about threefold.41 Based on these troubling figures and
the increasing pervasiveness of the drug problem, the Nixon government was forced to reframe
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the drug problem as a national crisis. The problem was also reframed as an urgent war that must
be fought on all fronts (Bertram et al.,1996; Musto, 1999).
The late 1960s was also particularly important because the era signified a major breaking
point for the narcotics policy agenda. For the first time in the history of US narcotics policy
making, drug policy basically shifted from a low attention issue to a high presidential attention
issue. In their study Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media, Edwards
and Wood (1999), argue that although other key domestic players, such as the Congress and the
media, do set policy agendas, presidents frequently act in an entrepreneurial capacity in setting
agendas because of the unique role (bully pulpit) they can play in directing the attention of other
key players to a policy issue. For Edwards and Wood (1999), influencing a policy agenda is an
important source of political power that creates the momentum for policy change.
Given Nixon’s political background, ideological orientation, and his presidential control
over the narcotics policy agenda, many expected an exclusively law enforcement approach to his
narcotics policymaking. Instead, Nixon adopted a comprehensive approach where treatment
option was also incorporated with law enforcement to narcotics control. What led to this policy
strategy remains an important question that continues to engage the attention of scholars. The
question is: was Nixon’s comprehensive drug policy an embodiment of a policy change or a
policy contradiction? The next section examines both sides of the debate.

Narcotics Control under Nixon: A Policy Change or Policy Contradiction?
Faced with the increasing drug abuse problem, the administration responded to the issue
in many different ways. One of the strategies that the Nixon White House adopted was to draw
on the long-standing connection between drug use and the increasing crime rate as the basis for
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his policy approach. Many drug addicts were not only stigmatized, but viewed as symbols of
criminality (Bertram et al., 1996). In his first major address to Congress, for example, Nixon
made a compelling case for tougher anti-drug laws. His message resonated with both Congress
and the American public regarding the need for tougher laws on narcotic drugs (Bertram et al.
1996).
The administration became actively involved in many policy initiatives for tougher antidrug legislations. As McWilliams (1992:20-21) observes, the extent to which the administration
was directly involved in the narcotics policy process was a remarkable characteristic feature of
the Nixon White House. Some of the efforts by the White House ranged from anti-drug
legislative proposals, to public campaign programs, to major influence over the bureaucratic
enforcement agencies. For McWilliams (1992), never before had the executive branch of
government played such an influential role on narcotics policy than during the Nixon era. As
agenda-setting theorists (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1998; Studlar, 2002) argue,
the purpose of presidential influence and control is to shape the course of a policy agenda on
both the systemic and institutional levels, and the narcotics policy under Nixon was no exception
to this conceptual idea.
The first major legislation passed under the Nixon era was the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act (CDAPCA) of 1970 (Musto and Korsmeyer, 2002:83). The
Act was distinguished from earlier legislation on the basis of its two essential provisions. First,
the law created five categories of controlled substances, known as schedules as shown in table
3.2.
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Table 3.2
Schedules of Controlled Substances
1.Schedule I

Example; heroin, LSD, Marijuana, and Methaqualone
(a) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse
(b) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States
(c) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision

2. Schedule II

Example; morphine & cocaine
(a) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse
(b) The drug or other substance has currently been accepted for medical use in the
United States with severe restrictions
(c) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence
Example; barbiturates
(a) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less than the drugs or other
substances in schedules I and II
(b) The drug or other substance has currently been accepted for medical use in the
United States
(c) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical
dependence or high psychological dependence

3. Schedule III

4. Schedule IV

5.Schedule V

Example; tranquilizers
(a) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs of
other substances in schedules III
(b) The drug or other substance has currently been accepted for medical use in the
United States
(c) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or
psychological dependence relative to drugs or other substances in schedule III
Example; cough syrups containing codeine
(a) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to drugs and other
substances in schedules IV
(b) The drug or other substances has currently been accepted for medical use in the
United States
(c) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to limited physical dependence or
psychological dependence relative to drugs or other substances in schedules IV

Source: Adapted from Belenko (2000:279). Also see http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ Retrieved on
1/31/2012.

The controlled substances are classified into the following categories: the degree of potential
abuse of the substances, the likelihood of the drug’s harmfulness, and the possibility for some
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legitimate medical use of the substance (Sharp, 1994:25; Spillane and McAllister, 2003: S8;
Abadinsky, 2005:13; Belenko, 2000:278).
In fact, the Office of Diversion Control (US Department of Justice) describes substances
under schedule I as drugs that have no accepted medical use in the United States. In essence,
drugs under schedule I cannot be prescribed for medical use. On the contrary, drugs listed under
schedules II to V are considered as having some accepted medical use and may be prescribed for
medical purposes.42 Although marijuana is still classified under schedule I as heroin and LSD,
Dennis and White (1999) note that many states have treated it as belonging to other schedules (II
to V) by reducing the penalties for marijuana possession.
The second important provision was the consolidation of all the previous federal narcotic
laws enacted since the Harrison Act of 1914. The comprehensive nature of the CDAPCA was a
unique characteristic of the era as well a significant provision of the Act. Against expectation,
the treatment option received some considerable financial and logistical support, unlike previous
narcotic legislation (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001:33). For example, budgetary allocations were
provided for treatment and prevention programs. Also, many existing Mental Health Centers for
drug addicts across the country were expanded. A chronology report on the US narcotics policy
since the 1960s by Frontline-Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) indicates that the majority of
funding for narcotics policy under the Nixon era was allocated to treatment, prevention, and
educational programs, as compared to law enforcement.
As Massing (2000) indicates, a total amount of $85 million was provided for treatment of
drug addicts, while $39 million was allocated for drug abuse educational projects and campaigns
42
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in the early years of the Nixon era. With the unprecedented support for the treatment option,
Massing (2000:119) maintains that the federal spending on treatment and prevention in 1973, for
example, increased by $420 million more since Nixon took office. In essence, demand-side
(treatment option) programs took about two-thirds of the federal drug budget as compared to
one-third for supply-side or law enforcement approach (Massing, 2000). In fact, this was the
only time in the history of the US narcotics policymaking that treatment option received a
considerable funding over law enforcement approach to narcotics control.43
The expansion of the heroin addiction treatment program under the support of the
Department of Corrections in the District of Colombia (DC) was another example of the
treatment option programs. The program, which was extended under the Narcotics Treatment
Administration (NTA), used methadone for the treatment of heroin addicts (DuPont, 2002:67-68;
Kleber, 2002; Reuter and MacCoun, 2002; Krogh, 2002). Part of the provisions of the law
provided for the establishment of a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
(SAODAP). The SAODAP was subsequently created in 1971 with the purpose of coordinating
all federal prevention and treatment programs in the country. Also, the methadone treatment
program experienced a dramatic expansion following the establishment of the SAODAP
program, as well as the client services of the SAODAP, which saw an increase from 20, 000 in
October 1971, to over 60,000 by December 1972, and another increase to about 80,000 by
October 1973 (Musto, 1999:253).
In addition, there were relative increases in budget allocations from $8.5 million in 1970
to $45.7 million in 1973 for prevention, training, and other treatment focused educational
43
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programs (Sharp, 1994:29). This was followed by the establishment of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) with the responsibility of overseeing drug research, treatment, and
prevention across the country (Ferraiolo, 2007, McBride and McCoy, 2003).
In terms of theoretical application, the analysis in this phase, particularly the narcotics
policy in the Nixon era, shows some level of policy change. Clearly, the policy changed from an
exclusively law enforcement approach, which characterized the previous drug policies, towards a
more balanced strategy that incorporated the treatment option with law enforcement in narcotics
control (DuPont, 2002; Musto, 1999:255). Regardless of how one looks at it, drug policy under
Nixon had experienced some level of policy change. Examining the US drug policy process from
a comparative perspective, for example, Sharp (1994:134-36) demonstrates with compelling
evidence how policy change had occurred during the Nixon era, as compared to previous eras.
By systematically examining a number of congressional records from the Harrison-Anslinger era
to the Nixon era, Sharp (1994) reveals that the pro-enforcement interest groups44 appeared much
more often during the congressional hearings on narcotic drugs than the treatment oriented
interest groups during the Harrison-Anslinger era (1914-1960s).
In the 1970s (Nixon era: 1969-1973), however, the pro-treatment interest groups45
appeared much more in the congressional hearings than did the enforcement-oriented interest
groups. The interpretation of Sharp’s (1994:134-136) findings is quite simple. The emphasis on
enforcement of narcotics control was clearly evident during the congressional hearings between
1914 to the late 1960s. In contrast, the emphasis on treatment was equally apparent during the
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congressional hearings from 1969 to 1973 when Nixon was in the White House. Again, the
results show how interest groups dominated the congressional hearings during the period under
review.
Given the fact that interest groups, to some extent, shaped the narcotics policy process
under Nixon, it is equally imperative also to explore other agents and policy incentives that
created the window of opportunity for these changes. For Ferraiolo (2007), Anslinger’s departure
from the scene was an important factor in explaining the policy shift during the Nixon era. As
earlier noted, Anslinger’s personal leadership and style under the FBN, without doubt greatly
influenced the consolidation of the punitive law enforcement approach for decades without any
major shift in policy. The FBN, however, lost its policy dominance and their influence
diminished following the retirement of Anslinger in 1962. According to Ferraiolo (2007:157),
this was also the same period that the FBN’s control over information began to crumble as public
health professionals in charge of treating drug addicts began to also gain much voice in the
narcotics policy arena.
As agenda-setting theorists agree, the need for policy control is crucial in reframing a
policy issue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Studlar, 2002). In the case of the US drug policy, for
example, the activities of many pro-treatment interest groups (health professionals) to reframe
the drug abuse problem as a disease and a public health issue started to gain some attention in the
early 1970s. These groups took advantage of their influence to shape public opinion to support
the treatment option for drug addicts. For the proponents of the treatment option, drug addiction,
like any other disease, needs treatment instead of the existing punitive approach to narcotics
control (Ferraiolo, 2007). In a congressional testimony before the House in support of the 1970
Act, Daniel Freedman (psychiatrist from the University of Chicago), expressed disappointment
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with the long-standing punitive strategy of narcotics control in America. According to Freedman,
the constant threats and harassment of pro-treatment advocates from Anslinger and his agency
not only repressed the advancement of research into treatment options, but the stigmatization of
drug addicts also created a public disaffection for both users and advocates of the treatment
option.46
It is noticeable from the above discussion that some level of policy change occurred
during this phase. Unlike the previous narcotic policies that were exclusively punitive, the
discussion showed a shift in policy towards treatment approach in the Nixon era. Perhaps, the
marijuana decriminalization policy in the late 1960s to the early 1970s provides a good reflection
of the permissive narcotics policy of the era. Also, the changes that occurred in the severity of
punishment for drug offenders demonstrate another evidence of policy change. Prior to the
1970s, for example, the federal penalties for marijuana possession and use attracted severe
punishment as did other hard drugs (heroin and cocaine). The punishment was five to twenty
years imprisonment for first time offenders and ten to forty years for second time offenders
(Sharp, 1994:40). However, the penalties for marijuana possession and distribution were reduced
to a maximum of five years imprisonment and $15,000 in fines for first offenders, and $30,000
for second offenders and some jail time. In some circumstances, first time offenders were
permitted to serve probation without a guilty verdict being placed on their records. Much
evidence suggests that similar policy change, especially on marijuana laws, occurred in a number
of US states (Sharp, 1994). For example, Alaska, California, and Vermont in 1968 lowered the
penalties for the possession of marijuana. Thirty-three other states reduced marijuana possession
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A paraphrase version of Daniel X. Freedman’s Congressional testimony was cited in Ferraiolo (2007:159).
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to a misdemeanor offense while Oregon completely decriminalized marijuana possession, with
only a fine of $100 for the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.47
Clearly, Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept of orders of policy change appears to be on
display again. By applying the concept to the preceding analysis, it appears that both first order
and second order change in narcotics policy have occurred in this phase. As discussed, first order
change refers to changes in the settings of a policy instrument. The incremental changes in
reducing the punishment for marijuana offenders demonstrate a change in the setting of the
policy instrument from an exclusive prohibition option. Hall (1993) describes these kinds of
incremental changes as first order changes in policy. Besides, Nixon’s narcotics policy shift from
an exclusively law enforcement approach, which characterized the previous phases, to a balanced
approach with more budgetary allocations to treatment approach, demonstrates a degree of a shift
in the policy instrument (second order change in policy). In essence, this study contends that a
combination first and second order change occurred in the US narcotics policy domain during the
second phase.
Although Nixon’s narcotics policy goal was generally comprehensive (treatment and law
enforcement) and considered distinctive and novel, it was not without controversy. Key questions
were raised regarding the real intentions of the overall policy goals of the Administration. Sharp
(1994:25) for instance, observes that some members of Nixon’s Republican Party in Congress
were not exactly sure of the direction of his narcotics policy. For some, Nixon’s reversal from an
exclusively punitive law and order approach, a key component of his political campaign promise,
towards a treatment option after he became president contradicts his earlier known position on
narcotic drugs. In fact, Nixon’s narcotics policy shift (more emphasis on treatment) became a
47

Sharp (1994) cited the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of 1977 as the primary source of the
data.
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bone of contention, which some described as a clear demonstration of his contradictory narcotics
policy regime (Sharp, 1994).
Sharp (1994) offers some explanations as to why the Nixon administration reversed the
exclusively punitive drug policy to an integrated policy option. For Sharp (1994:29), Nixon had
to embrace the treatment approach and its distinctive methadone maintenance program for heroin
addicts, for example, as a political ploy devised to show some results in the face of the increasing
menace of drug abuse across the country. This strategy was necessary for Nixon’s re-election
campaign. The reason why Nixon’s policy decision was believed to be politically motivated was
that barely ten months after his re-election in 1972, the President declared victory over the drug
abuse problem in 1973, citing a decline in the supply and use of heroin (Bertram et al.,1996).
In contrast to the argument that Nixon’s narcotics policy overemphasized the treatment
approach, others share the view that the apparent focus on treatment by the Administration did
not undermine his relentless efforts in pushing for a strong punitive law enforcement strategy of
narcotics control. Courtwright (1992:42), for example, argues that law enforcement was actually
intensified with numerous arrests, interdiction, prosecution, imprisonment, and the seizure of
assets belonging to drug offenders during the Nixon era. For Bertram et al. (1996: 107), Nixon’s
anti-drug campaign and law enforcement spending saw a substantial increase from $43 million in
the early 1970s to $321 million by the middle of the 1970s.
In a similar argument, Sharp (1994) contends that while the treatment approach received
some level of emphasis, the Nixon era was equally characterized by a more restrictive narcotics
policy. For Sharp (1994:25-26), the Comprehensive Act of 1970 was a “landmark legislation
primarily because of its contribution to the criminal justice side of drug policy.” For example, the
mandatory minimum prison sentence set by the Act was ten years for first time drug offenders,
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with a $100,000 maximum fine. In addition, the “no-knock” provision of the Act has been
considered as one of the most punitive elements in the Comprehensive Act (Sharp, 1994:26). The
“no-knock” provision allowed law enforcement officers to enter private facilities without a
warrant from judges to arrest suspected drug dealers. They were also not required to give any
advance notice before entering a private property in a situation where they suspected some
activities related to the possession of illegal drugs (Sharp, 1994:26).
The other punitive element of the legislation was the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA) of 1970. The notable aspect of this law was the Title IX provision. The provision, also
called the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), instituted stern penalties
where violators of drug laws were not only personally punished for their drug offences, but any
drug-related property involved was subject to confiscation by the state (Sharp, 1994). Applying
Hall’s (1993) perspective to the above discussion, one could argue that these calibrations in
policy toward a more restrictive approach (increases in the severity of existing punitive laws)
demonstrates evidence of a first order change in narcotics policy during the period under review.
Besides Nixon’s anti-drug legislative gains, the bureaucratic agencies involved in the
implementation of his narcotic policies were expanded and reorganized for more influence and
control. As generally shared, the executive office of the presidency and the bureaucratic agencies
do engage in policy battles over the question of influence and control (Rachal, 1982:66-67). This
was particularly the case with Nixon’s White House and the bureaucratic agencies involved in
the implementation of the narcotics policy.
In his Reorganization Plan No 2 Initiative to Congress in 1973, Nixon proposed the
creation of a single federal agency to consolidate and coordinate many separate government
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agencies involved in narcotics control.48 Many drug control agencies, such as the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE),
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI), and the Customs Service Investigation Unit
(CSIU) were consolidated into a single new agency called the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) as shown in figure 3.2. As expected, the reorganization gave the Nixon White House
much more control and influence over the enforcement agencies involved in narcotics control
(Bertram, et al., 1996; Meier, 1994).
Figure 3.2
Genealogy of the DEA
Bureau of Internal Revenue/Dept
of the Treasury 1915-1927

U.S. Customs Service (Drug
Investigations) Dept of the
Treasury

Bureau of Prohibition/Dept of the
Treasury 1927-1930

Office of National Narcotics
Intelligence/Dept of Justice

Bureau of Narcotics/Dept of the
Treasury 1930-1968

Office of Drug Abuse Law
Enforcement (ODALE) Dept of
Justice

Bureau of Drug Abuse
Control & Food
Admin.1966-1968

Narcotics Advance
Research Mang Team/ Exe
Office of the President

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs/Dept of Justice 1968-1973

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Department of Justice 1973

Source: Adapted from DEA 2008 Report with some modifications p.7.

48

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): A Tradition of Excellence 1973-2008 report. P: 13.
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Essentially, the question of why presidents frequently reorganize bureaucratic agencies may
provide some useful indication to understanding Nixon’s action.
In her book, Federal Narcotics Enforcement; Reorganization and Reform, Rachal
(1982:70) addresses the question of why presidents embrace the reorganization of bureaucratic
agencies. According to Rachal (1982), presidents often reorganize federal bureaucratic agencies
for management or political reasons. In the case of Nixon, Rachal (1982) argues that although
some evidence suggests that his Reorganization Plan (No 2) was based on organizational factors,
strong evidence points to the fact that Nixon’s decision to reorganize the drug implementation
agencies into a single bureau was politically motivated for control and influence over these
agencies.
Unlike the first phase, the second phase was characterized by the expansion of the US
role in international narcotics control, particularly in the Nixon era. As Marcy (2010) observes,
the underlying assumption of Nixon’s foreign narcotics policy was based on the logic that once
the US succeeded in destroying the supply side of the drug equation, the likelihood of stopping
the production and trafficking of these drugs into the US would be reduced. In essence, the drug
war spilled over into the global arena (Marcy, 2010; Massing, 2000; Ryan, 2001; Friman, 1996;
Zagaris and Macdonald, 1992). Besides Mexico, the main source of supply of these drugs into
the US during the period under review was Turkey and the region of Southeast Asia. Turkey was
particularly important to the Nixon administration because it was the main source of heroin
production for the US drug market (Musto and Korsmeyer, 2002:45; Walker, 1989:191). To
address the global supply of these drugs, the Nixon administration employed interdiction policy
instruments such as military and economic aid as forms of incentives to force the targeted
countries to reduce the manufacture and the supply these narcotic drugs (Marcy, 2010:10).
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Undoubtedly, Nixon’s narcotics policy legacy has been a subject of varied
interpretations by scholars and policy experts. For Bertram et al. (1996), the Nixon era was
significant because of the integrated approach to narcotics control. As against the view that
Nixon’s narcotics policy was contradictory, Bertram et al. (1996) contend that there was no
indication of a policy contradiction. Instead, the comprehensive narcotics policy of the Nixon era
represented two different policy instruments employed by the Administration in tackling the
narcotics problem (Bertram et al., 1996:108).
For others, Nixon’s integrated narcotics policy was a matter of political compromise and
not a policy contradiction. For many, the nature of the legislative process in the US sometime
appears contradictory due to the occurrence of divided (partisan) governments. In most cases,
political parties tend to compromise some aspect of their ideological ideas on policies in order to
obtain a winning coalition to pass legislations. In a pluralistic two party system of government
such as the US, for example, where divided government49(Newman and Lammert, 2011;
Lohmann and O’Halloran, 1994; Coleman, 1999) constitutes the norm, rather than exception,
compromise and consensus building often take the center stage in the passage of major
legislations. Since the Nixon era was also characterized by a divided government, it was very
likely that his Administration compromised on his restrictive narcotics policy orientation for a
comprehensive strategy of narcotics control with Democrats, who favor a more permissive or
liberal approach to narcotics control.
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A divided partisan government is typical of a presidential system of government with two dominant political
parties. Divided government occurs when the Presidency is controlled by a different political party, while the
Legislature-Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) is also controlled by another different political party.
The Obama era (2011) is a recent good example of a divided government. In contrast, a unified government occurs
when one party controls the Presidency and the Congress (House and Senate).
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Clearly, the narcotics policy development in the Nixon era has shown key evidence of the
main theories guiding this study. As revealed in the preceding discussion, agenda-setting
versions of issue redefinition, saliency, and framing were evident in the discussion. For example,
not only was the narcotics policy issue redefined and reframed as a national crisis when
President Nixon declared the war on drugs, but also for the first time, the issue was elevated
from a low profile issue to a high profile (salient) issue as a result of the presidential attention
given to it. Also, partisan rhetoric appears to have played a role, but on a limited scale, in
shaping Nixon’s narcotics policy. This was exemplified by the earlier discussion on the concept
of divided governments and policy outcomes.
Similarly, while the scope of the US narcotics policy had widened to include treatment
option in the Nixon era, it was also evident that the policy process had undergone some types of
change. Whether towards a more restrictive narcotics policy with emphasis on the war on drugs,
or towards a more permissive approach with focus on treatment option, policy change in one
form or the other had occurred (McBride and McCoy, 2003). Indeed, Hall’s (1993) concept of
policy change is again on display during the period under review. In fact, my interpretation of the
Nixon era from Hall’s perspective could be explained from two points of view. First, although
the treatment option of narcotics control received some attention in the Nixon administration, it
was also evident in the preceding analysis that incremental changes (stiffer punitive laws)
occurred to the prohibition policy instrument of the policy. Hall (1993) describes these kinds of
incremental policy adjustments as a first order change in policy. Second, one could also argue
that the high presidential attention and the subsequent policies toward treatment-centered
approach, as compared to the overriding punitive approach that characterized the first phase,
revealed some amount of change to the narcotics policy instrument. Such a change in the policy
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instrument is what Hall (1993) describes as a second order change in policy. This study therefore
contends that a combination of first and second order changes in narcotics policy occurred in the
Nixon era.
Nonetheless, the increasing drug war rhetoric that characterized the Nixon era dissipated
soon after he resigned as President in 1974. In fact, the rhetoric on the so-called drug war was
de-escalated, when President Ford succeeded Nixon. A similar policy option (de-escalation of
the drug war) was pursued in the Carter administration. The next section of this phase will
address these policy issues.

De-escalation of the War on Drugs (1974-1980)
The second part of phase two marked another important period in the evolution of the US
narcotics policy process. Unlike the Nixon era where the war on drugs received a high
presidential focus and attention, the administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter devoted
less attention to the drug war rhetoric. In effect, the so-called war on drugs was de-escalated not
only on the public agenda, but also on the institutional agenda as well. Instead, the permissive
approach to narcotics control received more emphasis and attention as compared to the
restrictive policy option (Sharp, 1994).
As noted, the second part of this phase began in 1974 when Gerald Ford, who was the
Vice President in the Nixon administration, assumed the presidency after President Richard
Nixon resigned over the Watergate scandal. Although Ford’s presidency was very brief, there
was quite a major transformation in the overall public tone and direction of the US narcotics
policy. President Ford may have shared some aspects of Nixon’s narcotics policy when he was
Vice President, but the framing of his narcotics policy changed from the core ideas of Nixon’s
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narcotics policy after he became the President. Although a Republican, Ford’s narcotics policy
was generally opposed to the forceful, war-like narcotics policy position taken by the Nixon era
(Musto, 1999; Belenko, 2000).
Unlike Nixon, Ford rejected the idea of the possibility of totally eliminating the drug
problem. For him, it was unrealistic and probably unachievable to think of waging an all out war
on illegal drugs. Instead, Ford emphasized what became known as the policy of narcotics
containment, which involved major adjustments to the inherited narcotics policy strategies from
the Nixon era (Musto, 1999:257, Belenko, 2000:285). The de-escalation of the drug war rhetoric
was one of the major changes made to the narcotics policy strategy. In 1975, for example, the
Ford administration issued a white paper through the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force
(DCDATF), recommending the need for law enforcement agencies to only focus their attention
on the users of very dangerous narcotic drugs (cocaine and heroin).
Against many expectations, the white paper excluded marijuana from the category of
very dangerous drugs (Fisher, 2006:4). Marijuana was subsequently de-emphasized and given
low priority status, even though most states and local authorities, who actually had the
enforcement responsibilities, continued to enforce the punitive laws on marijuana (Meier,
1994:48). Clearly, the narcotics policy agenda during the Ford era was redefined towards a more
permissive approach to narcotics control. However, no major anti-drug legislation was enacted
during the era to back the permissive narcotics policy initiatives of the Administration. Perhaps,
the brief period of Ford’s presidency, as Meier (1994) rightly contends, may have been largely
responsible for the inability to pass any major anti-drug laws before Jimmy Carter succeeded
President Ford.
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Generally, the narcotics policy under the Carter administration was clearly distinguished
from other eras, particularly the Nixon era, on two major policy grounds. First, President Carter,
like Ford, toned down the drug war rhetoric. Second, the President publicly endorsed a policy
proposal to decriminalize marijuana use (Sharp, 1994; McWilliams, 1992; Belenko, 2000).
Although, Carter spoke less publicly about the drug problem than Nixon before him or Reagan
after him (Ferraiolo, 1997), the drug problem was still prominent on Carter’s domestic policy
agenda, but with a different policy focus.
In a comparative analysis of the Carter era with those of Nixon and Reagan, Sharp (1994)
observes that the drug issue was on the domestic agendas of these Presidents, but the
fundamental differences between them was the approach each employed in setting the agenda.
Employing Cobb, Ross, and Keith-Ross’ (1976) version of agenda-setting theory in explaining
their policy differences, Sharp (1994:35) argues that while Nixon used the mobilization50 form of
agenda setting, which focuses on getting public support for a given policy issue, Carter, on the
contrary, used the inside-access51agenda setting approach, which gives greater influence and
control to policy experts without necessarily drawing much public attention to the issue.
Considering the many years of the punitive approach to narcotics control before the
Carter era, it might be possible that the Administration’s inside-access strategy to narcotics
agenda was to avoid public discontent towards Carter’s liberal narcotics policy goals. As noted,
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Cobb, Ross, and Keith-Ross (1976:127) conceptualized this version of agenda-setting. For them, the mobilization
model occurs when a policy issue is initiated within a government (formal agenda), but the issue needs to be
extended to the public (public agenda) for their support before any serious consideration is given to the issue. In
other words, the issue must be expanded from the formal agenda to the public agenda to gain the popular public
support needed before an action is taken on the issue. This model fits the drug agenda approach used by the Reagan
administration.
51
The inside-access or inside-initiative model (Cobb, Ross, and Keith-Ross, 1976:128) occurs when a policy issue
arises within a governmental agenda, especially among technocrats and policy experts for consideration. Unlike the
mobilization model, the inside-access model restricts the issue from expanding to the public agenda. This model was
clearly evident in Carter’s approach to narcotics policy.
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Carter’s narcotics policy agenda was clearly towards a more permissive approach, with the
overriding objective of decriminalizing marijuana use. In a speech to Congress in August 1977,
the President urged law makers to consider reducing the penalty against the possession of
marijuana to a civil fine. For Carter, the penalties against the possession of narcotic drugs should
not be more detrimental to the individual than the use of the drug itself (Musto, 1999). Although
the initiative did not translate into any concrete narcotics policy, Carter believes that it was
essentially important to approach the drug problem from a more humane point of view, where
drug users do not feel stigmatized as criminals (Bertram et al., 1996:109; Musto, 1999:261).
Applying a theoretical perspective to the policy option in the two administrations (Ford
and Carter) appears to indicate some changes in the narcotics policy instrument. For example, the
change in tone (de-escalation of the rhetoric on the drug war) and the policy proposal to
decriminalize marijuana fit into Hall’s (1993) description of a second order change in policy.
That is a change from an exclusively law enforcement approach to a more liberal policy option to
narcotics control. Also, the agenda-setting version of issue expansion (Cobb, Ross, and Ross,
1976:127) and venue switching (Studlar, 2002) provide useful tools in understanding the
narcotics policy in this phase. As previously noted, the possibility of an issue being redefined is
an important source of influence in the process of issue expansion. Redefining and expanding an
issue to other venues also involves a substitution of one aspect of an issue for another,
particularly to interested actors who desire to shape the policy process (Cobb, Ross, and KeithRoss, 1976; Studlar, 2002).
Essentially, these concepts of agenda-setting (issue expansion and venue switching) are
particularly relevant to the marijuana case. Prior to the 1960s, for example, marijuana was
generally categorized as a “killer weed” (Ferraiolo, 2007), which was commonly found among
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the most dangerous segment (deviants and criminals) of the American society (Ferraiolo, 2007).
As earlier noted, Sharp (1994:41) asserts that the trend of marijuana use switched in the late
1960s and 1970s from being associated with the poor and ethnic minorities, to become
associated with America’s affluent and the middle-class. Once the marijuana issue expanded to
these classes, it was redefined to the level of social acceptability, giving some limited level of
public support to Carter’s decriminalization initiative.
Pro-decriminalization interest groups, such as the National Organization for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws (NORML) became actively involved in expanding the marijuana issue to the
American public for acceptance and support, which helped sustained the issue on Carter’s policy
agenda. Created in 1971, NORML has been instrumental in shaping the marijuana laws toward a
more liberal approach. In Studlar’s (2002:200) words, agenda-setting underscores “the struggle
over issue definitions and how political actors, especially entrepreneurs” take advantage of
strategic opportunities to advance their policies. Indeed, one could argue that the action by the
pro-decriminalization interest and lobby groups regarding President Carter’s decriminalization
policy proposal fit Studlar’s (2002) analysis. These versions of agenda-setting (issue expansion
and venue switching) again helped us to understand the interplay of key interest groups in
shaping Carter’s marijuana decriminalization policy initiative.
In spite of the appearance of Carter’s determination to decriminalize marijuana as part of
his broader liberal narcotics policy agenda, the law enforcement aspect of his narcotics control
also received some considerable attention. This raises some questions about Carter’s overall
narcotics policy goals and policy consistency. Irrespective of the Administration’s so-called drug
war de-escalation, Bertram et al. (1996) argue that the federal budget programs for anti-drug law
enforcement in most of the bureaucratic agencies increased during the Ford and Carter
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administrations. Although the rate of inflation accounted for some of the increases, the budget
allocations for narcotics control increased from $382 million in 1977 under Ford to $855 million
by the fiscal year of 1981 under Carter (Bertram et al., 1996).
Another important theme that emerged on Carter’s drug policy agenda was the medical
use of marijuana. The push for the marijuana initiative was introduced perhaps to compensate for
the lack of public support for the marijuana legalization proposal by the Carter era. Gallup poll
results conducted during the period under review indicate that about two-thirds of Americans
who participated in the survey rejected a total legalization of marijuana, and about fifty-five
percent believed that the use of marijuana could be physically harmful (Sharp, 1994:41). Dr.
Peter Bourne, the chief policy advisor on narcotics policy in the Carter administration, was the
principal expert behind the initiative on medical marijuana use. Bourne proposed a legislation
that would allow the use of medical marijuana in some selected facilities across the country. In
fact, Bourne also suggested the possibility of supporting a medical use of heroin (Schroder,
1975:15), but the idea failed to gain much public and institutional supports.
Once the medical use of marijuana agenda was set by the federal government, a few drug
centers were established to provide medical marijuana services to a handful of patients on trial
basis. By 1978, for example, eleven states passed marijuana decriminalization statues, while four
other states passed resolutions to recognize the medical value of marijuana. Other laws legalizing
marijuana use for patients with certain chronic diseases also came into effect, but patients were
required to obtain a prescription in most cases for these drugs (Ferraiolo, 1997:159). For many
analysts, the Carter period was distinguished from other eras on several levels. From a policy
perspective, it is undeniable that Carter’s policy priority to decriminalize marijuana use helped
set the stage for the ongoing debate on marijuana decriminalization in the country.
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Moreover, the presidential attention, although limited, provided an incentive to sustain
the issue on both the formal and public agendas for some considerable time. Besides the few
states that passed marijuana decriminalization statues and resolutions to recognize the medical
value of marijuana, the Carter administration failed to pass a federal narcotics legislation to
decriminalize marijuana use (Musto, 1999; Sharp, 1994). Quite a number of reasons have been
offered to explain the policy inertia on the part of the Carter administration.
The resignation of Dr. Peter Bourne from the government was one of the explanations
offered for Carter’s inability to pass a federal legislation to decriminalize marijuana use. Dr.
Bourne, who was President Carter’s chief policy advisor on narcotics and architect of the
Administration’s liberal narcotics policy agenda, resigned his position when he was found to
have prescribed an illegal drug substance (tranquilizer and methaqualone tablets) to an aide who
worked with him (Musto, 1999: 262; Sharp, 1994:44; Meier, 1994:48). The problem, as many
scholars (Musto, 1999; Sharp, 1994) observed, was not with Bourne’s prescription, since he was
a qualified medical doctor. The scandal rather centered on his use of a fictitious name for the
prescription in order to avoid any record of his activities in the White House. Not only was his
credibility damaged, but Bourne’s departure also had a significant impact on Carter’s drug policy
initiatives (Sharp, 1994).
For others, the unsuccessful attempt to decriminalize marijuana use was due to a strong
public opposition to the policy. Carter’s decriminalization idea, for example, was generally
interpreted by many Americans as being too soft on illegal drugs and the criminal activities
associated with drug use. As previously stated, the possible explanation why President Carter
was described as being too soft on drugs might have originated from the long decades of punitive
and law enforcement approach, which appeared to have been ingrained in the consciousness of
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the American public (Bertram et al., 1996). As the literature reveals, almost all illegal drugs were
not only criminalized, but framed as dangerous to the American society (Bertram et al. 1996).
Meier (1994) also highlights some useful insight to the limits of narcotics policy change during
Carter’s presidency. According to Meier (1994:48), President Carter’s inability to effect a major
narcotics policy change, particularly on marijuana decriminalization, was due to his single term
in office. In addition to the single term, Carter’s administration was also characterized by series
of foreign policy crises.
Similarly, Carter’s inability to achieve a policy change could partly be explained from an
institutional point of view. Explaining the institutional perspective, Bertram et al. (1996) argue
that despite the shift in the drug war rhetoric during the Ford and Carter eras, neither of them was
able to curtail the enlargement of the federal anti-drug apparatus. In other words, the law
enforcement oriented drug-war bureaucratic agencies’ operational costs could not be reduced
during their presidency. In essence, the incapability of the Carter administration to reduce the
increasing growth of the federal bureaucratic anti-drug machinery clearly suggests what Bertram
et al. (1996:110) described as the “inherited constraints- institutional and ideological-that restrict
presidents interested in even minor drug-policy reforms.” In effect, the deep-seated institutional
interests provided the incentive for many centers of resistance to major changes in narcotics
policy within the bureaucratic agencies. Besides the institutional and ideological constraints,
there were widely shared assumptions toward tougher laws on illegal drugs, which imply more
inclination toward a law enforcement approach to narcotics control (Bertram et al.,1996).
In fact, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) concept of how policy core ideas and belief
systems shape the policy process in subsystem politics reflect a similar situation in the Carter era.
Expanding on similar ideas, Worsham (1997:13) suggests that a belief system often serves as an
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institutional guard in policy subsystems. This was exactly the case in the Carter era. In 1978, for
instance, Carter’s legislative proposal for the revision of the criminal code52 on marijuana was
unable to pass into law in the US Congress. While several reasons could be responsible for the
unwillingness of Congress to change the existing criminal code, it might be possible that the
institutional constraints and shared assumptions on how narcotic drugs should be controlled were
responsible for the inability of Congress to pass the legislation. Apparently, the very institutional
structures that limited major policy changes in the Carter era became the main driving force for
the escalation of the war on drugs under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush (Bertram et
al.,1996).
As previously stated, the bureaucratic agencies constitute another source of institutional
constraint on the narcotics policy reform (Bertram et al., 1996). Although most presidents do
prefer to set and lead policy agendas for the bureaucratic agencies to follow, institutional
conflicts tend to arise in some instances because of different policy ideas (Worsham, 1997). For
Worsham (1997: 9), new political administrations (presidents) in their enthusiasm as newcomers
with different policy agendas, often try to reorganize, alter, and modernize existing policy goals
and the bureaucracy, but these policy initiatives most often run into serious problems. As many
policy experts argue, the bureaucratic agencies constitute the main domain in the implementation
of public policies. Equally important is the fact that the bureaucracy as an institution can also
develop policy core ideas and belief systems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) that may differ
from the policy agenda of a president. In Carter’s case, it was evident that the increase in the
budgetary allocation for the narcotics law enforcement agencies could be possible because of the
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The bill proposed that a possession of less than 150 grams of marijuana was to be classified as a misdemeanor and
a possession of less than 30 grams be considered a mere infraction with no prison sentence (Bertram et al., 1996).
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strong policy core ideas of these agencies that were unwilling to adopt Carter’s policy reforms
toward a more liberal narcotics approach.
Overall, the second phase, like the first, has shown a similar theoretical fitness in
explaining the evolution of the US narcotics policy. Although the three domestic theories
(agenda-setting, partisan ideology and orders of change) offer useful explanations to the
development of the narcotics policy, some have done a better job in explaining the policy process
than others. The preceding discussion, for example, shows that the versions of agenda-setting
theory (issue salience, issue expansion, issue definition, and venue switching) provide a more
useful explanatory power in understanding the narcotics policy process. Besides, the subsystem’s
politics and the role of interest groups in setting the narcotics policy agenda not only emerge as
prominent themes in the second phase, but they also provide useful explanations for the US
narcotics policy change. Although partisan ideology appeared not to have played a dominant
role, still, the phase has shown some evidence of partisan influence in the narcotics policy
process. For example, President Carter’s liberal narcotics policy proposal has again attested to
the argument that Democratic administrations are more likely to pursue a more permissive
narcotics policy than Republican administrations.
The second phase has also shown some evidence of Hall’s (1993) theory of orders change
in policy (first and second order). Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the changes that
occurred in the US narcotics policy during the first and second phases, were largely incremental
in nature as shown by the evidence of first and second order changes in policy, rather than a third
order (radical change) kind.
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Third Phase: Escalation of the War on Drugs (1981-1992)
The third phase represents another major era in the history of the US narcotics policy
development. In contrast to the later years of phase two (de-escalation of drug war era), this
phase witnessed an increase in presidential rhetoric and attention to the war on drugs. Simply
put, the war on drugs escalated (increased in scope of rhetoric and proportion in terms of
punitive laws) during this phase. Various key issues related to narcotics control again attained
high level saliency on both the institutional and systemic agendas during the administrations of
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Like the previous phases, this phase is also examined
through the three domestic policy theories underlying this study. Theories such as agendasetting, partisan ideology, and orders of policy change are employed in the analyses.
While President Nixon was credited with launching the so-called war on drugs, it was
during the early 1980s that the drug war escalated following the election of Ronald Reagan as
President of the United States. Reagan re-energized the war by exclusively emphasizing punitive
anti-drug laws (Goode, 2005:109; Thoumi, 2003:303; Wisotsky, 1990:91; Belenko, 2000:285).
Like other past narcotics policy goals, the overriding policy goal of the Reagan administration
included efforts to reduce the demands for drugs through law enforcement (Sharp, 1994). The
drug issue was redefined by the Administration through many efforts of reinforcing the drug war
rhetoric. President Reagan also declared the drug problem as one of the greatest threats facing
the American society (Baggins, 1998). In his words, “drugs are bad, and we’re going after
them……As I’ve said before, we’ve taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle
flag…and we’re going to win the war on drugs” (Zimring and Hawkins, 1992:47; Gray,
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2000:100).53 Clearly, Reagan’s reference to the “surrendered flag” epitomized his interpretation
of the liberal approach to narcotics control that his government inherited from the Carter
administration. In effect, it was not surprising that the federally funded drug-treatment initiative,
which received lots of support in the Carter era, became the target for financial cutbacks.
As the case with other previous narcotic laws, the anti-drug policy during the Reagan era
was equally shaped by several factors. From ideological standpoint, one could argue that
Reagan’s narcotics policy outcomes were largely influenced by his conservative ideas (Belenko,
2000). These conservative ideas were clearly evident in Reagan’s overwhelming preference for
law enforcement policy approach over treatment option (Sharp, 1994; Belenko, 2000). Besides,
the exclusive emphasis on law enforcement for narcotics control was also driven by Reagan’s
ability to win a lot of support from the American public. One of the key sources of support for
the Reagan administration was from the moral majority movement,54 which helped elect Reagan
to the White House in the first place. Their key message, particularly in the 1980s, was to restore
the American society to its cherished moral values, including the control of illegal drug use
(Bertram et al., 1996; Musto and Korsmeyer, 2002:241).
In addition to the above discussed factors, the US narcotics policy was also shaped in this
phase by the societal patterns of drug use in the 1980s (Ferraiolo, 2007: 160). The 1980s were
particularly important because it was the period that crack cocaine55 emerged on the scene, and
the drug quickly became one of the most widely used because its strongly addictive nature
(Sharp, 1994). In fact, the extensive use of crack cocaine was deemed to be the most frightening
53

This statement by President Reagan on reclaiming the war on drugs was cited by Zimring and Hawkins (1992)
and Gray (2000).
54
The moral majority movement promoted views that were exclusively based on the defense of the traditional
family values, conservative Christianity, morality issues, and patriotism (Bertram, et al., 1996:111).
55
Sharp (1994) distinguishes “crack” from regular powdered-cocaine. She defines “crack’ as smokable, highly
addictive, and inexpensive form of cocaine.
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threat to the American society for two main reasons. First, crack cocaine was reported to be more
highly addictive than regular cocaine. Second, crack cocaine was less expensive and much more
accessible to the poor, particularly African-Americans, than regular cocaine (Sharp, 1994). In
addition to the widespread use and other social problems associated with these illegal drugs, it
was also discovered that these drugs aided the spread of the newly HIV/AIDS disease (Sharp,
1994:53). Consequently, the policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) of the drug issue was
not only redefined as a national crisis, but the problem also became one of the top policy issues
on the agenda of the Reagan administration.
One of the first visible political actions taken by the Administration was to introduce
Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” anti-drug campaign program (Goode, 2005; Stares, 1996: Fisher,
2006; Gordon, 1994) to alert the public of the increasing dangers of drug abuse. Basically, the
initiative created a huge public awareness about the drug issue through the mass media and other
educational campaign channels. Although contested by some policy analysts, Benavie (2009:89)
argues that the “Just Say No” policy initiative was quite effective in creating public awareness
about the dangers of drug use.
On the policy front, the Reagan administration initiated new major narcotics policy
control mechanisms. For example, through a number of executive orders and support from
Congress, the Administration integrated many of the federal intelligence agencies, such as the
Central Intelligence Authority (CIA), into the war on drugs (Wisotsky, 1986:92). Similarly, by
framing the drug problem as a “national security threat” (Kraska, 2003:297), which required a
more determined tougher law enforcement effort (Bayer and Oppenheimer, 1993), the Reagan
administration, for the first time in the history of the United States, secured a Congressional
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amendment to a century old law (Posse Comitatus Act), which forbids the involvement of the
military in any civilian law enforcement.
Apparently, the amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act allowed the use of the military in
the broader war on drugs with an expanded role both at home and abroad. While the Navy was
tasked to coordinate with the Coast Guard in interdicting illegal drugs at sea, other units of the
military were empowered to assist the Customs, Coast Guard, and the DEA with training,
information sharing, and the use of their hardware equipment for drug-related operations.
Subsequently, the budgetary allocation to the military’s new role increased from $4.9 million in
1982 to more than $1 billion by the early 1990s (Bertram et al., 1996:112).
As part of the military involvement in the drug war, a unit known as the South Florida
Task Force (SFTF) was established in 1982 under the leadership of the Vice President, George
H.W Bush. The SFTF relied extensively on the military in its efforts in drug enforcement and
interdiction operations along the southern US borders. The activities of the Task Force were later
extended to cover 13 other cities (Houston, New York, Detroit, Denver, Los Angeles, Baltimore,
Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, St. Louis, Atlanta, San Diego, and Miami) by the mid 1980s
(Sharp, 1994; Lynch, 2000).
From the legislative front, this phase witnessed the enactment of key narcotic legislations,
especially during the Reagan era. Backed by his control of the bureaucratic apparatus, Reagan
announced a “legislative offensive” (Wisotsky, 1986) against illegal drugs by the mid-1980s. In
effect, the 1984, 1986, and 1988 anti-drug laws were products of Reagan’s broad policy agenda
towards the so-called legislative offensive against narcotic drugs. These anti-drug laws were
tough and very punitive (Ferraiolo, 2007). Labeled with the slogan…“zero tolerance for illegal
drugs,” the Reagan White House pushed for the passage of the 1984 Anti-Crime Law with strong
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punitive provisions. For instance, one of the provisions of the 1984 Act, known as the forfeiture,
empowered the narcotics enforcement agencies with the authority to seize any property and
assets that may be obtained from drug traffickers. A similar provision of the law also increased
the penalties for drug-related offences and gave the Attorney General some emergency powers to
categorize new drugs under the schedule I program (Sharp, 1994:53).
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was another major narcotics legislation passed in the
Reagan era. Similar to the 1984 Act, the punishment associated with drug offences in the 1986
Act was equally severe and tough (Musto, 1999). One of the core provisions of the law included
a mandatory minimum sentence for drug offenders, especially those committed around public
and private school zones. Given the widespread use of cocaine during the era, as earlier
discussed, most of the drug sentences were based on evidence of the amount of powdered or
crack cocaine found in possession of drug offenders (Musto, 1999). For Musto (1999), although
many illegal drugs are harmful, some members of Congress during the Reagan era were
convinced that crack cocaine use was more harmful than other illegal drugs.
Interestingly, this assumption became the basis for some of the key provisions of the
1986 anti-drug legislation. For example, the law provided a stiffer punishment for drug offenders
found with crack cocaine as compared to offenders found with powdered cocaine. In fact, as
Musto, (1999:274-275) observes, the “penalty for the possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine,
equal to the penalty for possession of 500 grams (about one pound) of powdered cocaine, a ratio
1:100.” The prison sentences were also tougher and punitive and range from five to forty years
with no option for a suspended sentence or for probation (Musto, 1999).
Clearly, these disparities in the sentences between crack cocaine and powdered cocaine
users suggest that race dynamics played some role in shaping the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
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Although race has been part of the US narcotics policy history since the early 1900s, the
implications of the sentence disparity between crack and powered cocaine offenders in the 1986
Act were far reaching. As previously noted, since crack cocaine was relatively cheap and
commonly used mostly by Blacks (African-Americans), it was not surprising that many Black
offenders became the largest segment of those arrested and jailed for crack cocaine use as
compared to White (European descent) offenders (Musto, 1999). Table 3.3 provides some
support to the argument.
Table 3.3
Racial Distribution in Drug Arrests (1950-1990)
Year
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990

Total
8,539
16,370
415,600
580,900
1,089,500

% White
46.1
52.0
77.8
75.6
58.5

% Black
49.9
46.2
21.0
23.6
40.7

Source: Adapted from Meier (1994:45). Original data cited from Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Annual
Crime Report.

Although Blacks constitute a small percentage of the total US population as compared to Whites,
the statistical data in table 3.3 shows a higher proportion of Black arrests, to that of Whites.
Musto (1999:276), further reports that the Sentencing Commission’s 1997 Annual Report
has shown that White Americans accounted for about 97 percent of the federal offenders on
LSD56 use, 66 percent for methamphetamine, and 21percent for powdered cocaine. On the other
hand, 86 percent of those charged for crack cocaine offenses were Blacks. Zerai and Banks
(2002) argue from a similar perspective on what they describe as the media-driven rage
regarding crack cocaine use among Blacks, especially Black women in 1980s. For them,
56

LSD is d-lysergic acid diethylamide. It is one of the most potent mood-changing chemicals. It was discovered in
1938 and commonly used by many Americans, especially white Americans.
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institutional power and its policing force are perhaps responsible for most of the anti-drug
policies, which tend to perpetuate inequalities of race, class, and gender within the American
society (Zerai and Banks, 2002:37).
The race question and the disparity in prison sentences regarding narcotic drugs might
continue to dominant the narcotics policy discourse in the US unless the issues surrounding the
disparity in sentencing are addressed. In fact, the recent attempt to address this imbalance in
sentencing is worth mentioning. In an article titled: Prison Terms for Crack Cocaine Offenses
Reduced, Serrano (2011) reports that the US Sentencing Commission voted recently to end the
unfairly long sentences for crack cocaine offenders, who are mostly African-Americans, to be
consistent with the shorter sentences often given to powder cocaine offenders, who are mostly
Whites and other affluent Americans. The Commission’s action was a response to the Fair
Sentencing Act, which was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in 2010
to reduce the disparity in sentencing between offenders involving crack and power cocaine. The
law also had a retroactive effect, which allows for the reduction of the prison term (37 months)
of about 12,000 prisoners who were connected to the disparity in sentencing (Serrano, 2011).
As expected, the 1986 Anti-drug Act provided an increase in funding for law
enforcement, but decreased funding for educational and treatment programs. Out of the total
budgetary allocation of $1.7 billion in the mid-1980s, about $1.1 billion was allocated for local,
state, and federal law enforcement, with only $200 million or 12 percent of the entire fund for
education and treatment programs (McWilliams, 1992:24). The proportion of the budgetary
allocation to treatment does not, however, suggest any major shift from the law enforcement
approach of the Reagan era. The change rather reinforced the punitive approach than the
treatment policy option. Hall (1993) describes this kind of policy shift as first order change in
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policy. By exploiting the advantage of the executive “bully pulpit,” Reagan also shaped the
public attitude towards the drug war through his regular speeches, radio addresses, and other
special events (Bertram, et al., 1996).
Another distinctive feature of the third phase, especially during the Reagan era, was the
focus on the global aspect (supply-side) of narcotics control. In addition to targeting the domestic
producers of illegal drugs, billions of dollars were also spent on fighting the drug war outside the
US (Glasser, 1991). By the late 1980s, however, the tone of Reagan’s narcotics rhetoric shifted a
little towards the domestic users (demand-side) of these drugs. Briefing the White House media
officials in 1988, for example, the President, remarked that, “drug use is not a victimless crime, it
is not a private matter… we must demonstrate our great concern for the millions of innocent
citizens who pay the high price for illegal drug use” (Sharp, 1994:56).
The third major legislative achievement of the Reagan era was the passage of the 1988
anti-drug law. Recounting the competitive partisan politics that engulfed the passage of the bill,
Meier (1994:53) notes that the 1988 anti-drug legislation reached some sort of a compromise bill
which, according to him, resembles a “Christmas tree with something for everyone.” For Meier
(1994), while the Democratic members of Congress pressed to receive more funding for drug
treatment and prevention programs, the Republicans, however, pushed for greater funding for
law enforcement, interdiction, and for the prisons. Notwithstanding the compromise, the Reagan
administration emerged with a greater share of funding for narcotics control through law
enforcement (Meier, 1994).
In fact, the display of partisanship and narcotics policymaking as Meier (1994) rightly
discussed is theoretically relevant here. Indeed, the display of partisanship in the narcotics
policymaking is consistent with the theoretical argument on partisanship and policy outcomes
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outlined in chapter two. As discussed in the theory chapter, although some variations do occur
regarding narcotics control policies by Republican and Democratic administrations, in principle,
their ideological differences on narcotics control remains intact (Bertram et al., 1996:140-141).
For example, while the Republican ideological approach has a tendency towards a restrictive/
prohibitive approach (law enforcement) to narcotics control, the Democratic ideology tends to
favor a permissive option (treatment). Again, the evidence of partisan ideological orientations
and narcotics policymaking has clearly been shown in the Reagan era.
As we have seen with the previous Acts, one of the key provisions of the 1988 legislation
was the introduction of a new and stiffer penalty for drug offenders. The penalties for crack
cocaine offenders, for example, increased across the board. For three time drug offenders, the
penalty included the possibility of a life imprisonment without a parole. Also, the death penalty
was introduced in the Act for crimes committed by notorious drug traffickers (Meier, 1994;
McWilliams, 1992). Added to this, the law required severe punishment for anyone caught with
even a small amount of illegal drugs. Besides, convicted drug offenders also risked being denied
public housing, federal grants, loans, contract, and federal occupational licenses. For effective
implementation of these laws, Reagan created a cabinet-level position with the responsibility of
coordinating the new laws (Meier, 1994; McWilliams, 1992).
Like the Reagan era, the narcotics control policy under George H. W. Bush is examined
as the second part of the third phase and within the same theoretical framework. After George H.
W. Bush became President in 1989, one of the first few public statements was about his strong
intolerance towards illegal drugs. Clearly, the US narcotics policy in the Bush years could best
be described as an extension of the Reagan era. The explanation for the policy overlap in the two
eras is the fact that Bush served under Reagan as the Vice-president. Moreover, Bush was tasked
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to supervise many of Reagan’s drug policy programs. In essence, the narcotics policy agenda of
the Bush era was almost the same (law enforcement) as the Reagan era although President Bush
tried to define his own narcotics policy agenda (Bertram, et al., 1996; Musto 1999).
In his first public statement on the drug issue, President Bush, like his predecessors,
defined drug abuse as one of the most serious domestic problems facing the country and urged
Americans to help confront the problem of illegal drugs. To underscore his commitment to
fighting the drug war, Bush demanded a $1.5 billion increase in domestic law enforcement on
narcotics control and $3.5 billion for international interdiction and foreign supply reduction of
illegal drugs into the United States. As part of his broader objective to increase the funding for
narcotics control, the military’s drug enforcement budget increased from $357 million in 1989 to
more than $1 billion in 1992 (Bertram, et al., 1996).
Similar to the previous narcotics policy initiatives, the presidential influence over the
federal law enforcement agencies was also broadened under the Bush era. A number of executive
orders aimed at exerting greater level of control over these agencies were issued by the President.
One distinctive administrative influence was the establishment of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), which was part of the 1988 anti-drug legislation provision (Belenko,
2000; MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Soon after the establishment of the ONDCP, William
Bennett was appointed as the first director of the ONDCP and he outlined the government’s drug
policy goals toward a strong law enforcement approach to narcotics control (Musto, 1999).
Bennett defined himself as the “tough guy” against drug pushers and users and urged all
Americans to join the fight against the war on drugs. He reiterated the Bush administration’s
determination to use all means possible to fight the war on drugs. For Bennett, the only viable
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solution to the drug problem is to pursue a confrontation policy against the producers, traffickers,
and users of illegal drugs (Fisher, 2006; MacWilliams, 1992; Musto, 1999).
Like the Reagan era, the drug issue received some considerable attention in terms of
rhetoric and policy focus in the Bush era as well. Saliency of the issue was heightened a result of
the increased media campaign against narcotics use, particularly in the late 1980s. Musto (1999)
argues that the media campaign and public awareness against drug abuse actually intensified
during the Bush presidency. This was evident, according to Musto (1999: 281), in a New York
Times poll that was conducted in September 1989, which revealed that the problem of drug abuse
surpassed all other sources of concern for many Americans. This helped to sustain the issue on
both formal and public agendas throughout the 1980s to the 1990s.
The preceding analysis of this third phase (Reagan and Bush eras) has again shown some
evidence of the theoretical framework (agenda setting, partisan ideology, and orders of policy
change) at display. In terms of agenda-setting, for example, the discussion reveals evidence of
agenda-setting concepts of issue redefining, framing, and issue saliency (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993, Studlar, 2002: Worsham, 1997). For instance, the drug issue has not only been redefined
and framed as a national issue, but the saliency of the issue in terms of institutional (presidential)
and public attention (media) attained one of the highest as compared to the previous phases.
There have also been some considerable changes in the narcotics policy agenda towards
law enforcement strategies in the Reagan and Bush eras as compared to the Ford and Carter
years. While law enforcement policy option receded and the treatment option gained more
attention on the narcotics policy agenda in the second phase (Ford and Carter eras), the third
phase (Reagan and Bush eras) witnessed an increase in attention on the law enforcement
approach to narcotics control as compared to the treatment approach. In fact, Sharp (1994), as
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mentioned earlier, employed agenda mobilization and inside-initiative models (Cobb, Ross and
Keith-Ross, 1976) to study narcotics policy in the Carter and the Reagan administrations and
found similar findings. While the Reagan era fits the agenda mobilization theory because of the
heightened presidential attention to the issue, the inside-initiative model best applies to the Carter
era as a result of the less public attention to the drug issue.
The theory of partisanship appears to be on display in the third phase as well. In contrast
to the previous era, particularly in the Carter years where partisan ideology to narcotics control
was geared towards a more permissive approach, narcotics policy in the third phase was more
towards a restrictive policy option to narcotics control. For Bertram et al. (1996), the prohibitive
policy approach to US narcotics control was actually institutionalized under Reagan and Bush.
Although the narcotics policy content of Republican administrations (Nixon, Reagan, and Bush)
were slightly different, their overall policy goals were strongly driven by law enforcement
ideology to narcotics control. However, some punitive narcotic laws were also passed under
Democrats. For example, the 1951 Boggs Act was actually sponsored by a Democrat and passed
under a Democratic led government. Nevertheless, one could still argue from a partisan
theoretical perspective that the most punitive anti-drug laws were enacted under Republican led
governments of Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
This observation again confirms the hypothesis of this study (see chapter two) that
partisanship shapes US narcotics policy outcomes. In essence, Republicans and Conservative
leaning political governments tend to emphasize “toughness” on crime with strict law and order
approach to narcotics control, while Democrats and Liberal leaning political administrations tend
to favor a more permissive approach. It is therefore plausible to conclude that partisan ideology
has partly driven the US narcotics policymaking in the third phase.
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While agenda setting theory and partisan ideology provide some useful understanding of
the broad pattern of US narcotics policy change, this study contends that Hall’s (1993) orders of
change perhaps provide a better understanding of the nature of these changes. As shown in the
discussion, the severity of Reagan’s anti-drug laws, for example, increased incrementally from
the 1984 Act to the 1988 Act, which showed a clear evidence of what Hall (1993) describes as a
first order change in policy. In terms of Hall’s second order change, a comparative analysis will
be useful here. As shown in the preceding analysis, the third phase was characterized by a more
punitive approach (reliance on law enforcement) to narcotics control, particularly in the Reagan
era, as compared to the liberal approach in the Carter era. Hall (1993) describes this as a change
in the policy instrument from one level to the other. For Hall (1993), a change in the policy
instrument, with the policy goal remaining unchanged (see chapter two), constitutes a second
order change in policy. There was no indication, whatsoever, of a third order or paradigm change
in the narcotics policy of the phases discussed so far. In assessing the explanatory power of the
theories employed in this chapter, I argue, based on the preceding analysis, that partisanship
provides a partial explanation for the US narcotics policy change, while agenda-setting and
orders of change offer the best explanation for the narcotics policy process and change.

Summary
The US narcotics policy has indeed undergone many changes since the early 20th century.
These changes ranged from punitive law enforcement approach to narcotics control to liberal
approach (treatment option), and to some extent, a balanced policy strategy, since the early 20th
century. The analysis in this chapter has basically examined the historical development of the US
narcotics policy since the early 1900 through three main historical phases. The discussion in this
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chapter also highlights the major anti-drug laws that were enacted, the key players involved, the
nature and type of policy change that has occurred, and the implications of these changes on
future narcotics policy. The three domestic policy theories were essentially examined within the
context of different dimensions of policy, and therefore policy change. For example, agendasetting theory looks at narcotics policy agendas in terms of issue attention, definition/
redefinition, and issue framing. Partisan ideology examines campaign rhetoric and policy
proposals. The escalation of drug war rhetoric in the Nixon and Reagan eras are good examples.
Key policy proposal to decriminalize marijuana use in the Carter era is another case in point.
Orders of change explored policy adoption and implementation of narcotic laws in the three
phases.
Finally, it must be noted that the three historical phases examined in this chapter exclude
the administrations of President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. These two Administrations
are purposefully excluded in this chapter in order to examine them in the next chapter. In
essence, the fourth phase will discuss the US narcotics policy change within the context of the
two eras (Clinton and George W. Bush).
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Chapter 4
The US Narcotics Policy Process and Change (1993-2009)
Introduction
This chapter investigates the dynamics of US narcotics policy change since 1993. Unlike
chapter three, this chapter is examined within the context of only one broad phase (1993 to
2009). Like chapter three, my goal in this chapter is twofold: First, to demonstrate the relevance
of the main theoretical concepts underlying the study. The second is to determine the theory that
offers the best explanation for the US narcotics policy change since 1993. Agenda-setting theory
with versions of issue definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship will be
the first to be examined. The dynamics of partisan ideology in shaping the narcotics policy
process will be the second to be discussed, while Hall’s (1993) orders of policy change will
constitute the final theory to be examined.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the three domestic policy theories will be explored
within the context of different dimensions of policy, and therefore policy change. While agendasetting examines narcotics policy agendas, partisan ideology focuses on campaign rhetoric and
policy proposals in the narcotics policy process. Hall’s (1993) theory of paradigm change (orders
of change) explores narcotics policy adoption and implementation.

Fourth Phase: Explaining Narcotics Policy Change (Clinton and Bush Eras)
Although phase four constitutes one broad era, my analysis of the phase is sub-divided
into two different political Administrations. The Clinton era (1993-2001) and the Bush era
(2001-2009) as shown in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1
Fourth Phase of US Narcotics Policy (1993-2009)
Phase IV
(1993-2009)

The Clinton Era
(1993-2001)

The Bush Era
(2001-2009)

Source: This chart is modeled in line with earlier chart in figure 3.1 (Jones 2002:119).

The first sub-phase examines narcotics policy under the administration of President Bill Clinton
(1993-2001). The second sub-phase explores the administration of President George W. Bush
(2001-2009). The examination of the narcotics policy of the two Administrations is important for
two main reasons. The first is to determine the nature and the type of policy change that has
occurred within the US narcotics policy process since 1993, and the second is to explore in more
depth the extent to which partisan ideology has shaped the narcotics policy process.
As earlier noted, understanding change is at the core of all sciences, including policy
science (Capano, 2009:7). The field of policy science has advanced considerably in the
formulation of complex theoretical concepts that seek to explain the dynamics of policy change.
Although change is fundamental to the understanding of the policy process (Capano, 2009;
Pralle, 2006), the task of investigating the nature, type, and scope of change in a given policy
process, is one of the difficult and complex undertakings. This study shares the views of Capano
(2009) and Pralle (2006) that the complexity of the process can be minimized when change is
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conceptually well-defined in terms of degrees or amount (macro or micro)57 of change occurring
within given phenomenon.
Like chapter three, this chapter will also examine the three domestic policy theories
(agenda-setting, partisan ideology, and policy paradigm change) as competing explanations for
the US narcotics policy change since 1993. Evidence from secondary documentary sources and
primary data collected from interviews with leading narcotics policy experts constitute the
underlying methodology for the analysis. I started the narrative of this chapter by first examining
the Clinton administration before the Bush era. For a better overview of US narcotics policy
change, I will discuss the two Administrations from a broader changing pattern of narcotics
policy adoption and outcomes.

Agenda-Setting
As discussed in chapter two, agenda-setting is the process by which a public policy issue
moves from relative obscurity to becoming a priority issue because of some serious attention that
is given to the issue by policymakers and other actors in the policymaking process (McLendon,
2003:482). Central to agenda-setting theory are questions of how issues become issues, how they
are defined and redefined, how they gain prominence, and how these issues change over time
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; McLendon, 2003; Studlar, 2002; Sinclair, 1986). While some
policy scholars consider agenda setting as one of the most important stages in the policymaking
process (McLendon, 2003), Studlar (2002) reminds scholars to distinguish between agenda
57

I apply the term macro in this case to describe the type of policy change that is radical. Micro describes the type of
change that is incremental. Since change occurs in different forms, it becomes important for policy scholars to
cautiously apply policy theories that can best explain a phenomenon of policy change. Indeed, one will not argue
that all policy theories can best explain all types of change in a policy process. My argument is simple. Scholars
must carefully select policy theories that can best explain a given outcome. This is the approach this study has
adopted in the process of selecting the theories that can best explain the US narcotics policy process over time.
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setting stage and agenda-setting theory. Like other scholars, Studlar (2002) defines agendasetting as the process where issues are seriously considered toward the achievement of a policy
goal (Studlar, 2002:65).
The agenda-setting literature is vast and complex with different versions that explain the
rise and fall of issues on policy agendas or the extent to which change occurs to a policy issue
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2006). Regardless of the varieties of agenda-setting
theory, Studlar (2002:170) contends that the concept is essentially dependent on two important
questions:
(a) How policy issues are often defined and redefined?
(b) Who are the key actors usually involved in setting a policy agenda?

For the purpose of this study, I will explore related questions such as who is paying the most
attention to the narcotics issue, and what policy outcomes (major narcotic legislations) emerged
in the fourth phase. As previously noted, my analysis will focus on Baumgartner and Jones’
(1993) version of agenda-setting theory (punctuated equilibrium) with further concentration on
issue definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship. My primary task is to
demonstrate with empirical evidence how these concepts have driven the US narcotics policy
change since 1993. In other words, these theories are employed to determine their explanatory
power in shaping the US narcotics policy process and change since 1993.

Issue Definition/Venue Shifting and Narcotics Policy Change
One of the key research questions this study seeks to investigate is whether the US
narcotics policy has undergone or undergoing policy change and who are the drivers of these
changes? These questions are very important because any casual observer of the existing US
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narcotics policy is very likely to consider it as unchanging from a broader perspective. Although
the policy might broadly appear unchanging, a systematic examination of it through various
theoretical lenses might show that the US narcotics policy has indeed undergone, and still
undergoing some types of changes, especially at the state government level (since the early
1990s). Most of these changes are being driven by the efforts of policy entrepreneurs and antiprohibition advocacy groups.
While a change in policy towards a more punitive narcotics control has generally been
minimal, the demand for policy change towards a more permissive approach to narcotics control
have largely been on the increase in the 1990s, particularly on the marijuana policy initiative
(Musto, 1999; Ferraiolo, 2007). The question is this: why has the demand for a permissive
policy on marijuana intensified in the 1990s? To fully answer this empirical question, it is
important to ask two further questions that have previously been stated. First, how has the
narcotics policy issue been defined/redefined in the 1990s? Second, who are the key actors
involved in setting the narcotics policy agenda? Drawing on the seminal work of Baumgartner
and Jones’ (1993) theoretical concepts of issue definition and venue shifting/shopping under the
broad punctuated equilibrium and agenda-setting theories, I argue that these concepts (issue
definition and venue shifting) offer a compelling explanation for the US narcotics policy change,
especially marijuana policy, during the 1990s.
For many students of agenda-setting theory, issue definition constitutes an important
concept in the policymaking process (Pralle, 2006; Studlar, 2002; Princen, 2007; Worsham,
1997; Howlett, 1997). According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993:23), issue definition or policy
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image58 is a purposive process by which political leaders try to accomplish certain goals and
objectives. This goal can be manifested through the construction of a policy monopoly or the
destruction of another monopoly in a policy sub-system. In other words, defining an issue can
serve as a driving force either to sustain an existing policy issue, or create a condition for a
change of the issue by mobilizing previously disinterested actors toward the issue
(Schattschneider, 1960; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).
Essentially, the interpretation of Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) idea on how issues are
defined clearly suggest the importance of political leaders as one of the dominant change agents
in issue definition. While this definition is useful, I will expand the scope of their definition, for
the purpose of this study, to include advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs in the process of
defining an issue. In fact, Pralle (2006:172) shares a similar perspective and argues that issue
definition strategies are not only driven by policymakers, but also by the public and other actors
interested in changing the understanding of a policy issue. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) in their
book: The Politics of Problem Definition in Shaping the Policy Agenda, share similar views. For
them, problem definition has to do with what the public and political leaders choose to identify
as public issues and how these issues could be discussed by them.
Venue shopping or shifting is the next important concept intertwined with the concept of
issue definition and policy change. As discussed in the previous chapters, Baumgartner and
Jones (1993:32) describe policy venues as the “institutional locations where authoritative
decisions are made concerning a given issue.” In Pralle’s (2006:172) terms, venue shopping
entails the search for alternative policy arenas by policy entrepreneurs who try to move decision-

58

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) conceptualize issue definition as a process in which policy issues are discussed and
understood or the public understanding of a public policy problem. This understanding is crucial, according to the
authors, in the expansion of an issue to a previously apathetic group.
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making authority to new venues for the purpose of control and influence. In a similar study,
Pralle (2003) contends that advocacy groups often choose venues for the purpose of short-term
strategic interest. These groups also choose venues that will allow them to gain public support
towards the understanding of an old issue.
For Pralle (2006, 2003), venue shopping and issue definition are intertwined and
significant in two ways. First, issue redefinition also involves the process of shifting the venue of
a policy issue. Second, issue redefinition and venue shifting have become one of the key driving
forces for policy change. Considering the importance of these theoretical concepts to our
understanding of the policy process, the key question to ask is whether these concepts can offer
some explanations for US narcotics policy change since 1993. In other words, does the US
narcotics policy domain provides a useful fit for the application of these agenda-setting concepts
in explaining policy change? I will explore these guiding questions with empirical evidence to
support my argument in the next section.

The Clinton Era (1993-2001)
Like the previous phases, the narcotics policy issue received some level of attention in
the early 1990s. In fact, before Bill Clinton was inaugurated as President of the United States in
January 1993, the problem of illicit drugs featured prominently during the 1992 presidential
campaign. Following the saliency of the issue within the public domain prior to the general
election, Clinton promised the American people to combine tough law enforcement with
treatment and prevention programs if elected as president (Chepesiuk, 1999).

Farmer and

Marion (2004) made a similar observation in their study that examines the relationship between
presidential campaign promises and policy actions after elections. For them, Clinton actually
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made several campaign promises to fight drug abuse and related criminal activities during his
1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns.
Soon after becoming President, Clinton put forward some policy initiatives on narcotics
control. Although some modest changes were made to the existing narcotics policy, the overall
narcotics policy of the Administration was defined within the broad parameters of the US
narcotics policy legacy (Bertram et al., 1996). As Rose (1990) observes, a policy legacy is an
important variable that shapes a policymaking process. For Rose (1990:266), most newly elected
political administrations often inherit past commitments and policies made under previous
political regimes. Although a new government may alter some aspect of a past policy, as was the
case with the Clinton era, Rose (1990) maintains that the core elements of past policies (policy
goals and instruments) hardly experience huge changes in a new administration.
One might consider Rose’s (1990) concept of policy legacy as broadly applicable to the
US narcotics policy process as well. This is because of the overriding policy goal of reducing the
production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs by every US administration (Democrats or
Republicans). Another dimension of understanding the narcotics policy legacy is the manner in
which the drug issue has been framed and defined over the years. In fact, regardless of the
different partisan orientations toward narcotics control, the literature clearly reveals that the
prohibition policy option has been dominant as compared to other alternative policies (treatment)
from most successive political administrations since the early 1920s (Nadelmann, 1990; Fisher,
2006; Levine, 2003; Meier, 1994; Bertram et al.,1996).
In spite of the dominance of the prohibition approach to narcotics control, the issue has
undergone many types of change in terms of policy focus over the years. For example, the focus
of the narcotics issue, as discussed in chapter three, escalated at one point and was de-escalated
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at another (Bertram et al., 1996:5), especially after the war on drugs was declared in the early
1970s. Whereas President Ford, for instance, de-escalated the war on drugs soon after he
succeeded President Nixon, President Carter, on the hand, took a more liberal approach by
defining his narcotics policy initiative on the need to decriminalize marijuana use. Similarly,
while narcotics policy was given an important consideration (liberal approach) on Clinton’s
domestic policy agenda (Perl, 1993:143), the drug war rhetoric that characterized the previous
eras, (Reagan and Bush) was de-escalated by the Clinton administration.
There have also been some changes, particularly on the anti-drug policies that were
adopted in the Clinton era. Before Clinton was elected for example, he pledged during the
election campaign to combine law enforcement with a more liberal narcotics policy (Chepesiuk,
1999). The policy initiative of the Administration, however, shifted in focus toward a more
liberal approach as evident by the public statements made by some top officials. Two major
policy responses of the Administration also provide further evidence to support the policy shift in
the era. First, the budgetary allocation for the ONDCP was drastically reduced, and the number
of personnel staff assigned to the organization was also reduced from 146 to 25 (Chepesiuk,
1999:36; Bouley, 2001:172; Musto, 1999). In fact, the Administration’s liberal narcotics policy
became clearly visible as Clinton’s cabinet took shape (Bertram, et al., 1996). Many attempts
were made to frame and redefine the image of the drug problem through various policy
statements made by the President and his top policy officials. In one of the policy statements, for
example, Clinton, argued for a “drug treatment on demand” as an option for narcotics control.
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According to him, drug treatment on demand was a necessary component to prevent criminals
from reverting to illegal drugs when released from prison.59
Other top officials in the Clinton administration such as Lee Brown (Drug Czar) and
Janet Reno (Attorney General) were also very active in articulating the treatment and prevention
policy option to narcotics control in an attempt to redefine the drug problem differently. Lee
Brown, for example, was said never to use the “drug war” metaphor, as was commonly used in
the previous administrations of Reagan and George H.W. Bush (Bertram et al., 1996:118). In the
case of Janet Reno, her views toward a more liberal narcotics policy were revealed during her
confirmation hearings as Attorney General Nominee in May 1993 (Chepesiuk, 1999:36). After
her confirmation as Attorney General, Reno not only continued her advocacy for treatment for
drug addicts, but she also intensified her criticism of the existing prohibition approach.
In one of her narcotics policy initiatives, the Attorney General proposed a reevaluation of
the mandatory sentences for drug offenders. For her, “the limited resources available to the
justice department should be directed against violent offenders and not against addicts who were
caught selling drugs and who needed treatment more than punishment” (Bertram, et al.,
1996:119). Theoretically, it is apparent that the Clinton administration’s initial narcotics policy
demonstrates a clear evidence of agenda-setting concepts of issue definition and framing in the
narcotics policy issue. It also shows that some key officials in the Administration, including the
President himself, were paying serious attention to the narcotics issue.
The contentious debate that emerged in the 1990s over the legalization of some illegal
drugs, especially marijuana, provides another important empirical evidence of agenda-setting
concepts of issue definition, venue switching, and policy entrepreneurship in explaining the
59

Kramer 1993. “Clinton’s Drug Policy is a Bust.” Time Magazine, 20 December. p.35.
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dynamics of the US narcotics process of policy change. Since the 1914 Harrison Act was
enacted, there has been an ongoing debate on the need to legalize some narcotic drugs. At the
center of this debate are policy advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs whose primary
objective is to shape, redefine, and shift the narcotics policy from the predominantly punitive
policy regime towards a more public health approach to narcotics control (Balenko, 2000). Faced
with the challenge of achieving greater public support for a total legalization of some of these
drugs, critics of the existing prohibition system in recent years began to shift their focus from the
idea of a total legalization toward a policy option that will minimize the harms 60 associated with
the use of these illegal drugs (Balenko, 2000).
As discussed in chapter three, several studies have shown that marijuana is the most
commonly used illegal drug in the United States. A recent national survey conducted by the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) shows an overall
increase in the use of illicit drugs among many Americans. According to the report, the use of
these drugs have increased from about 8.0 percent of the population of age 12 and older in 2008
to 8.7 percent in 2009, with the overall increase largely driven by the rise in marijuana use.61 The
situation was not different in the 1990s either. A study conducted by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) shows
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Advocates for the harm reduction model argue that illegal drug use must be recognized as a reality and addiction to
drugs considered as a medical and a social problem that require public health response. The proposal for legalization
has also taken many different forms over the years. They range from total free market in the use of narcotics without
government control, to allowing a limited decriminalization of certain drugs for medical use, especially marijuana
(Balenko, 2000:335).
61
SAMHSA Report (2010). Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Volume I. Summary of
National Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series H-38A, HHS Publication No. SMA 10-4856 findings)
Rockville, MD.
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an increase in the use of marijuana in the 1990s.62 Similar findings were also reported by Golub
et al. (2006) in their study on marijuana use from the 1990s to the early part of the year 2000.
Clearly, the above analysis and the information from the respondents of my interview for
this study show that marijuana does not only constitute the commonly used drug in the US, but
also that the drug has become the epicenter or the focal point for the legalization debate. In fact,
the 1990s was particularly important because the debate over the legalization of marijuana for
medical purposes intensified and attained a high salience on the formal and public agendas.
Perhaps, the emergence of prominent advocacy groups, such as the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) whose primary objective is to effect a radical change in
the marijuana policy, might help explain the saliency of the issue. As one interviewee said:
NORML seeks to change Cannabis Prohibition laws via lobbying, litigation, and education.
Currently, less than 1 percent of cannabis consumers are involved in their own liberation.
Getting so many like-minded, but too-afraid-of-their-government to act in positive direction is
the key to completing the reforms undertaken since the 1970s.63

We have also seen in the previous chapter that the medical marijuana movement was
actually accorded a high presidential attention when Carter endorsed the decriminalization of
marijuana barely six months after he was elected as President of the United States (Sharp, 2005;
Ferraiolo, 2007; Dupont, 1996). Although Carter’s proposal did not materialize into any concrete
policy option, a few state governments passed many resolutions authorizing the use of marijuana
for certain illnesses, but only to be prescribed by a medical doctor. Similarly, state laws as we
know are subject to federal laws in principle and by virtue of how the US federal system is
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The data was reported in the US Department of Health and Human Services News Release (HIH News) 2004.
An official interviewed at the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML). This interview
was part of the elites selected for this study.
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designed. However, many state governments since the late 1960s have experimented with their
own policy on marijuana use.
For example, some states, as previously stated, reduced the penalties for marijuana use
and possession, with Oregon as the first state to decriminalize the use of marijuana in the early
1970s (Khatapoush and Hallfors, 2004:752). However, no provisions were made for a general
supply of the drug, since doctors were still forbidden, under federal law (Schedule I Controlled
Substances) from prescribing marijuana for addicts (Ferraiolo, 2007: 159-160). Consequently,
what started as a modest movement to allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes took a
different turn by the mid-1990s, following the widespread assumption that marijuana could be
used as an effective medicine for people suffering from the HIV/AIDS disease and other forms
of severe chronic pains and terminal diseases (Ferraiolo, 2007).
Faced with the possibility of using marijuana for these medicinal purposes, many AIDS
patients, particularly in the San Francisco area, supported the marijuana reform movement. The
Movement also received support from many reform-minded advocacy groups, such as NORML
in most of the western states like Oregon and California. No wonder that California became the
first state to vote for the use of medical marijuana in 1996. The California marijuana law
(Proposition 215-Compassionate Use Act) was overwhelmingly passed through the ballot box
initiative (direct democracy). The law allowed patients suffering from illnesses such as AIDS,
cancer, anorexia, and migraine to use marijuana for medical purposes, but with a doctor’s
referral (O’Connell and Bou-Matar, 2007; Khatapoush and Hallfors, 2004). Since California is
often described as a policy leading state due to the size of its economy and influence, it was not
surprising that other states quickly followed the California example (Khatapoush and Hallfors,
2004) using the ballot box to enact the medical marijuana laws. Clearly, the shift of the issue to
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another venue (state level) offers a good explanation for the change in the marijuana policy
(Ferraiolo, 2007). Table 4.1 shows the number of states that have so far enacted the medical
marijuana laws through either the ballot initiative or the state legislature.
Table 4.1
Statewide Medical Marijuana Policy Adoption (1996-2010)
State

Year

Laws Enacted

California
Arizona
Alaska
Oregon
Nevada
Washington
Maine
Colorado
Hawaii
Montana
Vermont
Rhode Island
New Mexico
Michigan
New Jersey

1996
1996
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
2000
2000
2004
2004
2006
2007
2008
2010

Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
Voter referendum
*Legislative vote
Voter referendum
*Legislative vote
*Legislative vote
*Legislative vote
Voter referendum
*Legislative vote

Vote (Yes)

Vote (No)

56%
65%
58%
55%
59%
59%
61%
54%
13
62%
25
28
32
63%
25

44%
35%
42%
45%
41%
41%
39%
46%
12
38%
4
6
3
37%
13

Source: Ferraiolo (2007:148). http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3391#Alaska Retrieved on 05/19/11
*Senate legislative votes. The District of Columbia (DC) is excluded from this table.
The law was recently passed (2010) in the District of Columbia (DC). The vote was (13-0) in favor.

As shown in table 64 4.1, the medical marijuana ballot initiative received quite very high level of
support, as indicated by the high percentage of the yes votes in the elections. The data also
reveals that the option for voter referendum appear to dominate the early years (1996-2000) of
the ballot initiative in states where the laws were enacted. Again, it can clearly be noticed from
the preceding analysis that key policy actors, such as advocacy groups, state political officials,
64

*Hawaii (Senate vote 13/12, House vote 32/18) http://www.dpfhi.org/news/honad328.htm
*Vermont (Senate vote 25/4, House vote 99/44).
http://stopthedrugwar.com/chronicle/2011/may/09/vermont_legislature_passes_medic
*Rhode Island (Senate vote 28/6, House vote 59/13).
http://www.cannabissearch.com/medical_marijuana_law/rhode-island/
*New Mexico (Senate vote 32/3, House vote 36/31) http://www.cannabissearch.com/medical_marijuana_law/newmexico/ * New Jersey ( Senate vote 25/13, House vote 48/14).
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/nyregion/12marijuana.html

146

and the public, were those paying the most attention to the marijuana issue during the period
under review.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the question to ask is: what explains the
intensity in the passage of many marijuana laws in the 1990s? This study argues that the active
involvement of key advocacy groups, such as NORML and many others, and the nature of how
the narcotics issue was redefined towards a more public health approach, provide a convincing
explanation for the increasing intensity of marijuana policy change in the 1990s. Also, the
increasing trend of public support (see figure 4.2) regarding the adoption of the medical
marijuana law provides another explanation for the support for the marijuana movement in the
1990s.

Figure 4.2
Trends in Public Opinion about the Legalization of Marijuana (1969-2011)

Source: Gallup poll survey report compiled by Frank Newport. October, 2011. Retrieved from (11/02/11)
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/Record-High-Americans-Favor-Legalizing-Marijuana.aspx
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As Studlar (2002) argues, public opinion is an important element of agenda-setting
theory. In the case of marijuana policy, a Gallup poll report

65

indicates that the number of

Americans who currently support the use of marijuana for medical purposes has steadily
increased compared to the 1970s (Saad, 2009). A recent poll conducted by the Pew Research
Center (PRC) shows that nearly three-quarters of most Americans, about 73 percent of the total
population, favor the use of marijuana for medical purposes.66 A more recent Gallup poll as
shown in figure 4.2 indicates that a record-high 50 percent of Americans who favor the
legalization of marijuana use. In fact, the trend of the survey report shows that close to 84
percent of Americans were opposed to marijuana legalization when Gallup first asked the
question in 1969. Support remained in the mid-20 percent in the 1970s into the 1990s. The
support increased to 30 percent in 2000 and to more than 40 percent in 2009, before finally
reaching the 50 percent threshold in 201167 (see figure 4.2).
Many interviewees, particularly the advocates of the liberal approach to narcotics control
also agreed that the general support for marijuana legalization will continue to increase because
of the new understanding by the public on the medical efficacy of the drug. For Millhorn et al.
(2009), the increasing public support for the medical use of marijuana might have been
particularly influenced by the dynamics of the changing times where more people are becoming
more tolerant of morality policy issues.
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Saad, Lydia. 2009. Gallup Poll Report. Retrieved on 05/19/2011.
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What is, however, important to note is that many people are still divided on the question
of whether to legalize marijuana use or not. It is important to clearly distinguish between those
who currently favor a complete legalization of marijuana and those who argue for the drug to be
used only for medical purposes. Although the recent poll suggests an increasing support for a
complete legalization of marijuana use, there are still going to be uncertainties on how the policy
will be implemented. For others, it might be ideal first to implement the medical marijuana
policy before considering the option of completely legalizing marijuana and other narcotic drugs.
The question of what explains the increasing success rate of the ballot box initiative in
other states after the California experience is an important empirical issue that needs to be
explored as well. As briefly mentioned in the earlier discussion, my theoretical assumption,
which appears to be consistent with similar agenda-setting theorists (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993; Sinclair, 1986; Pralle, 2006; Studlar, 2005; Howlett, 1997) is that the concepts of issue
definition and venue shifting offer one of the best explanations for the marijuana policy change
since the 1990s. As clearly evident in the literature, defining the drug issue has been an ongoing
struggle for many decades. For proponents of the prohibition paradigm, narcotic drugs,
especially marijuana, must be kept illegal and criminalized (Bennett, 2005; Walters, 2005). On
the contrary, advocates for narcotics policy reforms (Nadelmann, 1990, Andreas and Nadelmann,
2006; Husak, 2002; Inciardi, 1999) not only continue to push for policy change, but also try to
redefine the drug issue towards a more liberal approach, particularly marijuana.
Generally, the redefining of the issue has principally been achieved by the activation of
the growing public support base for more liberal marijuana laws (Ferraiolo, 2007). Aside from
the redefinition of the issue, a new understanding of the medical value of marijuana has also
been gaining some grounds as a result of the growing sympathetic view of marijuana and the
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remedy it could provide for those suffering from chronic diseases. There has also been the
dimension to the marijuana issue not only from a public health perspective, but also from a
patient right issue, and the compassion for drug addicts (Ferraiolo, 2007:149).
What is also important to note is that once the marijuana issue was successfully framed as
a public health issue, the reform-minded advocacy groups and other policy entrepreneurs shifted
the venue through the popular electoral ballot voting system (direct democracy) and legislative
approval at the state levels (Ferraiolo, 2007). In fact, Matsusaka’s (2005) argument on the recent
popularity of the ballot initiative in many states provides a useful insight into the broader
discussion on the medical marijuana movement. According to Matsusaka, the eclipse of the
ballot initiative in public policymaking in the passage of key laws could generally be attributed
to the declining public confidence in state legislatures.
The logic behind Matsusaka’s (2005) argument could possibly be interpreted to mean that
the ballot initiative is becoming popular, particularly in the 1990s, because of the lack of public
confidence in the state legislatures. Indeed, Matsusaka’s (2005) argument tends to fit the medical
marijuana movement with two positive outcomes. First, the result of public discontentment in
many state legislatures created the incentive for the popularity of the ballot initiative, which also
facilitated the passage of the medical marijuana laws at the state level. Second, it could also be
argued that the popularity of the ballot initiative created the window of opportunity (Kingdon,
1984) for reform-minded advocacy groups to successfully shift the venue of the marijuana issue
to the state level for policy change.
In the earlier discussion of venue shifting, this study shares Pralle’s (2006:172) view that
venue shifting involves effort by advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs to keep issues out of
their disadvantaged venues and shift them to advantage venues for popular support. In the
150

marijuana case, for example, Ferraiolo (2007) argues that many marijuana reform groups who
were faced with institutional constraints from Congress and federal narcotics agencies had to
look for new venues (state level) for support. Regarding the institutional constraint, NORML’s
unsuccessful attempt to petition the federal government to reschedule marijuana from schedule
one to a less restrictive category since the 1970s is a good example of an institutional constraint
these advocacy groups usually encounter (Ferraiolo, 2007). These conditions (disadvantaged
venues), in effect, created the incentives for these reform-minded advocacy groups to shift the
venue of the marijuana issue to the state level through the ballot box initiative for policy change.
From Ferraiolo’s (2007:164-165) standpoint, the ballot initiative that was introduced at
the state level created two important consequences for the narcotics policy process. First, the
initiative allowed proponents of the medical marijuana movement to expand the scope of the
issue from the powerful law-enforcement agencies and proponents of the existing system to
ordinary Americans at the state level. Second, supporters of the marijuana movement were
convinced of their victory in marijuana policy change following their success in shifting the
venue of the issue to the state level. As one interviewee observes:
The nature of the movement towards decriminalizing has been tentative. There is awareness
that decriminalization is still a non-starter in many legislative chambers. Marijuana
decriminalization and legalization is where there has been a substantial focus at the state level
in certain states. Ballot initiatives in certain states and legislation in state legislatures have
been the primary instruments of seeking the decriminalization of marijuana.68

Aside many advocacy groups, other attentive actors were also very instrumental in
shaping the marijuana policy issue since the 1990s. Who were these major players driving the
68

An official interviewed at the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA).
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issue? The literature describes these actors as policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom
and Vergari, 1996; Kingdon, 1995: Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Studlar, 2002). For Mintrom
(1997:739), policy entrepreneurs are “people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change.”
Studlar (2002:180) refers to them as political entrepreneurs. He defines the concept (political
entrepreneurship) as “the ability to take advantage of circumstances to push an issue onto the
public and governmental agenda.” As Mintrom (1997) argues, policy entrepreneurs play very
important roles in the policymaking process by primarily promoting their policy ideas through
(a) problem identification (b) networking in policy circles (c) shaping policy debates (d) building
coalitions. Within the definitional context, one can infer that the dynamics of policy change is
partly driven by policy entrepreneurs.
Applying the concept to the US narcotics policy, it is evident that the terrain of the
narcotics policy process has been occupied by policy entrepreneurs and other key policy actors
(reform-minded advocacy groups) in shaping narcotics policy change. On Crow’s (2010:301)
part, policy entrepreneurs are very important in the promotion of policy change in many public
policy fields. Although the concept of policy entrepreneurship mostly relates to an individual
policy entrepreneur, Crow (2010) argues that a group might also have the ability to act as
entrepreneurs in shaping policy changes. I will employ this idea of group entrepreneurs (reformminded advocacy groups) to explain the marijuana reform movement during the 1990s.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the narcotics policy debate is broadly shaped by
two main policy perspectives: the pro-legalization and the anti-legalization groups. The federal
and the state government agencies in charge of narcotics control constitute the main antilegalization groups. During the 1996 ballot box initiative in California, for example, state lawenforcement agencies like the California Narcotics Officers’ Association (CNOA), the California
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Sheriffs’ Association (CSA), and the office of the DEA were the primary opponents of the
medical marijuana movement (Ferraiolo, 2007). In the case of Maine, where a similar law was
passed in 1999 (see table 4.1), the Maine Chiefs of Police Association (MCPA) and the federal
narcotics agencies were some of the key opponents to the initiative (Ferraiolo, 2007).
The key policy actors involved in the pro-legalization (marijuana) movement on the other
hand, were advocacy groups such as NORML, Drug Policy Foundation (DPF), and Californians
for Medical Rights (CMR). An important policy entrepreneur is George Soros (Philanthropist).
Mr. Soros has been one of the prominent individual policy advocates for the marijuana reform
movement for many years now. He is not only an activist for policy change from the existing
policy, but also a major financier of many marijuana ballot initiatives at the state level since the
1990s (Ferraiolo, 2007). According to Musto (1999:288), since 1993, George Soros has
contributed about $15 million to programs aimed at shaping the marijuana reform issue across
the US. Most of the contributions made by Mr. Soros were through his Open Society Institute
(OSI) to advocacy groups such as the Drug Policy Alliance to support medical marijuana ballot
initiative programs.
Apparently, the active involvement of these advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs in
narcotics policy change is consistent with most of the responses from the interviewees, especially
on the medical marijuana issue.
As one respondent said:
In most of the states which have adopted medical marijuana laws, the issue has been put on
the ballot or pushed through the legislature by advocacy organizations.69
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According to another respondent:
The recent economic downturn has accelerated support for marijuana decriminalization and
scaling back of criminalization of drugs. Combined efforts of NGOs working to roll back the
war on drugs, along with the growing support for marijuana legalization and other objectives,
have largely driven the US drug policy change.70

In essence, one might argue, based on the evidence shown in the foregoing discussion,
that policy entrepreneurs and other key advocacy groups have largely shaped the US narcotics
policy process towards change since the 1990s. It is also important to mention that the growth of
these anti-prohibition advocacy groups might be a very good indication of the growing public
support towards policy change from the existing policy. A case in point, as previously noted, is
the recent public opinion survey by Gallup poll, which shows a rising support among many
Americans for marijuana legalization. Again, the usefulness of the concepts of policy
entrepreneurship and advocacy groups within the broad agenda-setting theory has been
reinforced in this study.
So far, my discussion of the US narcotics policy, especially during the Clinton era, has
been primarily focused on the medical marijuana initiative at the state level. In fact, my choice of
marijuana and the rationale for its extensive discussion in this chapter as compared to other
illegal drugs is important for one main reason. That is marijuana has not only been the most
commonly used illegal drug, but the drug has also become the center of the legalization debate
(Annas, 1997) for many decades now.
Also, there is another aspect of the US narcotics debate that needs to be examined. It is
important because it shows evidence of policy change to the long standing prohibition narcotics
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paradigm at the state level. As we have discussed, many policy changes are occurring at the state
level with respect to the existing marijuana laws, but marijuana use is still prohibited at the
federal level. That leads us to the question of how the federal authorities have responded to the
medical marijuana laws passed at the state level since the late 1990s. I will address this question
from two different policy responses that this study categorizes as confrontational response and a
cooperational response.
Generally, the nature of the US political system is designed for authoritative decision
making points at many different levels for the purpose of power sharing. These levels include the
federal, state, and local government authorities. Although power sharing among the authoritative
decision making points appears to be a useful balance of power against each other, the system is
equally susceptible to various forms of institutional conflicts and confrontations among the
authoritative decision making points (Radin and Boase, 2000). Broadly, the US Constitution
gives Congress the power to supersede state laws. However, in recent times, the authority of the
federal government has seriously been challenged by the ballot initiative at the state level with
respect to the medical marijuana laws (Dresser, 2009; Ferraiolo, 2007).
The initial response by the federal government on the state ballot initiative was swift and
confrontational, despite the attempt by proponents of the marijuana movement to frame the issue
from a more humane and public health perspective. For example, several attempts were made by
the Clinton administration to prevent the implementation of the California medical marijuana law
soon after it was passed (Annas, 1997). In a response to the 1996 California law at a White
House press conference, the director of the ONDCP, Barry McCaffrey, noted that the federal law
on marijuana and other illegal drugs remained unchanged in the face of the marijuana law that
was enacted in California. McCaffrey actually described the use of marijuana as a “gateway
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drug” that has the potential to lead to the use of other hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine
(Annas, 1997).
Other top government officials such as the Attorney General, Janet Reno, and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, also threatened to revoke the licenses
of physicians who prescribe marijuana for the so-called medical reasons (Ferraiolo, 2007; Annas,
1997). Apparently, these were some of the officials in the Clinton administration who initially
advocated in favor of a more liberal approach to narcotics control. Nonetheless, the Clinton
administration’s response to the 1996 California marijuana law could best be described as a
confrontational policy response.
Despite the strong opposition from the federal government on the marijuana laws at the
state level, positive steps (cooperational response) were taken by the Clinton administration to
re-examine the potential medical benefits of marijuana use. In January 1997, for instance, the
Director of ONDCP commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM), a subsidiary unit of the
National Academy of Sciences, to review the scientific evidence regarding the likely health
benefits of medical marijuana (Eddy, 2010; Musto, 1999). The report, which was based on a
series of public hearings and consultations held across the country, concluded that smoked
marijuana is unlikely to be a safe medication for any chronic medical condition. However, the
report did find more probable promise in synthetic cannabinoid drugs than in smoked marijuana
for medical use. The report recommended the need for well-formulated, scientific research into
the therapeutic effects of marijuana on patients with specific chronic diseases (Eddy, 2010:10).
The passage of the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act (CMCA) of 1996 in
the Clinton era71 also deserves a special mention in this chapter. The Act was one of the major
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narcotic legislations passed during the Clinton era. The bill was signed into law by the President
on October 3, 1996. The law mandates drug enforcement authorities to control the production,
trafficking, and distribution of methamphetamine in the US.72
Finally, an overview of the analysis in the first section of the fourth phase (see figure 4.1)
reveals an interesting changing pattern of the US narcotics policy process and the allocation of
attention since 1993. In this section (Clinton era), the narcotics issue not only surged and waned
on both the systemic and institutional agendas, but the issue was also redefined and shifted in
venue through the activities of many advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs at the state level.
The interplay of these concepts (issue definition, venue shifting and policy entrepreneurship)
offer a convincing explanation for the US narcotics policy change, especially on marijuana
policy in this phase. Again, the applicability of these concepts of agenda-setting has been well
demonstrated as evident in the preceding discussion. It also shows that these theoretical concepts
provide some utility in explaining the US narcotics policy process and change since 1993.

The Bush Era (2001-2009)
Similar to the Clinton era, the narcotics policy process during the era of President George
W. Bush was also shaped by the broad parameters of the past US anti-drug policies, but with
some modifications. In effect, my analytical narrative of the Bush era will be examined with the
same theoretical framework used to discuss the Clinton era. In essence, this section will be
analyzed within the context of the research questions, and the broad theoretical concepts outlined
at the beginning of this chapter. Specifically, the core elements of agenda-setting theory (issue
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definition, venue shifting and policy entrepreneurship) will be employed in understanding the
narcotics policy process in the Bush era.
As the literature reveals, the problem of drug abuse in the Bush era was not too different
from the previous eras. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the
publishers of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), some 16 million Americans on
average use many forms of illegal drugs (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) on
a regular basis, despite the existence of many punitive control measures (ONDCP, 2003).
Among these illegal drugs, marijuana again appears to be the most accessible and widely used
drug in America (ONDCP, 2003). Of the 5.6 million Americans who were diagnosed for drug
treatment in the early part of the year 2000, about 62 percent were found to have abused or
dependent on marijuana (ONDCP, 2003:14).
Similarly, the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), a study
conducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA),
confirms a similar finding on the increasing rate of illegal drug use in recent times. According to
the report, an estimated 21.8 million Americans aged 12 or older used various narcotic drugs in
2009 alone. The NSDUH report adds that among persons aged 12 and older, the rate of
marijuana use increased from 6.1 percent or 15.2 million in 2008 to 6.6 percent, or 16.7 million
in 2009.73 Like other studies, the report confirms that marijuana continues to be the most
commonly used narcotic drug in America. This might explain why marijuana continues to take
center stage in the politics of US narcotics policymaking.
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The 2003 NDCS report rightly captures this assertion this way:
No analysis of drug prevention would be complete without a discussion of marijuana,
the drug so widespread in today’s schools that nearly half of all high school seniors report
having tried it by graduation.74

Faced with these perturbing statistics, the drug issue took center stage in the Bush
administration. The commitment to the issue was particularly evident in some official policy
statements made by the President and his top appointees. In his official policy statement
announcing the new head of the ONDCP, for example, President Bush was emphatic on the fact
that any attempt to legalize illegal drugs would totally undermine the harmful message of
narcotics use (Husak, 2006). John Walters, the drug czar during the Bush era, also made a similar
statement. According to him, the so-called emphasis on harm reduction and the call for legalizing
some narcotic drugs might signal a misrepresentation of the harmfulness of drug use (McVay,
2006:14).
For Bennett (2005: 81), the fight against illegal drugs needs to be continued because of
what he describes as the “attitude of surrender to the drug war.” Bennett’s (2005) assumption for
the so-called attitude of surrender could be interpreted mainly from the increasing support for
harm reduction and the state initiative in promoting the medical use of marijuana through
referendum and legislation at the state level. Critics of this line of thinking would, however,
argue otherwise. For example, Reinarman (2000:106), one of the ardent critics of the existing
US narcotics policy, claims that the so-called toughness rhetoric on narcotic drugs by political
elites is often displayed only to serve their political purposes as these leaders compete for votes
on the basis of who is “tougher” on narcotics control (Reinarman, 2000).
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Apparently, the medical marijuana movement did not stop with the Clinton era. It
certainly continued into the Bush administration. However, a careful observation of the era
reveals that most of the medical marijuana laws from the year 2000 onwards were approved by
state legislatures and not through the ballot box initiative (see table 4.1). My interpretation of
this pattern, as far as the theoretical concept of this study is concerned, is that of the concept of
venue shifting being on display again. Clearly, the shift in venue in terms of the authoritative
decision on the issue from the ballot initiatives (1990s) to state legislatures (2000s) could be
explained by the popular support already existing in most of these states towards medical
marijuana laws.
There is also the possibility that the shift in venue regarding the authoritative decision on
the marijuana issue from popular elections to state legislatures was because of a window of
opportunity that was opened through public support75 for the marijuana initiative. Once antiprohibition advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs realized the strength of their support on
the issue, it was reasonable for them to lobby state lawmakers to enact the marijuana law. This
scenario could also be interpreted as another policy venue (window of opportunity), which was
utilized by the advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs to push for the enactment of the
medical marijuana law in the state legislatures, instead of using the ballot box initiative.
One could also argue that the public confidence in many state legislatures re-emerged
from the year 2000 onwards as against Matsusaka’s (2005) contention of the decline in public
trust for many state legislatures. Part of the reason for the shift from the ballot box initiative
might also be the result of the time-consuming and expensive nature of electoral campaigns
(ballot box initiative) in effecting marijuana policy change. In other cases, the ballot initiative led
75
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to divisiveness and unpredictable results as Ferraiolo (2007) rightly articulated. In effect, any
authoritative decision point, such as state legislatures, that is likely to maximize utility and
minimize cost will be attractive to any advocacy group. A careful look at the votes (see table
4.1) on the passage of the marijuana laws show a very high level of “yes” votes in the state
legislatures.
On the theoretical question of narcotics issue definition, the narcotics policy trend in the
Bush era was quite similar to the Clinton era. Advocacy groups such as the Marijuana Policy
Project (MPP), Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), and
Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) continued with their efforts to shape and redefine the
drug issue towards a more public health perspective. Key policy entrepreneurs were equally
active in shaping the narcotics policy domain during the Bush era. Clearly, the narcotics policy
process in the Bush era, like in the Clinton years, was equally shaped by the medical marijuana
issue (ONDCP, 2003, 2004).
The trends in public opinion (see figure 4.2) about medical marijuana use constitute
another important theme in the Bush era. Public opinion, as Studlar (2002) posits, is not only
intertwined with agenda-setting theory, but the concept constitutes an important part of the
policy science literature. Soroka (2002) shares a similar thought on the centrality of public
opinion on agenda-setting research and argues that the effect of public opinion on policymakers
regarding policy outcomes is intimately connected in many dimensions. Although the opinion of
many Americans toward the narcotics discourse shifted in many different directions over the
years, the Bush era was particularly different in the sense that the public support for medical
marijuana reached one of the record high levels.
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For example, a Gallup poll76 conducted in November 2003 indicates that about 75 percent
of American adults favor the use of marijuana for medical purposes, while only 22 percent of
respondents oppose such a policy action. Interestingly, the public support tends to vary across
many demographical categories. For instance, about 62 percent of adults aged 65 and older seem
less likely to support the idea, compared to those below 65 years. Differences in educational
attainment have also been observed to affect the level of support. For example, Americans with
some college education are said to be more likely to favor legalizing medical marijuana use than
those with high school education.77
A similar poll conducted in 2010 by the Pew Research Center, as earlier noted, indicates
almost the same findings concerning the rising public support for medical marijuana use.
According to the result, nearly three-quarters of Americans, representing about 73 percent of the
population, favor their state allowing the use of medical marijuana to be prescribed by a
physician. Only 23 percent were not in favor of the policy option.78 The findings reveal that more
Americans have a favorable attitude and support for the use of marijuana only for medical
purposes rather than desiring a complete legalization.79
The global trends of public and elites opinion also reflect similar perspective. A recent
report by very high-profile Commissioners made up of prominent personalities such as former
Latin American Presidents, world public intellectuals including Kofi Annan, the former UN
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Secretary General, made a strong recommendation for a redefinition of the so-called global war
on drugs towards a more liberal approach. According to the Commissioners:
The global war on drugs has failed with devastating consequences for individuals and
societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on
Narcotics Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US government’s war on
drugs, fundamental reforms in national and global control policies are urgently needed.80

A similar observation was made by Blow (2011) in his reflection on the recent 40th
anniversary declaration of the war on drugs. According to Charles Blow,81 the drug war has
been one of the biggest and most expensive social policy experiments in the history of America’s
social policies. From Blow’s point of view, since President Nixon declared the all-out offensive
on the war on drugs on June 17, 1971, the war has not only waxed and waned over time, but
trillions of dollars have been spent, community lives destroyed, and over 40 million estimated
arrests82 were made for drug-related offenses (Blow, 2011). As discussed in chapter three, Blow
(2011) reiterates the racial disparities in narcotics enforcement in the US and describes the
disparity issue as the most tragic consequences of the war on drugs. For Blow (2011), no group
has been more targeted than the African-American community, although other groups such as
Caucasian-Americans also engage in the use narcotic drugs. Fellner (2009) shares Blow’s (2011)
perspective on the issue of race, narcotic drugs, and law enforcement in the United States. In
fact, Fellner’s (2009) recent study provides some useful insight on the issue, as shown in figure
4.3.
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Figure 4.3
Rates of Adult Drug Arrest by Race (1980-2007)
(Arrests per 100,000 adult residents of each race)

Source: Adapted from Fellner (2009: 272)

Despite the fact that the ratio of black to white arrests decreased in the mid 1990s, the
disparity in racial arrests continued to exist in narcotics law enforcement (Fellner, 2009; Beckett,
et al. 2006). Fellner (2009) further reports that a longitudinal analysis of urban drug arrests in
some big cities, for example, indicates that drug arrests of Blacks rose at three times the rate for
Whites between 1980 and 2003, representing 225 percent for Blacks, compared to 70 percent for
Whites. In New York City for example, Blacks in 2002 presented about 10.7 percent of the
population, yet they accounted for about 42.1 percent for the drug-related arrests (Fellner,
2009:273-274).
Based on the preceding analysis with respect to the current drug situation, it was not
surprising that the final recommendations issued by the nineteen-member global narcotics
Commissioners reflect similar opinions by many Americans on the need to shift the policy
approach from the existing narcotics policy control towards a workable approach. Among other
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suggestions, these Commissioners (emerging global policy entrepreneurs) strongly recommend
the end to the global narcotics policy of criminalization, marginalization, and the stigmatization
of people who use narcotic drugs but do not harm others as a result of their drug use. Also, the
report urges governments across the world to reform the existing prohibition laws by initiating
models of legal regulation towards the decriminalization of narcotic drugs, especially cannabis or
marijuana. The purpose of the recommended policy initiatives, as the report noted, is to
undermine the power of organized crime that has been associated with narcotics production,
trafficking, and use, and also to safeguard the health and security of the citizens of the world.83
The broad assessment of the US narcotics policy process during the fourth phase (Clinton
and Bush eras) has so far shown some evidence of agenda-setting theories of issue definition,
venue shifting, policy entrepreneurs, and trends in public opinion on display. As Pralle (2006:
1001) argues, the role of multiple venues or veto points in effecting policy change is dependent
on the “mobilization and strategic savvy of policy actors pushing policy change on the one hand,
or defending the status quo on the other.” In essence, venue shifting has been shown as one of
the effective policy strategies in effecting policy change without having to mobilize a large
number of people and resources to compete in venues already controlled by policy competitors
(Pralle, 2003:255).
Indeed, Pralle’s (2006; 2003) theoretical argument has been clearly evident in the
successful shift in venue of the marijuana issue to the state level by policy advocacy groups and
policy entrepreneurs for the purpose of shaping the US narcotics policy process. But the difficult
question that continues to linger among scholars is the unchanging nature of the marijuana law at
the federal level. Ferraiolo (2007:171) rightly sums it up by noting that although marijuana
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policy change seems to be occurring at the state level, its impact is yet to be felt on the federal
narcotic laws in a major way. Nevertheless, the marijuana policy reformers (policy entrepreneurs
and advocacy groups) have achieved some level of success in changing the marijuana laws in
some states because of their skillful shift in venue of the issue.
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, agenda-setting theory with versions of issue
definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship provide a good theoretical
framework in explaining the US narcotics policy process and change in the fourth phase (Clinton
and Bush eras). While the theory (agenda-setting) is useful, one cannot conclude that it provides
a complete explanation for the US narcotics policy process. The question is: would partisan
ideology or Hall’s theory of paradigm change (orders of change) provide a stronger explanatory
power for our understanding of the US narcotics policy change? The next section of this phase
will examine this important question.

Partisan Ideology
Partisan ideology, as noted in chapter two, is another theoretical framework that offers
some explanation for policy outcomes, although there is no consensus among scholars on its
explanatory power in shaping major policy outcomes (Studlar, 2002: 72). For Studlar (2002), the
concept of policy legacy (Rose and Davies, 1994; Rose, 1990), where new governments inherit
past policies, irrespective of partisan influence on the past policies, pose a challenge to the
strength of the partisan argument in shaping major policy outcomes. Nonetheless, quite a number
of scholarly works (Studlar, 2005; Imbeau et al., 2001; Schmidt, 1996; Entman, 1983) have
shown the usefulness of partisan ideology (left-wing and right-wing orientations) in shaping
policy outcomes. Broadly, political parties are basically distinguished by different ideological
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orientations, system of beliefs, and principles, which tend to influence their policy outcomes. In
most cases, political elites reflect their partisan ideology either through their voting records,
policy actions, or policy inactions (Stratmann, 2000; McCarthy el at., 2006).
In the case of US narcotics policy process, particularly in the fourth phase (Clinton and
Bush eras), the important puzzle that emerges is whether US narcotics policy change has been
driven by partisan ideology and to what extent. In fact, Bertram et al. (1996) reflect on a similar
argument and contend that partisan competition between Democrats and Republicans in the late
1980s to the 1990s not only kept the drug issue on the agenda of presidential elections, but major
anti-drug policies were driven by partisan considerations. For example, the competition between
the two political parties was primarily based on the question of who gets tougher on narcotic
drugs and which policy option of control works better. Even though both Democrats and
Republicans often display elements of toughness on the narcotics issue, the influence of partisan
ideology in shaping their respective narcotics policy outcomes cannot be underestimated.
As previously discussed, variations exist in the liberal (Democrats) and the conservative
(Republicans) ideological persuasions (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984). While Democrats tend to
generally favor a permissive (liberal) approach to narcotics control, Republicans usually prefer a
restrictive/punitive approach (Entman, 1983; Schmidt, 1996; McCarthy el at., 2006). Explaining
the conceptual idea behind the restrictive drug policies of conservative governments, Bertram et
al. (1996) argue that the ideology of many conservative leaning governments toward illegal
drugs is based on the assumption that the widespread use of these drugs are responsible for the
moral degeneration of the American society, hence the need to enact tougher laws on narcotics.
Although this assumption is not widely shared by liberal leaning governments
(Democrats) because of their preferred permissive approach to narcotics control, there is still the
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recognition by Democrats of the threat that drug abuse poses to the society. This recognition
offers some explanation for the shift towards a more comprehensive or balanced strategy
(enforcement and treatment) of narcotics control under the Clinton and the Bush administrations
(Bertram et al., 1996:140-141). While the drug policies of both Administrations converged in
many areas as a result of the comprehensive policy option, the partisan rhetoric on narcotics
control in the two eras remained intact. In essence, one might expect the narcotic policies of
liberal leaning governments (Democratic) to be more permissive in nature as against restrictive
policy preferences from conservative (Republican) leaning governments (Bertram et al., 1996).
In the Clinton era, for example, the narcotics policy was not only comprehensive in
nature, but the Administration’s preference for permissive narcotics policy was evident and
consistent with the broad Democratic ideology on narcotics control. The 1994 National Drug
Control Strategy report provides some support for this argument. For instance, the funding for
the expansion of drug treatment facilities for about 140,000 drug addicts across the country saw
an increase of $355 million.84 In addition, the report underscored the need for a guaranteed use
of basic treatment services as part of the President’s Health Security Act. This was estimated to
benefit about 50 million Americans when fully implemented.85 Similarly, the Administration’s
policy reputation towards a permissive narcotics approach was revealed in a letter sent to
President Clinton in 1994 by Senate Republican leaders. The letter accused President Clinton of
decreasing the prosecution of illegal drug users and other interdiction efforts, while increasing
the budget allocation for treatment for hard-core drug addicts (Bertram et al., 1996:149). The
interpretation of the letter illustrates the extent of partisanship divide in the narcotics policy
process during the era of Clinton.
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Like the Clinton era, a similar narcotics policy (comprehensive approach) was pursued in
the Bush era. This means that both law enforcement and treatment strategies of narcotics control
received some serious attention from the Bush administration. The 2005 National Drug Control
Strategy report, for example, reveals that the Administration focused its narcotics policy on both
treatment programs as well as on law enforcement.86 Besides the comprehensive policy option, it
was also apparent that partisan ideological policy preference for a more restrictive narcotics
policy was evident in the Bush era. The budgetary allocation for narcotics control provides some
support for this argument.
For example, the 2002 ONDCP-Budget Summary report reveals that both treatment
programs and law enforcement received budgetary allocations. For instance, only 19.1 percent of
the total budget was allocated for treatment and research programs, while about 50.5 percent of
the total budget was allocated for domestic law enforcement alone. Overall, the budgetary
allocation for the supply-side (law enforcement) approach to narcotics control during the same
year (2002) was 67.4 percent as against 32.6 percent for a demand-side (treatment/prevention)
approach to narcotics control (ONDCP-Budget Summary, 2002:6). A similar trend occurred in
the 2006 drug control budget proposal. Only 38.7 percent of the total budget was allocated for
treatment and prevention programs, while 61.3 percent was allocated to law enforcement,
interdiction, and other drug-related intelligence.87
From a theoretical perspective, it is apparent from the analysis that partisan ideology
provides some useful framework in understanding the narcotics policy process in the fourth
phase. Still, the usefulness of partisan ideology has shown that the Clinton administration’s
narcotics policy was comprehensive in nature, but the preference of the administration was
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largely permissive, particularly in rhetoric. A similar policy trend was evident in the Bush
administration. For example, the narcotics policy of the Bush era was comprehensive in nature,
but the policy preference of the administration was generally restrictive towards narcotics control
(see appendix two). These findings appear to be consistent with similar findings in chapter three
where the Republican administrations of Reagan and George H.W. Bush (Musto 1999; Bertram
et al., 1996; McWilliams 1992; Sharp 1994) favored a more restrictive narcotics policy, unlike
the Democratic administration of Carter that was more inclined towards a permissive approach to
narcotics control (Sharp, 1994:37).
As noted in chapter two, my main objective in this study is to apply the three domestic
policy theories (agenda-setting, partisanship, and policy paradigm change/orders of change) as
competing explanations to determine the one that offers the best possible explanation for the
changing trend and nature of US narcotics policy since 1993. While partisan ideology offers
some utility in explaining the narcotics process, especially on partisan rhetoric, this study argues
that the theoretical concept of partisan ideology provides a limited explanation for the narcotics
policy process. Although the theory provides a broad perspective on how partisanship shapes the
policy process, the theory could not offer a better explanation for the type and nature of policy
change (s) or what Hall (1993) describes as orders of change in the narcotics policy process. This
is equally true for the agenda-setting theory, even though it provides a better explanation for the
narcotics policy process than partisanship.
Indeed, one cannot underestimate the usefulness of partisan ideology and agenda-setting
in understanding the narcotics policy process. However, a systematic observation of these
theories (partisan ideology and agenda-setting) reveals that they best explain the US narcotics
policy change process from a broader or macro perspective. By definition, I consider the macro
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perspective, as earlier mentioned, as a broader analysis of the policy phenomena without
necessarily analyzing the component parts of the policy. A careful review of Baumgartner and
Jones’ (1993) work on drug abuse shows a clear case of a broader perspective of analysis. For
example, the study by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) focused on the politics of attention, or the
changing nature of formal (congressional) and systemic (media) attention of US narcotics policy
for a considerable period of time. Although this approach is generally useful in providing a
general perspective to our understanding of policy change, I argue that this approach offers an
incomplete explanation for the changing type and nature of US narcotics policy process.
In essence, my argument is simple. That is, the agenda-setting and partisanship theories
are generally useful, but these theories provide an incomplete explanation to US narcotics policy
process since 1993. How do we therefore explain the nature and type of changes occurring
within the US narcotics policy domain? Can Hall’s (1993) theory of policy paradigm (orders of
change) offer a persuasive explanation for the US narcotics policy change since 1993?

Policy Paradigm Theory (Orders of Policy Change)
We have seen in chapter two that Hall’s (1993) theory (policy paradigm or orders of
change) has increasingly been employed by many scholars (Hausermann, 2009; Skogstad, 2009;
Studlar, 2009; Cashore and Howlett, 2007; Breton et al., 2008; Capano, 2009; 2003) to study
different substantive policy sectors in recent years. To the best of my knowledge of the literature,
no scholarly work has applied Hall’s concept to study narcotics policy change, hence the
significance of applying this theory to the study of narcotics policy since 1993.
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Figure 4.4
Schematic Representation of Hall’s Orders of Policy Change
Description of Change

Orders of Change

Change occurs in the settings of policy
instruments. Decision making is routine and
happens from experiences and new
knowledge with limited external influence.

First Order
Change

Change in the priority of the policy
instruments with the introduction of new
ones. Policy tools are altered in response to
past experiences and new knowledge, but
within the same policy goals.

Second Order
Change

Change involves fundamental paradigm
change in policy goals with changes in
policy instruments and settings of policy
instruments as well. For example, a major
change from Keynesianism to monetarism
in the UK (1970-1989).

The domain of
current US
narcotics
policy
changes

Third Order
Change
(Third order change is yet to
occur within the US narcotics
policy)

Source: Author’s own schematic design with ideas based on Hall’s (1993) concept of policy change.

As shown in figure 4.4, Hall (1993) conceptualizes the policy process or social learning
(change) within a typology of first order, second order, and third order change (s) in policies. For
Hall (1993), as shared by Breton et al. (2007), first order and second order change in policies are
mostly driven by social learning. Hall (1993) defines social learning “as a deliberate attempt to
adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information.
Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process” (Hall, 1993: 278).The
central argument of the theory is that policy change occurs in three different types or forms. By
definition, policy change, according to Hall (1993), involves the alteration or adjustment to a
given policy from one level to another. Conceptualizing this argument within the context of
social learning, Hall (1993) underscores the importance of disaggregating a given policy into
three major components. The three components include “the overarching goals that guide a
policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals and the
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precise settings of these instruments” (Hall, 1993:278). A good illustration by Hall (1993), as
previously noted, is important to reiterate here.
For instance, if the policy goal of a government is to alleviate the financial problems of
the elderly, the selected policy instrument or tool might be a pension scheme, and its settings of
instrument could be the level of benefits set for beneficiaries of the scheme (Hall, 1993). Hall’s
(1993) theoretical argument was further advanced by Capano and Howlett’s (2009) idea of
“policy compartmentalization.” For them, the policy process is complex and multi-dimensional,
and what actually changes in a policy is not the policy itself, but the specific components such as
the policy goal, policy instruments, and the settings of the policy instruments as shown in figure
4.5.
Figure 4.5
The Three Components of a Policy
Policy Instruments

Policy Goals

Settings of Policy
Instruments

Source: Author’s own schematic design with some ideas based on Hall’s (1993) concept of policy components.

As clearly revealed in figure 4.5, the policy compartmentalization concept underscores
the importance of changes in the type and nature of the three component parts of a policy. This
theoretical assumption, I will argue, resembles a “policy black box” that needs to be opened for a
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better understanding of the specific changes that might occur with the various components of the
policy. Explaining the idea further, Capano and Howlett (2009:3) maintain that policies are
dynamic and change does occur regularly. What is important though, is for scholars to
distinguish the type and the nature of the change (first, second, or third order) that occurs. This is
where Hall’s (1993) concept (orders of change) becomes very useful to understanding the policy
process, particularly the US narcotics policy since 1993. For Hall (1993:277), two key research
questions are significant in identifying the type, nature, and drivers of a given policy change. The
first question is whether the process of policy change is relatively incremental or characterized
by upheaval (punctuated equilibrium) changes to the policy system. The second question deals
with the issue of key players or drivers of the change process. Simply put, my main objective in
this section is to apply Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept of orders of change (first, second, and
third order) in order to determine the type, nature, tempo, and scope of policy change that has
occurred, or is occurring to the US narcotics policy in the fourth phase (Clinton and Bush eras).
To investigate these questions, as earlier noted in chapter two, this study draws on the
key measurements of policy change (Studlar, 2009; Capano and Howlett, 2009), which include:
tempo (speed), mode (amount of change), and scope (coverage). The reason for selecting these
measurement tools is because of its applicability to this research. Defining these measurements
Studlar (2009:75), for example, argues that the tempo of a policy generally involves the speed at
which new policy instruments are often introduced. The mode involves the amount of change
that occurs to a given policy, while the scope deals with the extent to which a policy has been
broadened or narrowed.
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Orders of Change and US Narcotics Policy: Towards an Explanation
As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, the fourth phase (1993 to 2009)
constitutes one broad era, which also constitutes the scope of this study. However, my analysis of
narcotics policy within the context of Hall’s theory will be examined with focus on the two
different political administrations (Clinton and Bush eras). The purpose is to demonstrate with
supporting evidence and draw conclusions on whether the theory offers one of the best, if not the
best, explanation for the US narcotics policy change since 1993.
In Hall’s (1993:279-80) terms, the process of policy learning can be understood from
three levels of change (orders of change). A first order change in policy involves an incremental
(Lindblom, 1959) change in policy through routine policymaking by bureaucratic officials and
other policy experts. A second order change in policy occurs when a new policy instrument is
introduced or an existing instrument is adjusted for strategic policy reasons. While first and
second order change in policies generally appear incremental (normal policymaking), a third
order change on the other hand, occurs when a major paradigm (radical) shift takes place in
policy goals of a given policy. In other words, a third order kind of change drastically transforms
a policy landscape where all the three policy components (goals, instruments, and settings of
instruments) undergo radical changes. Hall (1993:279) sums up the description of a third order
change in policy this way: “If first and second order changes preserve the broad continuities
usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is often a more disjunctive process
associated with periodic discontinuities in policy.” Hall (1993) adds that the implication of this
analysis does not conclude that first and second order changes in policy automatically lead to
third order changes. For him, normal policymaking and change, as in the case of scientific
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change, can continue without necessarily causing a paradigm or radical shift in a given policy
(Hall, 1993:279-280).
The question that emerges is whether or not the US narcotics policy reflects Hall’s (1993)
concept of policy change. To answer this question, this study hypothesizes that the general trend
of US narcotics policymaking, particularly during the scope of this study (1993-2009), has
generally undergone first and second order changes in policy, with second order change more
pronounced, and a third order change presently non-existent or yet to occur.

First Order Change
A first order change in policy occurs when the settings of a policy instrument change as a
result of past experiences or because of the introduction of new knowledge and ideas. For Hall
(1993), policies at time-1(yearly incremental settings of a policy instrument) are formulated
based on the outcome of policies at time-0 (past policies). Besides, the adjustments to policies
under first order are not only comfortably predicted, but tend to be incremental because of the
nature of the routine policymaking by bureaucratic officials (Capano and Howlett 2009; Breton
et al., 2008; Hall, 1993). Applying the concept of incrementalism to the US narcotics policy
change, Sharp (1994:131) shares Lindblom’s (1959) view that policymaking cannot be anything
other than a yearly adjustment to policies. For Sharp (1994), an incremental change in public
policymaking is typically driven by the limits on time and the inability to use huge amount of
knowledge and data in the policymaking process. In effect, policy makers tend to consider only
policy initiatives that involve marginal changes to the status quo policy rather than undertaking
major changes in policy. Hall (1993) describes these minor incremental changes as first order
change in policy with bureaucratic experts as the main drivers of these changes. Moreover, these
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minor policy changes occur in most cases with budget statements, personnel issues, laws, and
other procedural issues. Rose (1984) shares a similar conceptualization of policy characteristics
as comprising budget statements, personnel issues, and laws. I will integrate Rose’s (1984) ideas
with Hall’s concept in analyzing the evidence of first order change in US narcotics policy
process since the 1990s.
By applying Hall’s (1993) concept (orders of policy change) to the US narcotics policy, it
is apparent that the implementation of the policy, especially during the period under review
(1993 to 2009) has generally undergone a first order change. In the early years of the 1990s, for
example, the federal budget of the US narcotics policy witnessed a routine or incremental (mode
of change) policy change. In fact, the total federal spending on narcotics control actually saw a
sturdy increase since the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was established in
1989. According to the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy (ONDCP, 1994:66), President
Clinton’s budget request for narcotics control increased to $13.2 billion, representing an increase
of $1.0 billion, or nine percent more than the previous fiscal year (ONDCP, 1994:75). For Fiscal
Year (FY) 1997, the Clinton administration requested about $ 15.1 billion in financial support for
drug control efforts. The requested amount represented an increase of $1.3 billion or 9.3 percent
over the estimated amount in 1996 of $13.8 billion (ONDCP, 1996:55).
Like the Clinton era, the Bush era (2001 to 2009) reveals a similar pattern of incremental
change in the budgetary allocation for narcotics control. For example, the 2003 budgetary
allocation for narcotics control was estimated at $19.2 billion, representing an increase of $356.9
million, or 1.9 percent over the 2002 fiscal year. The actual enacted budgetary allocation was
$18.8 billion (ONDCP-Budgetary Summary, 2002:1). Although there was a slight decline in
funding for narcotics control from 2004 onwards as compared to the previous years, a minimal
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increase was still recorded in 2005 and 2006. For instance, the funding requested for the 2006
fiscal year was $12.4 billion, which represented an increase of about $268.4, or 2.2 percent over
the 2005 fiscal year. Out of the requested amount of $12.4 billion, the actual enacted amount was
$12.2 billion (ONDCP-Budgetary Summary, 2005:1). A corresponding budgetary pattern also
reveals a similar trend in the 2009 budget report, where the Bush administration requested an
amount of $14.1 billion for narcotics control. The 2009 requested amount saw an increase of
$459.0 million, or 3.4 percent over the fiscal year of 2008. The actual enacted amount for the
2009 fiscal year was 13.7 billion (ONDCP-Budgetary Summary, 2008:1). A general overview of
the incremental changes in the budgetary allocations, particularly during the Clinton era, is
shown in appendix two.
In addition to budgetary allocation, personnel issues, as Rose (1984) contends, constitute
another important element in a policymaking process. Clearly, the personnel involved in the
narcotics policy process saw a similar pattern of incremental change (first order) in the fourth
phase. A good case in point is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which represents
one of the largest enforcement agencies of US narcotics control programs. In 1994, for example,
President Bill Clinton appointed Thomas Constantine as the Administrator of the DEA. In one of
his official policy statements, the Administrator noted that although the DEA suffered a
declining budget and personnel cut in the late 1980s, the agency had seen some incremental
changes in its staffing from the mid-1990s to the late 1990s. For example, while the budget of
the DEA increased from $1,050 million in 1994 to $1,349 million in 1998, the organization also
saw an increase in its special agents (personnel) from 3,418 in 1994 to 4,261 in 1998 (DEA
Report 2008: 91). Also, by the end of 1998, ten foreign offices were opened, with additional staff
members, as part of the agency’s foreign obligations in narcotics control (DEA Report, 2008:91).
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Similar incremental changes (first order) occurred to other bureaucratic components
(personnel and budget) of the DEA during the era of George W. Bush. The DEA special agents,
for instance, increased from a total number of 4,841 in 2003 to 5,235 in 2008. The budget for the
operations of the DEA also saw an increase from $1.9 billion in 2003 to $2.4 billion in 2008
(DEA Report, 2008:161). It is clear that these changes are first order changes because of the
changes in the settings of the narcotics policy instrument. While the scope of the change has
broadened, especially with the DEA’s foreign expansion efforts on global narcotics control, the
tempo of the change can generally be described as slow in nature. It is plausible to argue, in view
of the analysis that Hall’s (1993) first order change appears to fit the pattern of US narcotics
policy process since 1993.

Second Order Change
A second order change, according to Hall (1993), occurs when a policy instrument is
adjusted for the purpose of introducing a new policy instrument or a redefinition of an old policy
instrument. For Hall (1993), a change in a policy instrument occurs when there is a general
dissatisfaction with the workings of an old policy instrument. A change in a policy instrument
can also occur because of a strategic policy reason. As the policy instrument as well as its
settings change, the overarching policy goals do not, however, undergo any form of change
(Hall, 1993). Change agents of most second order changes are mostly driven by bureaucratic
officials (Breton et al., 2007: 354; Hall, 1993:283). Applying this theoretical concept to the US
narcotics policy, this study finds that second order change agents within the US narcotics policy
field are not only exclusive to bureaucratic officials, but advocacy groups (anti-prohibition) and
policy entrepreneurs play major roles in shaping the US narcotics policy process.
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On the narcotics policy instruments, Coulkins et al. (2005:15) categorize the US narcotics
policy instruments (tools) into three main areas:
(a) Law enforcement/prohibition strategy.
(b) Treatment policy option.
(c) Education and prevention campaigns.

The broad literature has further grouped the three areas into two broader policy
instruments known as the supply-side (law enforcement option) and demand-side (treatment
option) to narcotics control (Boyum and Reuter, 2005; Burke 1992; Falco, 1989). For Boyum
and Reuter (2005), and Musto (1999), the division of the US narcotics policy instruments into
supply-reduction and demand-reduction has historically been rooted in the longstanding debate
over whether drug abuse should be handled as criminal or medical policy issues. As previously
noted, supply-reduction generally involves the enforcement of narcotic laws and strategies with
emphasis on prohibition and criminalization regarding the production, trafficking, and use of
narcotic drugs.
On the contrary, demand-reduction option involves prevention, education, and treatment
programs. Of the two policy instruments, the supply-reduction option of prohibition and
criminalization have largely dominated the entire narcotics control system for more than a
century (Boyum and Reuter, 2005; Burke, 1992; Fisher, 2006, Nadelmann, 1990). Clearly, the
broad pattern of the US narcotics policy instruments (supply-reduction and demand-reduction)
has undergone some degree of change in priority, tempo, mode, and scope over a period of time.
In fact, the dynamics of change in priority of the narcotics policy instrument, especially during
the fourth phase, is significant to determining whether a second order change has occurred or
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not. To demonstrate the empirical evidence of this change, I will examine some cases in both the
Clinton and the Bush eras to support my argument.
As we have seen in the previous discussion on partisanship and narcotics policymaking,
Democratic presidents tend to be more sympathetic to a permissive approach to narcotics control
than Republican presidents. Although the respective drug policies of both parties do converge,
especially on the balanced policies that were adopted in the Clinton and the Bush eras, one could
still argue that the rhetoric of the Clinton administration was geared towards a permissive
approach. For example, some top officials in the early years of the Administration made a series
of policy statements in support of a permissive policy option to narcotics control. In a statement
to the National Press Club in December 1993, for example, Dr. Jocelyn Elders88 remarked that
many criminal activities could be reduced in the country if illegal drugs were legalized (Musto,
1999:282). A similar view, as noted, was made by Janet Reno during her Congressional
confirmation hearing as Attorney General in May 1993 (Chepesiuk, 1999; Bertram, et al., 1996).
President Clinton himself pledged during his presidential campaign and after he became
president to put more emphasis on treatment and prevention programs of narcotics control
(Chepesiuk, 1999:36). In a speech delivered at Prince George’s County Correctional Center in
1994 to launch his national drug policy, the President reiterated the link between drug abuse and
criminal activities, and stated that “no nation can fight crime and drugs without dealing honestly
and forthrightly with the problem of drug addiction.”89 For Chepesiuk (1999), the plan by
Clinton to reduce the staff size of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy
88

Dr. Jocelyn Elders served as Commissioner of Health in Arkansas under Governor Clinton, before she was
appointed as Surgeon-General (first African-American) in the early years of the Clinton presidency.
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Treaster, Joseph, B. 1994. “New Focus on Drugs: President’s Strategy Reflect Concern about Crime and
Changing Priorities.” New York Times, February 12, 1994. http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/12/us/new-focusdrugs-president-s-strategy-reflects-concern-about-crimechanging.html?scp=1&sq=President+Clinton+and+drug++treatment++and+1995&st=nyt, Retrieved on 07/10/2011.
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from 146 to 25 soon after becoming President, could also be interpreted as one of the signals of
the Administration’s commitment to downsizing the inherited prohibition apparatus of the past
Republican governments.
Although the Clinton administration was committed to a more permissive approach, it
was also apparent that the Administration’s budgetary allocation to law enforcement witnessed
some increases.90 For some observers, the justification for the increases in spending for law
enforcement in the Clinton era was due to his balanced policy approach to narcotics control. Lee
Brown, actually made a similar claim on the need to develop a comprehensive or balanced (law
enforcement and treatment combined) anti-drug strategy during his Congressional confirmation
hearing as a Drug Czar designate in February 1993 (Chepesiuk, 1999:36). It was also reported
that an amount of $270 million, out of a total amount $400 million designated for prevention and
treatment programs, was actually used to hire more officers for community policing and other
law enforcement activities in the Clinton era.91
Moreover, Mathea Falco, who served as an assistant Secretary of State for international
narcotics during the Carter administration, summed up the assessment of President Clinton’s
narcotics policy this way: “I love the rhetoric of this Administration about the importance of
prevention and treatment… but unfortunately, their budget does not reflect any change in drug
policy.”92 Indeed, the US narcotics policy in the Clinton era has undergone some changes in
policy (scope, mode, and priority), but not fully to the policy direction expected of a Democratic
leaning government. Johnston and Weiner (1996) confirm this assumption by indicating that
some amount (mode) and scope of change (second-order) did occur in the Clinton era.
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According to Johnston and Weiner (1996):
After nearly three decades of Republican dominance of the issue, President Clinton has
scrapped his party’s traditional approach to crime and criminal justice, embracing a series
of punitive measures that have given him conservative credentials and threatened the
Republicans’ lock on law and order (Johnston and Weiner, 1996:1).

As Hall (1993) argues, changes are made to a policy instrument as a result of a gross
dissatisfaction with an existing policy instrument, or for a strategic policy reason. As clearly
evident in the preceding discussion, it is likely that the emphasis on the comprehensive approach
may have stemmed from the need for a pragmatic narcotics policy initiative. Also, the strategic
policy reason for change of policies that Hall (1993) outlined could also be responsible for the
second order change during the Clinton era. For instance, President Clinton was said to have
initially ignored and given less attention to the drug problem soon after taking office in 1993.
However, the drug issue took a center stage on his domestic policy agenda from 1994 onwards.
Perhaps the change was primarily due to his worsening poll numbers regarding his inaction on
the narcotics problem as some analysts suggest (Treaster, 1994). In effect, the policy response
(the comprehensive option) from the Administration may have been driven by a strategic policy
action in order to avoid being characterized as too soft on drugs.
Regardless of one’s interpretation of the Clinton narcotics policy, it is evidently clear that
the policy instrument of the Administration had undergone policy changes. By interpreting the
pattern of this change within the context of Hall’s (1993) concept of second order change,
reveals two important points worth addressing. First, the Clinton era shifted the tone of the
narcotics issue from an exclusively law enforcement approach (policy instrument) that
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characterized the previous phase towards a more liberal tone of narcotics control, especially in
rhetoric. Second, the emergence of the balanced approach signaled a shift in the direction of the
narcotics policy instrument (policy tools) from an exclusively law enforcement approach, which
was largely associated with the previous Republican eras (Reagan and George H.W. Bush).
In view of the above analysis, this study contends that Hall’s theoretical concept of a
second order change fit the changing trends of US narcotics policy in the fourth phase. Although
the budgetary allocation for law enforcement (supply-side) increased in total percentage in the
Clinton era, it must be noted that the absolute budgetary allocation for many liberal narcotics
control programs (demand-side) saw an incremental change as well (see Appendix 2).
Similar to the Clinton era, the narcotics policy under President George W. Bush was also
guided by the balanced strategy of narcotics control (Boyum and Reuter, 2005). Outlining the
details of his official narcotics policy in the 2002 National Drug Control Strategic report,
President Bush argues that the fight against the drug problem has not been very effective because
of what he describes as the inability to address the problem from a comprehensive perspective
(ONDCP, 2002: 4). According to the report, narcotics control policies tend to be largely shaped
by partisan rhetoric, where some prefer an exclusive focus on law enforcement, while others
advocate for a liberal approach (ONDCP, 2002).
However, what the country needs, noted the President, is an integrated approach with two
basic components: (a) to modify individual behavior in order to reduce drug use and addiction.
(b) To disrupt the market for illegal drugs (ONDCP, 2002: 4). For President Bush, the two
components not only act as mutually reinforcing, but the connection between law enforcement
and treatment options is also likely to strengthen the balanced strategy towards narcotics control.
Clearly, the Bush administration, like the Clinton era, pursued a comprehensive drug control
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policy (ONDCP, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008). In fact, the annual national control budget
statements93 of the Bush administration provide some support for his comprehensive policy.
In effect, the narcotics policy direction in the fourth phase (Clinton and Bush eras) was
characterized by a balanced approach to narcotics control. Nonetheless, Boyum and Reuter
(2005:11) argue that key differences in policy strategy existed between the Clinton and Bush
eras. For example, while President Clinton focused more attention on the problem of chronic
drug abuse, with less attention on reducing the general prevalence, the Bush administration,
however, emphasized on the broad option of drug use reduction. Drawing on Hall’s (1993) ideas
on the reasons for a second order change in policy (see chapter two), it is also likely, as revealed
in the preceding discussion, that the incentive towards a comprehensive narcotics policy strategy
in the fourth phase could be attributed to the growing dissatisfaction with the exclusively law
enforcement approach that has characterized the previous narcotics control measures.
Another important case that demonstrates the evidence of a second order change in policy
in the fourth phase (Clinton and Bush eras) was the change in the policy instrument on marijuana
policy in sixteen states,94 including the District of Columbia (DC). As previously discussed,
while the state laws on marijuana continue to undergo changes as a response to the demand for
the use of some amount of marijuana for medical purposes, the prohibitive laws on marijuana
appear unchanging at the federal government level (Khatapoush and Hallfors, 2004). Faced with
this challenge and the possibility that the marijuana ballot initiative might spread to other states,
the federal government made several attempts since 199695 to prevent the implementation of the
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medical marijuana laws at the state level (Ferraiolo, 2007). In June 2005, for example, the
Supreme Court ruled in Raich v. Ashcroft, that drug patients living in states that had ratified the
marijuana ballot initiative were not protected from arrest and prosecution by federal law
enforcement agents. Irrespective of the threats, quite a number of states continued not only to
defend the marijuana ballot initiative, but state officials were also generally uncooperative with
federal agents in the prosecution of medical marijuana cases across the country (Ferraiolo,
2007:170).
Again, the shift in the narcotics policy instrument (second order change) on marijuana
was basically driven by the increasing dissatisfaction with the existing restrictive marijuana
policies, especially at the state government level. Hall’s (1993:282) argument that a growing
dissatisfaction with an existing policy instrument creates the incentive for a second order change
in policy could is applicable to changing trends in the marijuana laws. As noted, these changes
are mostly driven by state officials and bureaucratic agents. What appears inconsistent, in the
case of this study, is the fact that the demands for these changes (marijuana laws), particularly in
the Clinton and George W. Bush eras, were not driven by state officials (Breton et al., 2007:354;
Hall, 993). However, anti-advocacy prohibition groups and policy entrepreneurs such as Drug
Policy Alliance and individual policy entrepreneurs such as George Soros were the active agents
involved in supporting legislations and ballot initiatives for the medical use of marijuana across
America (MacDonald, 2009; Ferraiolo, 2007).
The preceding analysis again supports the claim by this study that the domain of US
narcotics policy has undergone a second order change in policy, particularly from 1993 to 2009.
While the scope of the change has been broadened, especially at the state level, the tempo of the
change has rather been slow. Without doubt, Hall’s (1993) theoretical typology of first and
186

second order change (s) in policy provide very useful theoretical framework in our understanding
of US narcotics policy process and change since 1993. For a complete understanding of the type
and nature of US narcotics policy change that has occurred, it is vital to explore whether any
evidence of third order changes in policy exist within the policy domain. In other words, has the
US narcotics policy undergone any form of a third order change in the fourth phase?

Third Order Change
A third order change, according to Hall (1993), involves a fundamental paradigm change
in the overarching policy goals. In most cases, once the major goal of the policy changes, the
other two components (policy instruments and settings of the policy instruments) also changes.
In essence, a third order paradigm change implies a radical change in a policy regime 96 (Studlar,
2009; Skogstad, 2009; Breton et al., 2007; Hall, 1993). This kind of change (third order)
resembles and perhaps shares similar ideas with Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated
equilibrium theory. Since changes in the overriding policy goals constitute the centrality of a
third-order change in policy, it is important to outline the underlying policy goals of the US
narcotics policy in order to determine whether a third order change has occurred or not.
The overall narcotics policy goal of the federal government have broadly been shaped by
the need to reduce the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. It was the establishment
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1989 (a mandate of the1988 AntiDrug Abuse Act) that clearly outlined the general narcotics policy goal for US (Musto, 1999).
Similar to the previous policy goal, the overriding policy goal of the ONDCP broadly focuses on
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Hall’s classic example of a third order change in policy from Keynesianism to monetarism in Britain in the 1970s
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tobacco control from a purely economic issue to health issue, Skogstad (2009) employed the theory to study
agriculture policy in Canada. She describes the change as programmatic change (incremental) rather than a
paradigmatic (radical) change in the policy (agriculture).
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reducing the availability of narcotic drugs through law enforcement strategies. Further, the
narcotics policy goal of the ONDCP since its establishment has been guided by two main
purposes:
(a) To formulate policies, priorities, and objectives for the country’s drug control program.
(b) To coordinate domestic (federal, state, and local) and international efforts at
narcotics control.97

While the first purpose transforms the priorities of the ONDCP into a major narcotics
policy goal, the second purpose provides an important mechanism for the general guidance and
specific policy directions to over fifty federal drug control agencies involved in all forms of
narcotics control (ONDCP, 1996). Generally, the central policy goal of the ONDCP is “to reduce
illicit drug use, manufacturing, trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related
health consequences.” 98
To achieve these goals, the Director of the ONDCP is charged with the responsibility of
presenting an annual report known as the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) to Congress
each year with details of the nation’s narcotics control policy. In fact, the 1996 National Drug
Control Strategy describes the ONDCP’s major policy goal as a “collective American effort to
achieve a common purpose…..and the common purpose of that collective effort is to reduce
illegal drug use and its consequences in America.”99 Some of the key elements of the strategy
include: the policy goals, policy strategies of control, budget statements, and the guidelines for
cooperation among federal, state, and local narcotics agencies.100 The first major narcotics policy
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goal and instrument in this phase was outlined in the 1993 Interim National Drug Control
Strategic report. In his introductory remarks to the report, President Clinton noted that:
The drug issue is about the responsibility of government to its citizens and the kind of
society we aspire to be. There must be a national imperative to reduce drug use. Surely this
is the national goal that can unite us all, across the boundaries of party, race, region, and
income.101

As shown in the President’s remarks, the overriding goal of his Administration was to
reduce the use of illegal drugs in the US. Indeed, the control of production, trafficking, and sale
of narcotic drugs became the major policy goal of the Clinton years (ONDCP, 1993; 1994; 1996;
1998). A similar narcotics policy goal towards the overall reduction in the production,
trafficking, and use in narcotic drugs characterized the Bush era as well (ONDCP, 2001; 2002;
2003; 2005; 2008; 2009). In 2002, for example, President George W. Bush set his major policy
goal by targeting the reduction of narcotics use among teenagers (ONDCP, 2002:3).
As we have seen so far, the US narcotics policy goals have generally been shaped by the
dominance of the prohibition policy framework (Fisher, 2006; Caulkins et al., 2005; BewleyTaylor, 2003; Bertram et al., 1996; Sharp, 1994; Nadelmann, 1990). In fact, the trend of the
federal budgetary allocations (see appendix 2, 3a, b, & c) and some interview responses support
the dominance of the prohibition policy claim. Caulkins et al. (2005:15) also reflect on a similar
assertion in their study. For them, the federal anti-drug budget, narcotics policy directions, and
narcotics policy priorities have for many years been skewed toward law enforcement approach to
narcotics control.
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In a response to one of my interview questions, one respondent said that:
In the 1990s and the early 2000s, there was certainly an emphasis placed on further
criminalization of illicit drugs and the people who use them….. but most of the emphasis has
been at the federal level. Emerging substances such as synthetic cannabis (a.k.a K2/Spice)
have just recently been criminalized at the federal level, while another psychoactive drug,
salvia divinorum, has remained unscheduled.102

Given that some degree of policy change had occurred to the US narcotics policy
instrument and the settings of these instruments (ONDCP, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2002; 2006, 2009)
as previously examined, the overriding narcotics policy goals, however, remained largely
unchanged. In fact, while few interviewees were not sure whether any significant change is
occurring, a greater number of respondents agree that the US narcotics policy has undergone
many forms of incremental policy changes (first order and second order), but not a radical or a
third order change. It is plausible to therefore argue, as other respondents103 have also expressed,
that the changes occurring within the US narcotics policy domain have not only been incremental
in nature, but the speed (tempo) of the change has been slow and deliberative. Durant and Diehl
(1989) conceptualize this kind of slow tempo as protracted. For these respondents, a radical
change (third order) in US narcotics policy might be possible through either a court decision or a
binding voter initiative in the future.
In spite of the fact that a third order change in narcotics policy has not occurred, it is still
important to underscore the fact that such a change might occur sometime in the future. This
assertion is based on two assumptions that might help explain why a third order change is likely
to occur at some point in time. First, all policies, as many policy scholars agree, are inherently
102

An official interviewed at Drug Policy Alliance (DPA).
Officials interviewed at Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), Rand Drug Policy Research Center (RDPRC), and
NORML Foundation.
103

190

dynamic and subject to change at some point in time and space (Capano and Howlett, 2009;
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Hall, 1993). Second, policies change because of existing policy
anomalies and failures (Skogstad, 2009:94; Hall, 1993).104 In essence, once all policies are
subject to change, especially policies characterized by anomalies and failures as with the existing
narcotics policy regime, one can speculate, based on these assumptions, that a third order change
in US narcotics policy is likely to occur at some point. In the meantime, we have established in
the preceding analysis that the US narcotics policy, particularly in this phase (1993-2009) has not
shown any evidence of a paradigm or a third order change in policy. The changes that have
occurred are largely incremental in nature (first and second order changes).

Summary
Two major objectives were set for this chapter. The first was to explore the dynamics of
US narcotics policy process and change through the theoretical frameworks of the three domestic
policy theories. The second objective was to assess the explanatory power of each theory and
determine the one that offers the best and most compelling explanation for US narcotics policy
change since 1993.While many aspects of the theories examined have contributed to our
understanding of the US narcotics policy change over time, it is clear from the analysis that some
of these theories have been more useful than others in explaining the type and nature of the
narcotics policy process. In short, my argument is that some of the theories have performed
better than others in explaining the narcotics policy process.
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existing policy paradigm tends to create the incentive for policy change. The increasing frustrations of many towards
the existing narcotics policy represent a good case in point.
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Agenda-setting was the first theory examined in this chapter. By employing the concepts
of issue definition, venue switching, and policy entrepreneurship, the cases examined in the
narcotics policy domain show some consistency with the existing literature (Pralle, 2003, 2006a;
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Studlar, 2002; McLendon, 2003; Sinclair, 1986; Howlett, 1997;
Princen, 2007; Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Crow, 2010) on the usefulness of agenda-setting
theory in explaining policy change. In fact, these scholars (above) are among many others that
have applied agenda-setting theory to study many different policy spheres with results showing
greater levels of utility and applicability to other policy fields. In the case of US narcotics policy,
we have clearly seen that the concepts of agenda-setting have been well demonstrated in the
policymaking process. The analysis also reveals that these concepts of agenda-setting (issue
definition, venue switching, and policy entrepreneurship)105 offer a better explanation for some
of the changes that have occurred within the US narcotics policy since 1993. On the other hand,
this study does not find the broad concept of punctuated equilibrium as very useful in explaining
the changes that have occurred within the US narcotics policy. This is because of the nonexistence of any evidence to support any sign of a sudden or abrupt interjection (punctuation) in
the form of a focusing event or a major political factor (s) to cause a transformative (drastic)
policy change in the narcotics policy. In effect, the policy dimension that looks at policy agendas
was clearly displayed through the agenda-setting theory in this chapter.
The influence of partisanship and ideological orientation in shaping the narcotics policy
process and therefore change was equally apparent. Like agenda-setting, partisanship provides a
useful understanding of the narcotics policy process and change. The discussion on partisanship
and policy outcomes, especially on the distinction between a restrictive policy approach
105
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(Republican ideology) and a permissive policy strategy (Democratic ideology) in shaping the
narcotics policy process, provide us with a useful explanation of the phenomenon. The partisan
dynamics also help to highlight the struggle between the two poles of the narcotics policy
domain, namely prohibition and criminalization versus treatment and harm reduction. This was
particularly evident within the policy dimension of campaign rhetoric and policy proposals.
Although partisanship ideology does not appear to play a dominant role in explaining the nature
of narcotics policy change, the theory is still relevant to our general understanding of the US
narcotics policymaking process.
Hall’s (1993) theory of paradigm change (orders of change) was also examined within
the context of US narcotics policy change. The discussion focuses on the typology of first order,
second order, and third order change in policies. While evidence of a first and a second order
change in narcotics policy has occurred, there was no evidence to show the occurrence of a third
order or paradigm change in policy. In terms of Hall’s (1993) theory, key evidence suggests that
a first order change in narcotics policy had occurred during this phase (Clinton and Bush eras).
Although a first order change offers some explanation in understanding the incremental change
that occurred, this study concludes, based on the supporting evidence, that Hall’s (1993) concept
of second order change in policy provides a persuasive explanation for the type and nature of US
narcotics policy change from 1993 to 2009. In contrast, the concept of a third order change
(paradigm), which appears to share similar assumptions with the punctuated equilibrium theory,
offers little explanation for the US narcotics policy process during the period under review. In
other words, there was no change in terms of a third order kind.
Broadly, the trend of US narcotics policy change has predominantly undergone a second
order change (policy instruments) since 1993. Having employed the three theories as competing
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explanations to understand the US narcotics policy process since 1993, this study argues that
Hall’s theory of orders of change provides a compelling explanation for the US narcotics policy
process as compared to the other theories. This argument is based on the theoretical assessment
of the relative explanatory power (Studlar, 2002) of the three domestic theories in answering the
question of how well each theory performed in explaining policy change, particularly the nature
and type of change that have occurred.
As previously discussed, while agenda-setting and partisan ideology provide useful
theoretical frameworks in explaining the narcotics policy process, this study contends that they
are unable to better explain the type and nature of change that has occurred within the US
narcotics policy domain. However, Hall’s (1993) theory provides a better explanatory power in
explaining the type and nature of change (first order and second order) in the narcotics policy
process. More importantly, this study also finds that Hall’s (1993) theory fit the three
components (policy goal, policy instrument, and settings of a policy instrument) of policy
compartmentalization (Capano and Howlett, 2009) in explaining the type of change associated
with each component parts (see figures 4.4 and 4.5).
In view of the preceding arguments, the important question to ask is this: to what extent
does the US narcotics policy change shape the global narcotics regime? In other words, what are
the implications of US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime as a result of the
dominant influence of the US on the global narcotics regime? The next chapter addresses this
question.
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Chapter 5
US Policy Change: Implications for the Global Narcotics Regime
Introduction
This chapter examines the basic question of whether a US domestic policy change is
likely to have a similar influence (change or resistance to change) on the global narcotics regime
as a result of the dominant role of the US on the global narcotics regime. As stated in the
previous chapters, the study employs the concept of regime theory (Young, 1983; Keohane and
Nye, 1977: Keohane, 1984, 2005) with specific application of the hegemonic stability theory
(Ikenberry, 1989; Kindleberger, 1981) to help with our understanding of how the dominant role
of the US shapes many global issue areas, including narcotics control. Again, it is useful to
reiterate how the concept of hegemonic power is applied in this chapter. Essentially, the broad
ideas of the hegemonic stability theory are applied, but my interpretation of a hegemon, as it
relates to the US, is not in the original sense of the theory (see chapter two). In essence, the
theory (HST) is broadly applied to demonstrate the dominant and influential role of the US
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999a) in shaping the global narcotics prohibition regime since 1909.
The chapter starts from three basic standpoints. First, it discusses the US involvement
and role in the global narcotics regime. Second, the chapter examines the evolutionary process
(four stages) of a global prohibition regime (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006) and demonstrates
how the global narcotics prohibition regime fits the evolutionary process. Finally, the study
shows the influential role of the US in shaping the global narcotics regime with supporting cases.
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The Global Narcotics Problem
The problem of illegal drugs, with current global proceeds ranging from $100 million to
more than $1 trillion per year (Wyler, 2009:1), and the efforts to control them is not only a
problem for the United States, but for the international community as a whole. Since 1909, the
world community, with the US at the forefront, has been engaged in a global fight against the
production, trafficking, and use of narcotic drugs (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a;
Gerber and Jensen, 2001). As stated in chapter one, illegal drugs are broadly categorized as
narcotics or psychotropic substances that are produced, traded, and used across many parts of the
global environment. As a result of the international conventions prohibiting these drugs, almost
every signatory country’s domestic law prohibits the production, trafficking, and use of narcotic
drugs (Wyler, 2008:1). Some of the commonly used narcotic drugs include cocaine, coca leaf,
heroin, cannabis or marijuana, and opium. The psychotropic substances include ecstasy,106
LSD,107 amphetamine, and methamphetamine, with only few exceptions of these drugs that are
currently permitted for medical and scientific purposes (Wyler, 2009:1).
Although the global efforts to control narcotic drugs have been an integral part of the US
foreign policy objectives for decades, Wyler (2008, 2009) contends that the debate on narcotic
drugs as a potential threat to US national security first emerged on the foreign policy agenda in
the late 1960s. Since then, the issue has largely been defined through security and law
enforcement approaches by many successive Administrations and Congresses. While the rhetoric
on the so-called war on drugs tends to characterize the eras of many presidents, the US Congress
has been equally involved in many international efforts at narcotics control. The role of Congress
has been through the enactment of various legislations that expanded the powers of many drug
106
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Ecstasy is the street name for MDMA (3, 4-Methylenedioxy-N-Methylamphetamine (Wyler, 2009:1).
LSD is the street name for lysergic acid diethylamide (Wyler, 2009:1).
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interdiction authorities and criminal penalties for drug production and trafficking from major
producing and trafficking countries108 into the US (Wyler, 2009:2). Senator John Kerry is on
record to have, for example, pushed for a greater involvement of the US in global crime control,
especially narcotics during the mid-1980s through to the 1990s.
In the words of Senator Kerry:
We are compelled by the globalization of crime to globalize law and law enforcement… and
transnational crime is the new communism, the new monolithic threat… and the United States must
lead an international crusade to defeat it.109

Apparently, Senator Kerry’s line of thinking has been generally shared by other political
elites and ordinary Americans (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006) for some time now. For sure,
one might argue that the view expressed by Senator Kerry may not have been exclusive to the
1980s and 1990s alone, but also applicable to recent times (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006,
Wyler, 2009:2). While different views exist on the strategies of narcotics control
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(Gerber and

Jensen, 2001: 7), it is widely believed that one of the reasons for the relentless effort by the US
in the global narcotics control is the fact that the major supply of narcotic drugs into the US
comes from outside the US (Bewley-Taylor, 2006,1999a). In effect, the US has for many
decades led the international counternarcotics control (supply-reduction) programs on drug
growers, processing centers, and transit points in many of the source countries (see appendix 4)
while the domestic control programs focus on the disruption of the distribution networks and
users as shown in figure 5.1.
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See appendix 4, Map of the World Drug Majors in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009.
This quotation was cited in Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: v) Also see Kerry (1997).
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Gerber and Jensen (2001:7) argue that the US deliberately exports narcotics prohibition strategy to other nations
because of the following reasons (states need enemies, because of the disappearance of the red scare, and the US has
become the police force of the world).
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Figure 5.1
Global and Domestic Dimensions of US Narcotics Control
Grower

Processing

Transit

The Domain of US Counternarcotics
Control
(International)

Distribution

User

The Domain of US
Narcotics Control
(Domestic)

Source: Adapted from Jones (2002:119) with some modifications.

Given the active involvement of the US within the global system because of its dominant
influence, it becomes imperative to ask whether a policy change in the US narcotics policy
domain is likely to impact the global narcotics regime. In other words, will a change in the
narcotics policy domain in the US, or a resistance to change, reflect a similar policy change on
the global narcotics regime? As noted, this chapter draws on regime theory (hegemonic stability)
from the international relations literature to discuss the implications of a narcotics policy change
in the US on the global narcotics regime.
For Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), the internationalization of crime is not new to the
contemporary international system. For them, the outcomes of the internationalization of crime
are from many years of efforts by many Western powers to export their domestic perception of
criminal activities on the rest of the world. The purpose is basically to serve their political and
economic interests. Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: vii) conclude that the “global prohibitions
and international crime control priorities and practices would not be what they are today if
different states with different values had dominated the international society during the past two
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centuries.” In the case of narcotics policy, it is common to find that almost all countries adhere to
the international treaties prohibiting drugs that are labeled as narcotics, except for scientific and
some limited medical purposes (Bewley-Taylor, 2006:29, Nadelmann, 1990).
Among the Western powers that shape and influence many global issue areas, the US
stood out as the most influential country in shaping the internationalization of crime, particularly
on narcotics prohibition (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). The involvement of the US in the
global control of narcotics has been shaped by internal and external dynamics for many decades.
For example, many religiously affiliated groups and individuals within the US have since the
beginning of the twentieth century framed the source of the narcotics problem beyond the
boundaries of the US (Bewley-Taylor, 2006, 1999a). According to Bewley-Taylor (2006:29),
the attempt by these moral advocates (Protestant culturalism), was to shift the blame to outside
sources in order to fight against the use of illegal drug that many deemed morally unacceptable
to the American society. While the influence of the moral advocates of the Protestant culture is
important in shaping the global involvement of the US in narcotics control, this study argues that
the dominant influence (political and diplomatic) of the US offers a better explanation for the US
leadership and role in shaping the evolution and maintenance of the global prohibition regime.

United States and the Global Narcotics Regime
As noted in chapter two, the hegemonic stability theory constitutes an important part of
regime theory in the international relations literature. Broadly, international regimes have the
principal responsibility of governing the relationship among states in an issue area through
agreed principles and norms. These norms can either be implicit or explicit, with members’
expectation converging in common areas of global concern (Jervis, 1983; Krasner, 1983). As
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many international relations experts (Waltz, 1979; Axelrod, 1984; Mearsheimer, 2001) agree, the
anarchical nature (see chapter two) of the international system creates the incentive for one
powerful (hegemon) state to facilitate cooperation of others into a global institutionalized system
or regime in support of their interests (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Axelrod, 1984; Byers,
2003). For Martins and Thompson (2007), a state achieves a hegemonic or dominant status if it is
able to demonstrate its global leadership, reach, and capability, and also strong enough to impose
its interests and values on other states. In fact, Wade (2002) provides a simplified version of the
hegemonic concept as a dominant country’s ability to make others want the same thing as it
wants for itself.
It is undeniable that the international system is complex in structure and function. The
complexity of the system is characterized by multifaceted interactions among sovereign states
with different interests, values, and agendas, which makes cooperation even in areas of mutual
interests sometimes very difficult (Keohane, 1984). Perhaps this explains why it is important to
have a hegemonic or a dominant power that can exert its influence and coordinate or coerce
others in the evolution and maintenance of regimes within the global system. As previously
discussed, Keohane (1984; 2005) reminds scholars that international regimes can emerge and be
sustained with or without a hegemon. For Keohane (1984; 2005), a hegemonic power may not
necessarily be a sufficient condition for the evolution of cooperative relationships or regimes
because state actions promote cooperation for the purpose of mutual benefits. Keohane’s (1984;
2005) argument is useful in advancing the broader debate on the hegemonic stability theory, but
this study believes that Keohane’s argument does not diminish the dominant impact of great
powers such as the US in shaping issue areas in the international system in line with their norms,
values, and interests.
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Within the original sense of the concept, a hegemonic stability theory assumes a situation
where a state in the international system becomes so powerful (military, political, economic and
technological) to the extent of exerting its influence and control on other states due to the
unequal power relations within the system. In most cases, the hegemonic power takes an active
responsibility in the maintenance of order within the system (Keohane, 1984; Ikenberry, 1989).
For Cronin (2001), the US has been quite influential on the world stage since the beginning of
the twentieth century. However, the US assumed the status of a hegemonic power only after the
end of World War II and in the post-Cold War era. In an article titled Power and Liberal Order:
America’s Post War World, Ikenberry (2005:133) describes the current global position of the US
as follows:
The American power (military, economic, technological, cultural, and political) is one of the great
realities of our age. Never before has one country been so powerful or unrivaled. The United States
emerged from the Cold War as the world’s only superpower and grew faster than Europe and Japan in
the decade that followed. American bases and naval forces encircle the globe….and for the first time
in the modern age, the world’s most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the fear of
counterbalancing competitors… the world has entered the age of American unipolar.

Many others do share Ikenberry’s (2005) perspective that the US is indeed the single
most important dominant power within the current post-Cold War global system. Applying a
similar idea of a hegemonic concept to the global narcotics issue, it is obvious that the US has
successfully utilized its dominant influence to shape the evolution and maintenance of the global
narcotics prohibition regime (Room and Paglia, 1999; Kuzmarov, 2008; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a).
Before I examine the dominant influence of the US on the global narcotics regime, I will first
explore the conceptual pattern of regime formation. Like other regimes in the international
system, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) argue that most global prohibition regimes, such as
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those targeted at the suppression of slavery, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking, appear to follow
a theoretical pattern of four stages in their evolutionary process. The next section examines the
formation of the global narcotics prohibition regime within the context of the four conceptual
steps.

Stages in the Evolution of a Global Prohibition Regime
First Stage
According to Andreas and Nadelmann (2006:20-21), most societies prior to the first stage
often consider the activity or behavior to be prohibited as entirely legitimate and normal. The
case of narcotic drugs in the US and other places in the world are particularly relevant here. In
fact, the legitimacy argument of some narcotic drugs in the first stage is supported by a 2009
article in the New York Times titled, Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves by the President of Bolivia,
Evo Morales Ayma.111The article, which was based on the President’s address to the United
Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND) in Vienna, argues that the inclusion of coca
leaf in the same category as cocaine in the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a
misguided policy that was adopted by the global community. For him, the custom of chewing
coca leaves has been in existence in many countries of the Andean region of South America for
centuries. Coca leaves not only help to alleviate hunger, but also provide energy to help counter
altitude sickness for Bolivians and other mestizo people during their long days of labor intensive
works. The President concludes that coca leaves were not only consumed during the past
generations, but are equally consumed and very much useful in present times. In his words:
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Ayma, Marales Evo. 2009 “Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves.” New York Times, March 13th, 2009 (Op-ED
Columnist), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14morales.html, Retrieved 07/20/2011. Evo Morales
Ayma is the current President of Bolivia. Retrieved on 7/20/11.
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Millions of people chew coca in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, northern Argentina and Chile.
The coca leaf continues to have ritual, religious and cultural significance that transcends
indigenous cultures and encompasses the mestizo population.112

In the case of the United States, we have seen in chapter three how drugs such as opium,
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana were all legal substances and accessible to anyone who wanted
them in the late 1890s to the early 1900s (Bertram, et al., 1996; Musto, 1999). These drugs were
not only found in several unregulated medicines for the treatment of regular ailments such as
stomach aches and headaches, but others such as cocaine were actually used as an ingredient for
the production of wines and other food additives (Meier, 1994:22; Bertram, et al., 1996:61).

Second Stage
Theoretically, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) argue that the second stage basically
involves a redefinition of the issue not only as a social problem, but also as an evil in itself that
demands both national and global attention in policy responses (legislation and treaties) towards
its control. In other words, this is the stage where the otherwise normal practice, become denormalized and may also be categorized as a deviant activity. Applying this concept to the US
narcotics policy, it is clear that the frequent use of these narcotic drugs, particularly among the
immigrant and poor communities, led to a widespread addiction and abuse and the subsequent
demand for the control of these drugs.
Pressure was therefore put on the federal government from all angles, particularly from
prominent moral and religious advocacy groups such as the Puritan American heritage, to control
and prohibit the use of these drugs (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, 2006). Andreas and Nadelmann
(2006:20-21) describe this phenomenon as one of the key characteristics of the second stage in
112
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the evolutionary process of any global prohibition regime. The response from the US federal
government to the widespread use of narcotic drugs in early 1900s led to the passage of the 1906
Pure Food and Drug Act (see chapter 3). This was the first major involvement of the US in
legislation to control narcotics use (Meier, 1994). As previously discussed, the 1906 Act was
significant because it marked a major change from the past years where there was no law
regulating narcotics use (Meier, 1994).

Third Stage
The third stage constitutes one of the most important parts in the evolutionary process for
two main reasons. First, this is the stage where the scope of the issue expands onto the global
system for possible global debate on the issue. Andreas and Nadelmann (2006:21) describe this
third stage as crucial because it is the stage where many regime proponents strongly agitate for
global policy proposals or treaties for the suppression or criminalization of the presumed deviant
activity. This may or not lead to an international agreement, but often times provide the basis for
global collaborative efforts that could eventually lead to the emergence of an international treaty
against the activity. The global narcotics prohibition regime is a good case in point.
The second major reason why the third stage is so important is the fact that this where the
display of a dominant power or hegemonic influence occurs. During this stage, the state that
emerges as the dominant player in the international system tends to exert its influence and power
on other states toward the formation of a global regime in the issue area. In most cases, the
outcome of the treaty may reflect the interests and values of the dominant power. The hegemonic
state can also employ powerful policy tools such as diplomatic pressure, economic incentives,
military threats, and or propaganda campaign strategies to influence other states towards a
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cooperative treaty or an agreement to control the issue (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006:21).
Aside from states, transnational moral entrepreneurs also do influence the process of regime
formation at this stage (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006).
The conceptual assumption described above was clearly evident in the role that the US
government and US-affiliated moral entrepreneurs played in the evolution of the global narcotics
regime in the early 1920s. For these scholars (Nadelmann, 1990; Bullington, 2004; BewleyTaylor, 1999, 2006), the interest of the US in global narcotics control intensified after the
Spanish-American War ended and the US acquired the Philippines. In fact, this was the era when
opium use and trafficking was widespread in the region of Asia, especially China. Buxton
(2006:31), for example, observes that because the US federal government took direct control of
the Philippines, the country did not only inherit the opium retail system, but the US federal
government was also forced to take a strong position on the sale and consumption of opium.
Backed by influential moral entrepreneurs,113 the US pushed for a stronger policy action in
prohibiting opium use and other narcotic drugs at the domestic and the international levels
(Mandel, 2006).
Clearly, the American influence on the global narcotics control, particularly on the China
opium problem, was displayed when the first international conference on opium (Shanghai
Conference) was convened by the US in 1909 to specifically address the Chinese opium
problem. Buxton (2006:26) argues that the Shanghai Conference had far reaching significance in
promoting America’s preferred policy approach on the global narcotics control regime. In fact,
the influence of the US on the Shanghai Conference was evident in many ways. For example, the
113

Examples of some of these moral entrepreneurs include Charles H. Brent, the Episcopal Bishop in the
Philippines, Reverend Wilbur Crafts, the president of the International Reform Bureau (IRB), the American
Missionary Organization, and Hamilton Wright, a politically connected Physician (Nadelmann, 1990, Musto 1999,
Buxton, 2006).
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conference was not only chaired by Bishop Brent, the longtime campaigner for a stiffer narcotics
control policy, but the US delegation was also led by Dr. Hamilton Wright, another proponent of
a global narcotics prohibition regime (Bullington, 2004; Buxton, 2006).
As earlier noted, the US was not a global hegemon in the true sense of the word by the
early 1900s, but it played an influential role in not only convening the Shanghai Conference to
discuss the opium problem, but was also active in shaping the global narcotics control treaties
towards a supply-side prohibition approach (Buxton, 2006). For Bewley-Taylor (1999:11), the
Shanghai Conference had two important implications for the US in terms of its impact on the
global narcotics regime. First, it signaled the arrival of the US onto the global stage, and second,
the US began to externalize its concept of domestic narcotics prohibition (multilateral relations at
the UN) on the global narcotics regime and on other countries through bilateral relations.

Fourth Stage
According to Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), the fourth stage emerges after efforts by
advocates of an international regime in an issue area become successful. Once the idea of regime
creation is supported by other states following a redefinition of the issue, an international treaty
with institutional structures to support the implementation of the treaty will be established. In
some cases, regime proponents may face huge challenges from dissidents and other deviant
states who might not want to comply with the treaties. Diplomatic and other forms of pressures
are often applied to compel deviant states to enforce the norms of the regime. In the words of
Andreas and Nadelmann (2006:21), “it is only at this point that one can speak of a global
prohibition regime having fully come into existence.”
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In terms of the global narcotics prohibition regime, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006)
observe that the United States was primarily responsible for persuading other countries to agree
to the establishment of the regime. Given the initial success with the Shanghai Conference, the
US convened further international meetings with the goal of cementing its preferred supply-side
prohibition approach through binding international treaty agreements (Bullington, 2004:690).
The Hague Conventions of 1912 and 1914114 were the outcome of international meetings toward
the global narcotics regime. In fact, before the UN finally approved the 1961 Single Convention
Agreement, nine international narcotic treaties were proposed and approved since the 1912
Hague Convention. As expected, the United States was not only involved in the negotiations,
but also employed its dominant position to influence the institutional structures and frameworks
in the establishment of the global narcotics regime (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a;
Bullington, 2004).

US Policy Tools and Global Narcotics Control
As revealed in the discussion, the US has been very influential in the evolution and the
maintenance of the global narcotics prohibition regime. In Bullington’s (2004:690) words:
The United States had been the prime mover of this early anti-drug legislation, relying on diplomatic
pressure and arm twisting to forge a shaky consensus among nations that were generally much less
convinced of the need for international controls. This American triumph signaled the beginning of
nearly a century during which America literally dominated the direction of drug control and drug
policy in the international arena.
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See table 1.1 in chapter 1 for the chronology of Multilateral Conventions on the Global Narcotics Control (19091988).
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Levine (2003:148) shares a similar view on the dominant role of the US on the UN narcotics
regime. According to Levine (2003), the global narcotics prohibition has enjoyed a considerable
support and legitimacy for many decades because the “US has used the UN as the international
agency to create, spread, and supervise world-wide prohibition.”
In its effort to externalize the prohibition approach of narcotics control through the global
narcotics regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a), the US employs some vital policy tools (see table 5.1)
in achieving its global narcotics control objectives. Like other powerful countries, the US
employs diplomatic influence and pressure as one of its policy tools to shape the global narcotics
prohibition regime. As Bewley-Taylor (1999b) observes, the US does not only exploit its
dominant influence, but also uses its diplomatic strength within the UN, particularly in the period
after the Second World War, to pressure other countries to support its prohibition style approach
to global narcotics control.

Table 5.1
US Policy Tools of Influence (Global Narcotics Control)
Policy Tools
Diplomatic

Derivative Control

Certification Policy

Financial Leverage

Description
The US employs diplomatic pressure on other countries both at the
multi-lateral and bilateral levels toward the goal of global narcotics
prohibition.
This policy tool connects non-narcotic issues to narcotic ones in
agreement of other nations so they can get the US economic aid and
political support in other areas.
This policy tool mandates every US president to present an annual
assessment report to Congress on the compliance status (US laws
and UN narcotic Conventions) of major drug producing and
trafficking countries. US foreign assistance can be withheld from
non-compliant countries under the policy provision.
The US employs its financial leverage as the largest contributor to
the UN to shape policies, including narcotics.

Source: Table designed by the author based on the information and ideas from these works.
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Hinojosa, 2007; Chepesiuk, 1999:34).
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Derivative control is another important policy tool at the disposal of the US. According to
Bewley-Taylor (1999b:151), the US successfully employed and continues to use this policy tool
to connect non-narcotic issues to narcotic matters within the United Nations. Bewley-Taylor
(1999b:151) describes the policy instrument as this:
By tying the acquiescence of other nations in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to American
economic aid and political support in other areas, the US was able to dominate the decision-making
process and play a central role in the instigation and design of anti-narcotics legislation.

Another key policy instrument of influence that the US uses is the certification concept.
Generally, the concept is seen as one of the most vital policy tools available to the US narcoforeign policy, especially in terms of its relationship with the Andean countries. It is a policy
instrument of diplomatic arm twisting by the US for the purpose of accessing greater influence
and control over the global narcotics regime (Chepesiuk, 1999; Bouley, 2001). The certification
process, which became effective in 1986, was part of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (Chepesiuk, 1999; Bouley, 2001). Under the new certification law, every US
president is expected to make an annual assessment of major drug producing countries in a report
to Congress. The purpose is to make sure these countries not only comply with the US on all
narcotics production and trafficking issues, but also with the goals and objectives of all the UN
conventions on narcotic drugs and other psychotropic substances (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a;
Hinojosa, 2007).
The law also mandates a president to withhold US foreign assistance from any noncompliant country (Chepesiuk, 1999:34). In a study examining the certification concept for
many Latin American countries, Bouley (2001) shares Falco’s (1996) views that the certification
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process was designed to boost US efforts in compelling countries in the region to cooperate on
limiting the trafficking of narcotic drugs into the United States. It also ensures that US presidents
are accountable to the American people through Congress in enforcing a more vigorous approach
to global narcotics control.
The financial leverage of the US on the UN constitutes another important policy tool that
the US uses to influence the global narcotics regime (see table 5.1). Apparently, the US has been
the largest financial contributor to the operations of many agencies of the UN, including the
narcotics agencies, although it owed about $1.4 billion115 in its financial obligations to the UN in
the 1990s (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a). On the importance of the US financial leverage on the UN,
Bruun et al. (1975) and Bewley-Taylor (1999a) provide a good idea on the importance of this
policy tool in shaping the global narcotics regime. For them, the influence of the US within the
UN drug control program illustrates its dominant position in many other agencies of the UN
because of the US role as the largest financial contributor to the organization. Clearly, the
financial leverage of the US on the UN has not diminished in recent years. For example, the
Better World Campaign (BWC) reports that the US funding for the UN for the Fiscal Year 2011,
include an amount of $1.887 billion for peacekeeping operations, $516 million for the regular
budgets, and $354 million for agencies that the US regularly contributes (narcotics agencies
included) toward its operations. The BWC also notes that the US currently pays close to a
quarter of the UN regular and peacekeeping budget allocations.116

115

According to the Better World Campaign (BWC), the organization devoted to promoting a strong US-UN
relationship, the arrears owed by the US to the UN was paid off in September 2002. Retrieved from
http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/about/ (11/06/11).
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The data and information on the financial contributions of the US to many UN agencies are provided on the
website of Better World Campaign (BWC). Retrieved from
http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/funding/how-the-us-funds-the-un.html (11/06/11).
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Bewley-Taylor (2005:429) elaborates on the financial leverage argument by indicating
that “any discussion of the UN drug control system is incomplete without the mention of major
donors.” For Bewley-Taylor (2005), the UN drug system has generally been considered as the
servant of many major top donors such as the US, Sweden, and Japan. Clearly, the US has been
the strongest advocate for global prohibition of narcotics control among the top donors (BewleyTaylor, 2005). It is important to reiterate a recent example of US financial dominance and
influence over the UNODC. As Bewley-Taylor (2005:429) recounts, the former Executive
Director of the UNODC, Mr. Antonio Costa, met in November 2004 with Mr. Robert Charles,
head of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to discuss
some possible alternative approaches such as the harm reduction intervention programs to global
narcotics control. Realizing the potential threat to the existing prohibition approach from an
alternative option, the head of the US Narcotics Bureau was said to have threatened to reduce the
US financial support to the UNODC, unless Mr. Costa reassure the US that the UNODC will not
offer its support for any global harm reduction intervention program. In order to avoid any cut in
funding from the US, the head of the UNODC succumbed to the US demands (Bewley-Taylor,
2005:429).
In fact, a number of respondents for this study share the same view on US dominance
within the UN drug system. In one of the responses to an interview question on the dominant role
of the US in the global narcotics prohibition regime, one respondent said that:
The US plays very dominant role and has provided an enormous amount of funding to UN antidrug efforts. At one point when the World Health Organization (WHO) was planning to issue a report
on the lack of dangerousness of cannabis, the US pressured the WHO to kill the report…At another
point when the Liberal government of Canada under Prime Minister Chretien proposed to
decriminalize marijuana, the Bush Administration’s drug czar, John Walters, threatened trade
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retaliation against Canada regarding timber, fish, and other issues.117

In a similar answer to another interview question on whether the US is influential on the global
narcotics regime because of its hegemonic status, here is what another respondent said:
Latin American lawmakers, for instance, have moved intellectually and also policy wise toward
decriminalization in recent years, but have feared going far because of their northern neighbor. In
recent years, the U.S. has also pressured Canada and the U.K from moving ahead with policy
changes that would shift away from criminalization. The U.S. fears that drug policy change would
compromise the UN conventions.118

The preceding analysis has indeed shown that the US is unquestionably powerful and
continues to influence and shape the global narcotics regime as well as its bilateral narcotics
relations with other states since the 1909 Opium Conference in China. While this study argues
that regime theory (hegemonic stability) offers a good explanation for the dominant role of the
US in the evolution and the maintenance of the global narcotics regime, it is equally important to
consider a possible alternative explanation for the dominance of the US on the global narcotics
regime.
Sharing the view of Bruun et al. (1975), Bewley-Taylor (1999b:151), for example, argues
that when a superpower exhibits this kind of involvement and control over global issue areas
such as the global narcotics policy domain, there is often the possibility of less resistance or
unresponsiveness on the issue from other countries. For Bewley-Taylor (1999a:211), the success
of the US in “globalizing its drug prohibition policy is attributable to a lack of widespread and
forcible opposition.” This is particularly crucial in cases where the issue does not appear to
contradict the interest of other countries. In other words, the argument assumes that the US is
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likely to receive support and cooperation from other countries on the global efforts to control
narcotics as long as such cooperation does not conflict with other countries’ interests (Bruun et
al., 1975; Bewley-Taylor, 1999b:151). In essence, one might infer from this argument that the
preferred narcotics option (prohibition) of the US is largely in place because of similar interests
shared by other countries to keep the prohibition regime in existence.
While this alternative explanation for the continuous existence of the regime seems quite
convincing in principle, the argument appears not very compelling. This is because it is unlikely
that almost every country in the world will continue to adhere to the same narcotics policy option
(prohibition) for decades without embracing alternative policy options even in the face of policy
failures. In fact, some scholars (Nadelmann, 1990; Lee, 1993; Akiba, 1997; Baggins, 1998;
Thoumi, 2009) describe the global narcotics prohibition policy as ineffective in controlling the
production, trafficking, and use of narcotic drugs. Although the alternative explanation might be
useful to some extent, my argument is that countries could opt and push for an alternative policy
regime, if not for the hegemonic influence of the US on these countries through the UN narcotics
control system to keep the existing prohibition policy in place.
In other words, the concept of national interest is paramount to a country’s interaction
with the rest of the world, but it is unlikely that almost all countries that pursue the prohibition
policy option would share the same interest (prohibition approach to narcotics control) with the
US, if not for the dominance of the US through its global policy tools of control (see table 5.1).
This argument is not to however suggest that the US and other countries’ interests might not
converge with UN policies. It certainly can converge. However, my central argument, which I
have attempted to support with earlier discussed cases, is that the existing UN narcotics
prohibition regime is largely shaped by the dominant influence of the US on the UN. This
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finding appears to be consistent with earlier scholarly works (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor,
1999a; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006), which have also underscored the dominant role of the
US in externalizing its preferred prohibition approach on the rest of the world.
Again, this study contends that the influential role of the US with its preferred prohibition
policy shapes the global narcotics regime. One could conclude that the hegemonic stability
theory offers a good theoretical explanation for the existing prohibition option of global narcotics
control. In other words, this study argues that the current global narcotics regime is somehow
driven by the hegemonic influence of the US. It is therefore imperative, in view of this claim, to
revisit the guiding research question of this study, which seeks to find out the implications of US
narcotics policy change on the global narcotics prohibition regime.

Two-Level Games: US Policy Change / Global Narcotics Regime
The foremost objective of this chapter is to demonstrate with evidence through the
hegemonic stability theory that US narcotics policy change is likely to provoke a similar change
or resistance to change in the global narcotics regime because of the dominant influence of the
US on the regime. As previously discussed, the US interacts with other countries in the world on
narcotics control from two important levels. The first interaction occurs at the multilateral level
under the auspices of the United Nations. The second interaction takes place on bilateral level.
These kinds of interactions between the US as a dominant player in the global system and the
rest of the world fall within the emerging field of domestic and international politics. According
to these scholars (Milner, 1997; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hagan, 2001; Mesquita, 2002;
Hinojosa, 2007; Hirschi and Widmer, 2010), the interaction between domestic politics and
international relations occupies an important field of study in political science in recent times.
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More than four decades ago, Rosenau (1969) wrote on the concept of Linkage Politics to
highlight the importance of domestic linkage with international politics. A few decades later,
Putnam (1998) developed and extended the ideas of Rosenau (1969) with his concept of twolevel games to enhance the understanding of the link between domestic and international politics.
Applying this concept to the US situation, it is noticeable that the display of US hegemonic
influence on the global narcotics regime stemmed from the US influence on the regime through
its interaction (multilateral and bilateral) with the rest of the world (Bewley-Taylor, 1999b;
Nadelmann, 1990; Bullington, 2004; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006).
As shown in the preceding discussion, based on the evidence from the documentary
analysis and the interviews, it is apparent that the US has successfully employed its dominant
influence through various policy instruments and diplomatic actions (see table 5.1) to shape the
global narcotics regime in line with its domestic interests of narcotics control (Bewley-Taylor,
1999a; Bullington, 2004; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Having established the basis of this
argument, the obvious question that emerges is whether the global narcotics regime reflects
similar policy changes that have occurred within the US narcotics policy domain. In other words,
is the global narcotics policy change being driven by policy changes occurring with the US
narcotics policy? Before I examine the dynamics of this question in the next few pages, a brief
outlook at the current policy direction of the US will suffice for now.
In his introductory remarks in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy to Congress,
President Barack Obama made the following remarks:
While I remain steadfast in my commitment to continue our strong enforcement efforts, especially
along the southwest border, I directed the Office of National Drug Control Policy to reengage in
efforts to prevent drug use and addiction and to make treatment available for those who seek
recovery. This new, balanced approach will expand efforts for the three critical ways that we can
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address the drug problem: prevention, treatment, and law enforcement.119

While the President’s strategy emphasizes a balanced approach, the budget commitment of the
Administration reveals that law enforcement approach (domestic and international) overrides
other treatment and prevention programs (see appendix 3d). The increasing budgetary allocation
and policy attention to law enforcement demonstrates the dominance of the prohibition policy
regime even in the Obama administration. Clearly, the over reliance on narcotics prohibition
continues to attract criticisms in the US and on the global stage. For many, the existing narcotics
prohibition policy approach in the US and the global system has not been able to address the
drug problem as expected (Nadelmann, 1990; Fish, 2006; Husak, 2006).
As previously argued, the influential role of the US on the global prohibition regime is
evident in the three main international treaties -the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Albrecht, 2001). These treaties do not
only provide the institutional framework for the existing regime, but also reflect much of the US
domestic ideas on prohibition (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a:166; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). In
fact, Comparing the hegemonic role played by Great Britain and other European nations in the
late nineteenth century into the twentieth century where global prohibition against piracy and the
slave trade reflected their norms, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006:45) observe that the existing
global narcotics regime also reflects the prohibition policy interest of the United States.
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Generally, some reservations still persist among scholars (Nadelmann, 1990; Fish, 2006;
Husak, 2006) on the existing prohibition policy option. However, the US and UN authorities
have not given any serious attention to the possibility of adopting an alternative policy option
(demand-reduction approach) to global narcotics control (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a). In spite of the
broad based resistance to policy changes, there are few emerging alternative voices and growing
debates regarding the need for some more attention toward a public health approach to global
narcotics control.
For example, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) in the 2010 World Drug Report made the following remarks:
Drug addiction is a treatable health condition…and slowly, people are starting to realize that drug
addicts should be sent to treatment, not to jail… and treatment is becoming part of mainstream
healthcare.120

Such a statement coming from a high-profile official within the UN system not only underscores
the importance of the emerging discourse on reforms, but also reveals the growing frustrations
with the dominance of the existing prohibition regime. A similar sentiment was recently
expressed in a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to the US Congress on the
policy directions of global narcotics control. The report highlights some of the growing concern
over the effectiveness of the prohibition strategy in global narcotics control (Perl, 2003).
In spite of the growing dissatisfaction regarding the existing policy approach, policy
officials in both the US and the UN continue to defend the prohibition policy option, to the
extent of undermining academic and independently conducted research studies that recommend
revisions to the global prohibition policy (Bewley-Taylor,1999a:169). The research in question
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was undertaken by WHO/PSA (Program on Substance Abuse), in conjunction with the UN
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) between 1992 and 1994. The
findings of study indicate that health problems are greater with the use of legal drugs than with
occasional use of narcotic drugs such as cocaine and cannabis (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a:169).
Fearing that the outcome of the study might pose a threat to their interest (prohibition approach),
the UN organization, under pressure from the United States, quickly issued a disclaimer to the
report and indicated that the report does not represent the official position of the organization
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999a:169). As a matter of fact, this statement is consistent with a similar one
made during my interview with an official from the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. In an
answer to one of the interview questions on whether the US plays a dominant role on the global
narcotics regime, the respondent, citing some examples among others, stated that:
The US is very dominant within the global narcotics regime and has provided an enormous amount of
funding to the UN anti-drug agencies and directly to various nations through wide variety of
mechanisms. The US also works closely and influences other UN drug agencies. At one point, the
World Health Organization (WHO) was planning to issue a report on lack of dangerousness of
Cannabis, but the US pressured WHO to kill the report.

Although the degree of dominance by the US on the global narcotics regime might be subject to
diverse interpretations, most of the elites interviewed for this study generally share the view that
the US has greater influence on the global narcotics regime than other countries.
It is again evident, based on the above discussion, that the US has tactically employed its
influential status not only to help create and maintain a global narcotics prohibition regime, but
has also made a tremendous impact in shaping the global regime with prohibition option of
narcotics control. On the basis of this argument that the US is influential in shaping the global
narcotics regime, the theoretical question that this study seeks to further explore is whether a
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change in narcotics policy within the US policy domain is likely to have a similar change on the
global narcotics regime. In other words, the study is interested in the implications of US policy
change on the global narcotics regime. As previously noted, the hegemonic stability theory is the
underlying theory on which the argument is based. My assumption is that a change or resistance
to change in narcotics policy in the US is more likely to have a similar change or resistance to
change on the global narcotics regime. For a better understanding of the implications of US
policy change on the global narcotics regime, this study integrates the hegemonic stability theory
with Hall’s (1993) theory of paradigm change (orders of change) to demonstrate the nature and
type of change occurring within the global narcotics regime.
It is noticeable, based on Hall’s (1993) theory, that a third order (radical) kind of change
has not occurred in the global narcotics regime. In essence, the prohibition approach to global
narcotics control, which has been in existence for more than a century, is still in place. In other
words, the global prohibition regime has not undergone a transformative change in policy from
the existing approach (prohibition) to an alternative one (decriminalization). Instead, one might
argue that the global regime is undergoing incremental changes (first and second order changes).
As we have noticed in chapter four, a change in routine budgetary allocation provides a
good indicator in measuring incremental changes in policy (Rose, 1984). This is also true for the
UN and its major agencies, including the narcotics agency (UNODC). Applying this concept
(Rose, 1984) to the routine budgetary allocation of the UN narcotics agency, this study argues
that the narcotics policy implementation of the agency has undergone incremental changes in
policy. For example, the UNODC indicates that the financial contributions toward its budget for
global drug and crime control increased by 13 percent from US$ 215.3 million in 2009 to US$
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242.9 million in 2010.121 From Hall’s (1993) perspective, this kind of incremental change is a
basic characteristic of a first order change (settings of a policy instrument) in policy.
Beside the first order kind of changes in policy, it also appears that a second order change
in policy is occurring within the UN drug control system. This is evident by the increasing
attention to public health approach to narcotics control by the UNODC. For instance, the 2009
annual report of the UNODC indicates the importance of putting health right at the center of
global narcotics control. According to the report,122 the prevention and treatment of those
dependent on illicit drugs should be considered as a crucial demand reduction strategy for global
narcotics control. The report adds that “law enforcement efforts to stop or reduce the production
and trafficking of illicit drugs (supply-reduction) tend to be ineffective if not combined with
prevention of drug use and treatment of drug dependence (demand-reduction).”123 To promote
this policy objective, the UNODC has recently launched a new treatment strategy known as
Treatnet Phase II. The purpose of this new strategy is to provide effective and quality drug
treatment and rehabilitating services for those addicted to drugs in many countries.124
Clearly, this appearance of a gradual shift in tone and policy direction of the UNODC
indicates an incremental change in the existing policy instrument of prohibition towards a liberal
policy option to global narcotics control. In essence, the exclusive prohibition strategy to global
narcotics control seems to be giving way to a comprehensive (demand-side and supply-side)
approach to global narcotics control. In Hall’s (1993) terms, a change to a policy instrument
121
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with the introduction of a new instrument or an adjustment to an old instrument (Studlar, 2009)
demonstrates the appearance of a second order change in policy. Indeed, the changing trend from
an exclusive prohibition approach towards a comprehensive strategy in global narcotics control
is significant to the underlying assumption of this chapter. This is because the new approach
(comprehensive) appears to reflect a similar trend of US narcotics policy approach since the
1990s, particularly during the administrations of Clinton and Bush (see chapter four). As this
study assumes, it is plausible that the gradual change towards a more comprehensive approach to
global narcotics control is a reflection of a similar change (comprehensive approach) occurring
within the US narcotics policy domain. Again, my argument is that the global narcotics regime
is undergoing a similar nature of change (comprehensive approach) because of the influence of
the US on the regime.
Aside from the shift towards a balanced approach to global narcotics control, there are
also some emerging international venues for narcotics policy change toward a liberal approach.
A good case in point is the Dutch liberal drug policy experiment. The Dutch experiment began in
the 1970s with the aim of making soft narcotic drugs such as cannabis available to users as a
pragmatic method of responding to the reality of the drug problem (Bullington, 2004; BewleyTaylor, 2006). Interestingly, the liberal experimental approach by the Netherlands not only
challenged the basic assumptions of the UN/US backed-prohibition strategy, but the Dutch
policy initiative became a reference point for lesson drawing purposes for other countries
(Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and other European countries) in recent years. As BewleyTaylor (2006) observes, many European countries since 2000 have adopted a more permissive
policies, particularly on cannabis or marijuana.
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In 2001, for example, more than 95 percent of cannabis possession cases were not
prosecuted in France. The law on marijuana was also relaxed in other European countries, such
as Denmark, Italy, and Germany. Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom are the other
countries making some changes to their marijuana laws (Bewley-Taylor, 2006:40). Also, the
liberal drug policies in some of these countries are connected to the gradual positive response to
the harm reduction concept as a result of the increasing spread of the HIV/AIDS disease among
many injection drug users. The harm reduction concept became attractive when the needle
exchange125 program was introduced in many countries for injection drug addicts (Bullington,
2004; Nathanson, 2007). Applying the theoretical concept of orders of change to the cases
examined, one might describe these changes as incremental in nature or changes within the
domain of first and second order changes in policy on the global regime.
The evidence examined so far shows the existence of some changes in policy within the
global narcotics regime. As revealed, first and second order changes appear to be the common
types of change that have occurred and currently occurring within the global narcotics regime.
However, there is no evidence to suggest the occurrence of a third order type of change (radical)
within the regime. Haven established the evidence of these changes, the key question is: to what
extent are these changes driven by the influence of the US?
Certainly, this study argues, based on the cases examined that the incremental types (first
and second order) of narcotics policy changes that have occurred within the US policy domain
reflect similar policy changes on the global narcotics regime. Taking the first and second order
types of change, for example, it is apparent that these incremental changes on the global regime
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reflect similar changes that have occurred within the US policy arena. Also, the ongoing
emphasis on a more comprehensive approach to narcotics control in the US appears to reflect a
similar trend on the global regime. In terms of the occurrence of a third order (radical) type of
change, it is also evident, as earlier noted, that such a change has not occurred (1993-2009) and
neither is it occurring within the US or on the global regime. By implication, this study argues
that the US through its hegemonic influence has resisted the occurrence of a third order change
from taking place both within the US and on the global scene because of its vested interest in
preserving the status quo policy of prohibition.
While the evidence analyzed in this study supports the centrality of the hegemonic
stability theory in explaining the influence (change or resistance to change) of the US on the
global regime, it might also be useful to consider a possible alternative explanation for the
changes occurring within the global narcotics regime. In fact, critics of my proposition could
argue that the dynamics of regular internal bureaucratic reforms to existing policies, which tend
to be normal with any organization, might offer some explanation for the changes occurring
within the global prohibition regime. Although there a possibility with this argument or line of
thinking, the argument is problematic because a decision to change a globally sensitive policy
issue, such as narcotics control could hardly be driven by bureaucratic experts alone with no
regard to the dominant player (United States) with vested interest (prohibition approach) within
the regime.
Overall, my argument is that the hegemonic stability theory offers a useful conceptual
framework in explaining the implications of change (first and second order) and resistance to
change (third order) in the US narcotics policy on the global narcotics regime. In other words,
the changes (first and second order) in the global narcotics regime have largely been shaped by
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similar changes that are occurring within the US narcotics policy domain. The same assumption
holds for the resistance to a third order change by the US on the global narcotics regime because
of the non-existence of a similar third order change within the US itself.
In effect, this study proposes that a radical narcotics policy change from the existing
prohibition approach to a complete legalization of narcotic drugs in the US, is more likely to
result in a similar policy change within the global narcotics prohibition regime. In fact, many
respondents (elite interview) for this study expressed similar views. In an answer to one of the
questions on the implications of a US domestic policy change on the global narcotics regime, one
interviewee said that:
Many countries fear that a US backlash for drug policy changes would compromise the UN
conventions. However, a major shift in the US drug policy (for example, California ending
marijuana prohibition) would likely have implications for policy change within the Western
Hemisphere and /or a global scale.126

In the words of another respondent:
Most US allies would rather refrain from challenging the US drug policies. Once the US
decriminalizes, nearly every other country will follow suit.127

Based on the evidence examined in terms of the dominant influence of the US on the
global narcotics regime, this study maintains that the explanation for the non-occurrence of a
paradigm change (third order) within the global narcotics regime is somehow driven by the nonexistence of a similar change within the US domestic policy domain. In essence, this observation
supports my argument that the US has not only been very instrumental in the evolution of the
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global narcotics regime, but has employed its hegemonic influence to shape the global narcotics
policy towards its preferred option of prohibition. This conclusion is consistent with my set
hypothesis (see chapter two) that the US has successfully resisted pressure for a paradigm (third
order) policy change within the global narcotics regime as a result of its dominant influence on
the regime. From a broad theoretical assessment, the hegemonic stability theory and Hall’s
(1993) orders of change provide one of the best frameworks in terms of their applicability to the
global narcotics policy arena. However, the two domestic policy theories (agenda-setting and
partisan ideology) could not be usefully employed (applicability) in studying the global narcotics
policy change.

Summary
This chapter has examined the implications of the US narcotics policy change on the
global narcotics regime. Grounded in the broad concept of the hegemonic stability theory and
orders of policy change, the chapter has demonstrated, using both documentary evidence and
data gathered from my elite interviews to show that the US has shaped the evolution and
maintenance of the global narcotics prohibition regime. Without doubt, the US continues to
influence the regime. Based on the evidence of the influential and dominant role by the United
States on the global narcotics regime, the chapter concludes the discussion by stating that a
change or resistance to change in the US narcotics policy domain is more likely to reflect a
similar change (s) on the global narcotics prohibition regime.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

Introduction
This work started with two main research questions. First, the study seeks to explore
whether policy change has occurred within the US narcotics policy domain, especially from 1993
to 2009 (scope of study). Second, the study investigates whether a change (radical or marginal)
or resistance to change to the US narcotics policy is likely to have a similar impact on the global
narcotics prohibition regime because of the dominant influence of the US on the regime.
My goal in this concluding chapter is to provide a general assessment of the theories
employed to explain the US narcotics policy change over time, and the likely implications of the
US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime. Also, the chapter summarizes the
main theoretical arguments advanced in the study, and the underlying hypotheses as well as the
major findings of the study. The study concludes by examining whether any prospect exists for a
paradigm or a third order change in both the US and the global narcotics policy. Finally, the
limitations of the study are discussed and areas for future research agenda are proposed.

Summary of Theories and Findings
As we have seen throughout this study, the problem of narcotic drugs has been on the
global agenda for more than a century. For many scholars (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Bayer and
Ghodse, 2000; Buxton, 2008; UNODC, 2010), the first concerted action to address the Chinese
opium epidemic in 1909 invariably marked the starting point of the international community’s
effort in global narcotics control. Following the 1909 Shanghai meeting, a series of other
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international negotiations were held, which eventually led to the passage and adoption of various
treaties on global narcotics control.128 The three main treaties that currently shape and guide the
global narcotics regime include the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Generally, the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) serves as the main guardian of the treaties regarding narcotics control
(Albrecht, 2001; UNODC, 2010).
Although many other countries were involved in the passage of these conventions, the US
has been the leading country in the establishment of the global narcotics regime. As previously
noted, it was the US that convened the first international meeting to address the Chinese opium
problem in 1909. The United States also played a key role in instituting the structures for the
global narcotics regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999b; Bayer and Ghodse, 2000). As a matter of fact,
the active involvement of the US in the evolution of the global narcotics regime was not by
accident. Like other countries, the use of narcotic drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and opium,
among others, was generally not regulated in the late nineteenth century to the early years of the
twentieth century (Meier, 1994). Apparently, the widespread use of these drugs led to many
forms of abuse and addiction. For Meier (1994), the passage of the 1906 Act (Pure Food), the
1909 Act (Opium Act), and the Harrison Act of 1914
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were the first major policy responses

from the US federal government on narcotics control. With a strong support from moral
entrepreneurs for the enactment of punitive narcotics control measures (Nadelmann, 1990;
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Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006), the US passed many punitive anti-drug policies from the 1930s
through to the 1980s.
Consequently, the US narcotics policy preference for prohibition paradigm with strong
institutional interest in law enforcement became the dominant policy approach (Fischer, 1999).
The prohibition strategy was later extended to other countries by virtue of US influence on the
rest of the world through the global narcotics regime (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Andreas and
Nadelmann, 2006).
As discussed in the previous chapters, two main perspectives (prohibition and treatment)
dominate the debate over narcotics control. Many advocates of the prohibition option (Marshall,
2000; McCaffrey, 2000; McCollum, 2000; Bennett, 2005; Wilson, 2005; Walters, 2005) argue
that illegal drug use should generally remain prohibited because public morality will continue to
win so long as narcotic drugs are prohibited. Also, the prohibition advocates believe that illicit
drugs are not only becoming more readily available and cheaper, but the drug trade has reached
an alarming proportion as one of the biggest and most lucrative enterprises, often accompanied
by other drug-related criminal activities. For example, the rising crime rate such as murder, rape,
and other drug-related forms of violence across the US-Mexico border support my case in point.
Critics of the existing prohibition policy strategy (Fazey, 2003; Fish, 2006; Husak, 2002;
Levine, 2003) consider the current narcotics policy regime (domestic and international) as
counterproductive, ineffective, and fragmented. It is not surprising therefore that many policy
advocacy groups and ordinary citizens are pushing for a shift from the existing prohibition policy
towards a public health approach (treatment and prevention) to narcotics control (Levine, 2003;
Bewley-Taylor, 2003; Nadelmann, 2000). As noted, the struggle over the US narcotics policy
control falls within the context of two competing poles: prohibition (law enforcement approach)
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versus treatment/harm reduction (public health approach). As similar to the tobacco control
debate in terms of its economic usefulness or public health concerns (Cairney 2007), it is likely
that the tug of war between those who advocate for prohibition or public health approaches to
narcotics control will continue to dominate the narcotics policy discourse.
As widely shared, the century-year old prohibition strategy of narcotics control appears to
be unchanging from a broader perspective. However, Capano and Howlett (2009:3) remind
scholars that policies are generally dynamic and change over time. In essence, policy change is
inherent and inexorable with any given policy process. Indeed, the narcotics policy domain
within the US and the global arena are certainly not excluded from change. Capano and Howlett
(2009) further argue that because of the fluidity of policies, it becomes important to understand
the process of stability and change in a policy process. In other words, change is necessary to
study in order to understand what, how, and when policies undergo radical or incremental
changes (see chapter two).
In view of this theoretical perspective of policy dynamics and change, this study set out
to investigate and explore the empirical question of whether policy change has occurred with the
US narcotics policy over time, particularly since 1993. To undertake this investigation, the study
employed three domestic policy theories (agenda-setting, partisan ideology, and paradigm
change/orders of policy change) as competing explanations to examine the US narcotics policy
process over time. The overall purpose is to compare and contrast these theories in order to
determine the strength or the explanatory power of each theory in explaining the US narcotics
policy change. In essence, the comparative assessment of these theories is vital to determine the
theory that offers the best explanation for the US narcotics policy change. Also, the hegemonic
stability theory was employed to explain the influence of the US as a dominant power on the
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global narcotics regime. The next section will review each theory in terms of its explanatory
power and usefulness in explaining the US narcotics policy process and change.

Agenda-Setting
As many policy scholars (Sinclair, 1986; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Studlar, 2002;
McLendon, 2003) agree, agenda-setting theory involves a process by which an issue moves from
relative obscurity to become a priority issue as a result of some serious attention given to it by
policy and political actors. Central to agenda-setting theory are key concepts of issue definition,
redefinition, framing, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship. The question of how issues
change and how the public often responds to an issue are also critical to agenda-setting theory
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). As previously noted, Studlar (2002:170) offers an insightful
perspective on agenda-setting. According to him, regardless of the conceptual varieties of
agenda-setting theory, the theory is essentially dependent on few basic elements such as how
issues are defined and redefined, and who in most cases constitute the key actors in setting an
agenda.
For the purpose of this study, I employed Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) version of
agenda-setting theory-punctuated equilibrium-with specific focus on key concepts such as issue
definition/redefinition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship in explaining US narcotics
policy change over time. In chapter three, for example, I examined the trends of US narcotics
policy change within the context of three main historical phases. The findings from the three
phases examined show the utility of agenda-setting in explaining the US narcotics policymaking
process and change since 1906. For example, the drug issue was not only framed and defined in
different ways, but key actors such as Congress, the media, the public, bureaucratic agencies,
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policy entrepreneurs, and other interest groups played a critical role in shaping the policy
process.
Although the drug issue received a considerable attention in all the three phases from the
key players mentioned above, an important finding of this study reveals that the narcotics policy
issue in the second phase (Nixon era) and the third phase (Reagan and Bush eras) received a very
high level of presidential attention to the issue (see chapter three) as compared to other phases.
Consistent with the work on agenda-setting and US drug policy by Baumgartner and Jones
(1993:152-164), this study also finds that the narcotics issue has waxed and waned on both the
systemic and institutional agendas, especially during the scope (1993-2009) of the research.
Similar to chapter three, I applied Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) version of agenda-setting
theory to explain the dynamics of the US narcotics policy change in chapter four. Again, a
similar display of agenda-setting theory was clearly evident in explaining the US narcotics policy
change since 1993. Using data gathered from the elite interviews I conducted and from the
analysis of the documentary data, this study130 finds that the concepts of issue definition, venue
shifting, and policy entrepreneurship provide us with a better understanding of the US narcotics
process.
For example, the study reveals that the 1990s, in particular, witnessed an increasing
struggle over a redefining of the drug issue towards a more public health or demand-reduction
(treatment and prevention) approach to narcotics control. The medical marijuana movement is
particularly important here. The data (interview and secondary documentary analysis) reveal that
key anti-prohibition advocacy groups were very instrumental in shaping the redefinition of the
marijuana issue, especially at the state government level (see chapter four). The successful
130

As previously mentioned, I categorized the scope (1993-2009) of my study as phase four of the US narcotics
policy process. The Clinton and Bush eras are the two political administrations examined in this phase.
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redefining of the marijuana issue towards a more public health approach galvanized many
advocacy groups and other policy entrepreneurs in shifting the venue of the marijuana issue to
the state level for policy change. Indeed, the successes of the ballot and legislative initiatives in
changing the marijuana laws at the state level (Ferraiolo, 2007) could largely be explained from
the two key concepts -issue definition and venue shifting-of agenda-setting theory.
Clearly, the broad framework of agenda-setting with the concepts of issue definition,
venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship and the role of reform-minded advocacy groups offer
very useful theoretical tools in explaining the pattern of the US policy change, particularly on the
use of marijuana for medical purposes (see table 4.1). Generally, these conceptual versions of
agenda-setting contribute to our understanding of the US narcotics policy change since the
1990s. In addition, these findings appear to be consistent with the two hypotheses set under
agenda-setting theory. First, that the scope of the US narcotics policy has widened and is
undergoing incremental policy change, and second, that the rise of drug liberalization advocacy
groups has led to changes in the US drug policy, particularly at the state level since the 1990s
(see chapter two).

Partisan Ideology
We have seen in the previous chapters that some scholarly works (Entman, 1983;
Schmidt, 1996; Imbeau et al., 2001; Studlar, 2002) have found a theoretical utility of partisan
ideology in explaining public policy outcomes. Similar to other theories employed, this study
investigated whether partisan ideology played any dominant role in the US narcotics policy
process. The discussion in the previous chapters reveals that the history of the US narcotics
policy has generally been shaped by partisan ideological orientations between Democrats and
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Republicans, which has helped sustained the drug issue on the agenda of major presidential
elections since the late 1970s (Bertram et al., 1996).
Clearly, partisan ideology has been evidently shown in the study. Not only has
partisanship shaped the US narcotics policy process to some extent, but the concept has also
enriched our understanding of the changing patterns of US narcotics policy process through the
partisan ideology of the Democratic and the Republican parties. For example, a key finding of
this study, which is consistent with the existing literature, reveals that Republican Presidents, to a
large extent, generally favor a more restrictive narcotics policy with a strong punitive and law
enforcement approach than do Democratic Presidents. For example, after President Nixon
declared the so-called war on drugs, the war subsequently escalated (punitive laws on narcotics)
under Republican Presidents of Nixon, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, than under Democratic
Presidents. In a similar discussion, Marcy (2010) contends that not only was the domestic law
enforcement on narcotics control drastically increased during the administrations of Reagan and
George H.W Bush, but the role of the US military in counternarcotics activities in the Andean
countries, for example, also saw a dramatic increase during the two administrations (see chapter
three).131
On the contrary, the ideological approach to narcotics policy by Democrats has generally
been towards a more permissive policy approach with emphasis on the public health approach
(treatment and educational programs) to narcotics control. The evidence of this approach was
clearly shown by the narcotic policies of the Carter and the Clinton administrations (see chapters
three and four). In view of the analysis on partisanship and policy outcomes, it is apparent that
131

See phases of US narcotics policy development.
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partisan ideology shapes the US narcotics policy process. It must, however, be noted that the
concept does not appear to play a dominant role in shaping the US narcotics policy process, let
alone provide a persuasive explanation for the policy change process, unlike the other two
domestic policy theories (agenda-setting and orders of policy change). Nonetheless, the theory is
still useful in our understanding of the US narcotics policy process.

Policy Paradigm Theory (Orders of Change)
Hall’s (1993) theory of policy paradigm approach or orders of change (first order, second
order, and third order), particularly the first and second order change (s) in policy not only
constitute the main theory of this study, but also the theory that offers a superior explanation, in
my estimation, for the changing nature of the US narcotics policy, especially in the 1990s. As
previously discussed, Hall (1993) defines policy change as involving alterations or adjustments
to a given policy from one level to another. The basic assumption of the theory rests on the logic
that all policies are composed of three main parts (policy goals, policy instruments, and settings
of a policy instrument) and what actually changes in a given policy is not necessarily the whole
policy, but each specific component of the policy. In essence, Hall (1993) argues that one can
better understand change (incremental or radical) in a given policy domain when the three key
components are examined separately within their respective context. Hall (1993) describes each
specific component within the typology of orders of change (see figure 4.2).
In chapter three, for example, the evolutionary process of the US narcotics policy was
examined through three different phases. Applying Hall’s (1993) concept to each phase clearly
reveals that the theory provides a persuasive explanation for the nature of policy changes (first
and second order) that have occurred throughout the evolutionary process of the US narcotics
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policy. In fact, a similar pattern of first and second order change in policy was evident in chapter
four as well. Another important observation of this study, which also appears to be consistent
with the existing narcotics literature is that the prohibition-based narcotics policy in the US and
the rest of the world seems unchanging by a third order after more than a century of its adoption.
It is based on this appearance of the unchanging nature of US narcotics policy that this study
investigated whether policy change (s) has occurred within the US narcotics policy domain.
As previously noted, I employed three domestic policy theories (agenda-setting, partisan
ideology, and orders of change) as competing explanations to examine the US narcotics policy
process, and therefore change over time. Although these theories offer some useful explanations
for US narcotics policy change, this study contends that the agenda-setting theory and partisan
ideology were unable to better explain the type and nature of these changes.
For example, Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) work on drug abuse was examined from a
broader perspective. Their study explored the changing trend of congressional (formal) and
media (systemic) attention to narcotics policy since the early 1900s. While this study believes
that the approach by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) is useful in providing a broad perspective of
the changing nature and the allocation of attention to US narcotics policy, it appears that their
approach (punctuated equilibrium) could not fully explain the nature and types of policy changes
that have occurred or occurring.
This is where Hall’s (1993) theory (orders of change), especially first order and second
order changes in policy become compelling in explaining the US narcotics policy. Although
Hall’s (1993) concept of a third order change (radical) in policy, which resembles Baumgartner
and Jones’ (1993) model of punctuated equilibrium, offers no useful explanation for the changes
because of the non-existence of a sudden and radical change in the existing narcotics policy, it is
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evidently clear that Hall’s conceptualization (first and second order change in policy) offers the
superior and persuasive explanation for US narcotics policy change since 1993.
Essentially, the assessment of the three domestic policy theories has clearly shown the
differences in the explanatory power of each theory. In other words, while the concept of orders
of change has performed very well in explaining the narcotics policy process and change (type
and nature), others (agenda-setting and partisanship) have partially explained the narcotics
phenomenon. Nonetheless, each theory performed well in explaining their various dimensions of
policy. For example, agenda-setting explained the dynamics of policy agendas, while partisan
theory explained campaign rhetoric and policy proposals very well. Also, orders of change
performed well in explaining policy adoption and implementation. Without doubt, all the three
domestic theories examined in this study have broadly enriched and contributed to the overall
understanding of the US narcotics policy process over time, particularly from 1993 to 2009
(scope of study).

Hegemonic Stability Theory/Global Narcotics Regime
As noted in the introductory chapter, two important research questions guided the
exploration of this study. First, the study examined whether policy change has occurred with the
US narcotics policy or not. Second, the study explored the likely implications of US policy
change (radical or marginal) or resistance to change on the global narcotics prohibition regime.
As previously argued, the concept of regime theory (Young, 1983; Keohane and Nye,
1977: Keohane, 1984, 2005) with focus on the hegemonic stability theory (Ikenberry, 1989;
Kindleberger, 1981) was employed to understand the dynamics of US policy change on the
global narcotics regime. For the purpose of this study, the concept of a hegemonic power was
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applied in a very broad sense of the term and not from the original sense (see chapter two). In
essence, I defined the hegemonic influence of the US in this case as a dominant player on the
global narcotics regime since the early 1900s (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a).
By integrating Hall’s (1993) orders of change with the hegemonic stability theory, it is
clear from the analysis that first order changes in policy have occurred within the global
narcotics regime. For instance, there has been a shift in budget allocations, tone, and policy
instruments of the UNODC. Hall (1993) describes these regular incremental budget changes as
first order changes in policy. It is also apparent that there has been a gradual shift in tone and
policy toward a public health approach (emphasis on treatment) to global narcotics control by the
UNODC (see chapter five). Hall (1993) conceptualizes changes in the policy instruments as
second order changes in policy. These findings suggest that the global narcotics regime, like the
US policy arena, has undergone both first and second order changes in policy. However, the
study does not find any evidence of a third order change (radical or paradigm) within the global
narcotics regime.
Based on the evidence discussed, this study argues that the US has successfully employed
its influential (hegemonic) status to shape the global narcotics regime towards its preferred
prohibition approach. Indeed, the hegemonic stability theory offers a useful framework in
explaining the implications of policy changes (first and second order) and resistance to change
(third order) in US narcotics policy on the global narcotics regime. In other words, the changes
(first and second order) in the global narcotics regime have largely been shaped by similar
changes that have occurred and occurring within the US narcotics policy domain.
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The Global Narcotics Policy Regime: Any Prospect for Paradigm Change?
Given the fact that the US narcotics policy is intertwined with the global narcotics
regime, and the dominant influence of the US in the evolution and maintenance of the regime,
this study investigated the implications of US policy change on the global narcotics regime as
previously noted. Employing the hegemonic stability theory in analyzing the data132 in chapter
five, this study noticed that (key finding) the dominant influence of the US has largely driven the
directions of the global narcotics regime for decades. Consistent with other works (Nadelmann,
1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999a; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006), this study also demonstrates the
utility of the hegemonic stability theory in explaining the influence of the US on the global
narcotics regime. It is also evident that the US has successfully resisted a third order or paradigm
change from occurring within the global narcotics prohibition regime (see chapter five). The
important question is: are there any prospects for a third order change to the existing global
narcotics regime?
Grounded in the earlier argument on regime theory (hegemonic stability), this study looks
at the possibility of a third order or paradigm change occurring from two perspectives. First, that
a third order change133 is more likely to occur once a similar change (third order) occurs in the
US. This assumption, as previously discussed in chapter five, is based on the dominant influence
of the US on the global narcotics regime. As Bewley-Taylor (1999a) shares with Bruun et al.
(1975), the strength of the United States within the overall UN system in terms of its major
influence (financial and diplomatic) is strong enough to initiate such a change. Indeed, the
famous quote by Abba Eban, the former Israeli Foreign Minister and veteran UN diplomat that,

132

The data in this context include primary data gathered from the elite interview responses and the existing
secondary data (scholarly works in the field).
133
An example will be a change from the existing prohibition policy approach to a liberal policy approach.
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“nothing can happen without the Americans…. and …. Everything can happen with them,”134
might be relevant to the global narcotics regime as well. Perhaps, the question of how the US
itself can experience a third order change in the first place is an essential aspect of the broader
debate that needs to be equally examined.
Although the debate on the US narcotics policy reform is not new, the drug discourse has
intensified in recent years with some policy actions toward change happening at the state level.
The medical marijuana ballot initiative, as discussed in chapter four, is a case in point.
Regardless of the fact that marijuana use is still prohibited under the federal law, the number of
states that are enacting laws for the medical use of marijuana (Ferraiolo, 2007) is growing in
number. It is likely that windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1984) might be opened for policy
learning and emulation by other states. As more and more states adopt the policy reforms on
marijuana, there is the possibility that policy change will occur at the federal level as well. In
addition, the relentless pressure from many anti-prohibition advocacy groups (see chapter 3 and
4), and the recent legislative initiative by some members of Congress135 for US drug policy
reforms is another likely source of future policy change to the US narcotics policy.
Similarly, the increasing external pressures on the US and the UN from global advocacy
groups for narcotics policy reform is another possibility that might trigger some degree of
narcotics policy change in the near future. In a recent report issued by the Global Commission on
Drug Policy (GCDP), for example, nineteen Commissioners136 of the GCDP, mostly made up of
former presidents, prime ministers, and eminent public figures such as Kofi Annan, the former
134

Cited in Bewley-Taylor, 1999a:213.
Congressman Barney Frank and Congressman Ron Paul recently introduced a marijuana bill in the US Congress.
According to them, the goal of the bill, HR 2306, is not to legalize marijuana but to remove it from the list of
federally controlled substances so that states can devise their own means to regulate the drug. Source: Los Angeles
Times, June 23, 2011. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/06/marijuana-bill-officially-introduced-tocongress-by-ron-paul-barney-frank.html. Retrieved on 07/20/11.
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See appendix six for the names and positions (nineteen Commissioners of the GCDP).
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UN Secretary General, noted that the so-called global war on drugs with emphasis on prohibition
has failed, with vestiges of devastating consequences for individuals and societies across the
world. The Commissioners made a strong recommendation for the adoption of an alternative
policy strategy with emphasis on public health approach to global narcotics control.
Apart from the emerging pressure from many international advocacy groups for narcotics
policy reforms, there is also a growing criticism from certain countries about the US-backed
prohibition approach. The Dutch liberal drug policy experiment, which began in the 1970s with
the aim of making soft narcotic drugs (cannabis) available to users, is a good case in point
(Bullington, 2004; Bewley-Taylor, 2006). Besides the Dutch experiment, other countries such as
Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and other European countries are loosening their marijuana laws
(see chapter five). It is possible that the anti-prohibition actions from these countries will
fragment the global narcotics regime and create the venue for future policy changes.
Having examined some of the likely cases that might trigger a major change (third order)
in US narcotics policy and on the global scale in the near future is not to suggest that a third
order change in policy is imminent. Such a radical policy change could not be imminent in the
next few years. There are still huge obstacles in the form of strong core policy ideas and
institutional constraints, based on the enshrined prohibition approach that must first be eroded.
In fact, this study shares the views of Bullington (2004) and Bewley-Taylor (2006) that most
regions of the world, especially in Africa, have so far not shown any serious indication to shift
their existing prohibition policies toward the direction of some liberal approach to narcotics
control.
Perhaps, as Bullington (2004:715) rightly noted, the international narcotics regime with
the prohibition and criminalization policy strategy might simply collapse at some point in time.
240

For Bullington (2004), just as the former Soviet Union collapsed due to its inherent and
incompatible policy contradictions and policy failures, it is likely that the current global narcotics
regime might also collapse at some point. A likely scenario for change could also occur from two
main sources (endogenous and exogenous). Based on the assumption of this study, I will
consider the endogenous source as coming from the US. In a situation where the American
public continues to favor a more public health approach to narcotics control, a possibility could
arise for a third order change in policy at the federal level. The recent Gallup polls where for the
first time more than 50 percent of the American public favors the legalization of marijuana use
(see figure 4.2) is a strong indication of the emerging trend of the new public understanding of an
old issue. It is likely that this emerging support could be extended to other hard drugs such as
cocaine and heroin. Once a policy change occurs in the US, as this study assumes, a similar
change might also occur within the global system due to the US influence. Regarding the
exogenous sources of change, one could argue that once more and more countries adopt a more
liberal narcotics control, it is equally probable that the global regime might fragment to the point
where a new international narcotics convention will emerge towards a more liberal approach
(public health) to global narcotics control.

Concluding Discussion
The study started with the goal of investigating whether policy change has occurred with
the US narcotics policy process or not. As part of the larger goal, the study also explored the
implications of US narcotics policy change on the global narcotics regime. The idea to examine
the dynamics of policy change is based on the widely held assumption that the existing
prohibition-based strategy of narcotics control appears not only as unchanging from a broader
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perspective, but that the policy has been viewed as generally ineffective, especially on the war on
drugs (Sharp, 1994; Levine, 2003; Bewley-Taylor, 2003; Nadelmann, 2005: Fish, 2006).
To investigate these research questions (see chapter two), the study draws on three key
theories of the policy process: agenda-setting theory, partisan ideology, and orders of policy
change to examine the US narcotics policy change. To equally explain the likely implications of
US policy change on the global narcotics regime, the study employed the concept of regime
theory with specific reference to the hegemonic stability theory as the theoretical framework for
the analysis.
Overall, the theoretical perspectives employed in the study have generally been useful in
providing very good explanations for the changing trends in the US narcotics policy process
since 1993. As earlier mentioned, key policy theories such as agenda-setting, with conceptual
versions of issue definition, venue shifting, and policy entrepreneurship performed better than
partisan ideology in explaining the US narcotics policy change (see chapters three and four).
While agenda-setting and partisan ideology provide very useful explanations as discussed, this
study argues that Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept (orders of change), particularly first and
second, provides a superior explanation in terms of the nature, scope, and tempo of the US
narcotics policy change. Another important finding of the study shows that the US narcotics
policy change has been partly driven by the active involvement of many advocacy groups and
policy entrepreneurs in the policy change process. The medical marijuana ballot initiative is a
very good example (see chapter 4).
Also, the findings of the occurrence of first and second order changes in policy, with the
dominance of a second order change in the US narcotics policy domain, is not only unique, but
offer a modest contribution to the policy literature. This is because of the fact that this study is
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the first to employ Hall’s (1993) conceptual framework to study the dynamics of the US
narcotics policy process. From the perspective of US narcotics policy process and change, this
study finally concludes (based on the evidence examined in the previous chapters) that the US
narcotics policy has largely undergone Hall’s conceptual second order change (type) in policy
with the tempo (nature) of the change generally slow. This finding tends to be consistent with the
set hypothesis (see chapter two) that the US narcotics policy has experienced a second order
change in policy since 1993 and the tempo of the policy change has been slow. In effect, Hall’s
theoretical concept of orders of policy change provides a persuasive explanation for the changing
type and nature of the US narcotics policy from 1993 to 2009.
Also, the main research questions of the study have been addressed. For example, the
question of whether the US narcotics policy has undergone policy changes has been addressed.
Importantly, the US narcotics policy is not only undergoing change, but the types of these
changes have generally been incremental in nature. Another important finding of the study
reveals that the key policy actors involved in shaping the US narcotics policymaking process are
anti-prohibition advocacy groups, interest groups, executive (president), congress, media, and
policy entrepreneurs. With respect to the global impact of the US policy change, the application
of the hegemonic stability theory provides a useful tool in explaining the influence of the US in
the evolution and maintenance of the global narcotics regime. In essence, a global perspective
has been gained on the likely impact of a major change (third order) in the US on the global
narcotics regime. In fact, this finding is consistent with similar scholarly works (Nadelmann,
1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Marcy, 2010) in the field, which
show a strong US influence and dominance on the international stage, particularly on the global
narcotics prohibition regime.
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Another important contribution of this study is by successfully blending the two major
fields of public policy and international relations. These fields are some of the growing areas of
research in the political science literature in recent years. Recent works such as Mamudu (2005),
Appah (2007), and Hinojosa (2007) have used this method of approach in their research.
Finally, the question of whether the US and the global narcotics regime under the UN
should continue to formulate and implement narcotic policies based on prohibition approach or
to decriminalize and legalize drug use is certainly beyond the scope and judgment of this study.
As noted, the purpose of this study is to examine the existing illegal drug problem from
empirical and theoretical perspectives in terms of whether the existing policy has undergone
policy change (s) and the implications for the global narcotics regime. Based on the available
evidence through the data that was generated from the elite interviews and the analysis of the
documentary literature, it is apparent that the main purpose of this study has been accomplished.

Limitations of Study
Similar to other studies of this nature, this study also faced some problems with sampling
of the interviewees. My objective was to interview many elites from various US government
institutions and UN agencies involved in the formulation and the implementation of the existing
narcotics policy, with similar number of elites from advocacy groups opposed to the existing
prohibition strategy. While a considerable number of elites from the advocacy groups responded
to the questionnaires in a timely manner, it was extremely difficult to get the needed responses
from officials (narcotics policy makers) of the US government and the UN agency involved in
global narcotics control.
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Nonetheless, I found very relevant and useful information on their narcotics policy
preferences (policy goals and instruments) from their policy documents and official websites,
which has balanced the argument advanced in the study. Also, the reliance on one case for this
study might present some difficulty in making an empirical generalization across other policy
areas. However, this methodology (single case analysis) provides scholars, including the author
of this study, with an in-depth understanding of a particular policy domain such as the US
narcotics policy field.

Future Research Agenda
Although the theories that this study employed to examine the US narcotics policy
process provide very useful theoretical tools in our understanding of the broad process of
narcotics policy change, this study argues that Hall’s (1993) paradigm theory (orders of change)
provides the most persuasive explanation for the US narcotics policy change. The theory’s
explanatory power offers a better understanding of the trends, nature, type, mode, and tempo of
the US narcotics policy change over time. The reviewed policy literature, however, indicates a
limited use of the theory (order of change) by policy scholars in studying the process of change
in other policy areas. Apart from a few scholars such as Breton et al. (2008), Capano and
Howlett (2009), Studlar (2009), and Skogstad (2009) who have employed the theory (order of
change) to study other policy sectors, the theory could be described as generally under-utilized in
the field of policy science.
Future research agenda could explore the use of it in investigating policy change in other
policy areas. Also, a careful observation regarding the application of Hall’s (1993) theory reveals
that it can be useful to study policy change at the global level in policy areas such as
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environment and energy. It is also possible to apply Hall’s (1993) theoretical concept to the study
of foreign policy change. In addition, Hall’s (1993) theory can also be employed to study policy
change in developing countries like Ghana. Another important area to mention is the subsystems
theory and narcotics policy change. Although this study draws on the conceptual idea of
subsystems theory in explaining some selected cases regarding the US narcotics policy process
(see chapter two and three), the concept was not part of my main theories used for this study.
However, this study believes that the subsystems theory can be applied to study the US narcotics
policy process in a future research. Finally, a future research project can integrate other theories
of the policy process with Hall’s (1993) orders of policy change to test the validity and the
superiority of the theory in connection with the findings of this study.

246

Appendix 1

Estimated Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations by Age Group, 1970-2007
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Adult
322,300
383,900
407,300
463,600
474,900
456,000
464,100
493,300
480,000
435,600
471,200
468,100
584,900
583,500
623,700
718,600
742,700
849,500
1,050,600
1,247,800
1,008,300
931,900
980,700
1,017,800
1,192,800
1,285,700
1,295,100
1,370,400
1,360,600
1,365,100
1,375,600
1,384,400
1,352,600
1,476,800
1,551,500
1,654,600
1,693,100
1,645,500

Juvenile
93,300
108,100
120,100
165,300
167,200
145,400
145,400
149,400
148,700
123,000
109,700
91,800
91,200
77,900
84,700
92,800
81,400
87,900
104,600
113,900
81,200
78,100
85,700
108,500
158,600
190,400
211,100
213,200
198,500
192,000
203,900
202,500
186,200
201,400
194,200
191,800
196,700
195,700

Source: Crime in the United States, annual, Uniform Crime Reports. Also reported in the Bureau of
Justice Statistics. http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/drugtab.cfm. Retrieved on 06/15/11.
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Appendix 2
National Drug Control Budget by Function, FY 1992–2002
(Budget Authority in Millions)
FUNCTIONAL
AREAS:

FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY
2002
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Final BA Enacted Request

Demand Reduction
Drug
Abuse 1,859.7
Treatment

2,016.7

2,176.7

2,425.5

2,096.2

2,321.3

2,166.5

2,363.9

2,497.9

2,685.7

2,850.1

Drug
Abuse 1,538.7
Prevention

1,556.4

1,597.4

1,555.5

1,394.2

1,642.1

1,810.7

1,952.2

2,018.4

2,159.8

2,037.5

Prevention
Research

157.5

164.3

174.8

179.6

212.2

230.7

249.5

285.6

320.3

355.9

403.9

Treatment
Research

194.4

242.0

253.6

261.2

280.8

311.7

327.9

381.9

417.3

482.5

563.0

3,979.4

4,202.5

4,421.9

3,983.4

4,505.8

4,554.6

4,983.5

5,253.8

5,683.9

5,854.5

33%

35%

34%

31%

31%

30%

29%

29%

31%

31%

Total Demand 3,750.3
Reduction
Percentage

32%

Domestic Law Enforcement
Criminal
Justice System

4,943.0

5,692.4

5,903.2

6,756.9

7,164.9

7,446.4

8,193.1

8,557.6

8,429.0

9,357.7

9,475.6

Other
Research

152.6

91.9

91.9

101.4

114.3

111.8

106.4

113.2

89.6

106.1

112.0

Intelligence

98.6

138.1

123.9

125.0

114.5

142.3

190.6

277.3

309.1

345.2

358.1

Total Domestic 5,194.2
Law Enf.

5,922.3

6,119.0

6,983.3

7,393.7

7,700.6

8,490.1

8,948.1

8,827.8

9,809.0

9,945.7

Percentage

45%

50%

51%

54%

57%

54%

56%

52%

49%

54%

52%

International

660.4

523.4

329.4

295.8

289.8

424.1

496.9

774.7

1,892.9

609.7

1,237.0

Percentage

6%

4%

3%

2%

2%

3%

3%

5%

11%

3%

6%

Interdiction

1,960.2

1,511.1

1,311.6

1,280.1

1,321.0

1,723.3

1,636.9

2,417.9

1,965.9

1,950.4

2,141.5

Percentage

17%

13%

11%

10%

10%

12%

11%

14%

11%

11%

11%

TOTALS

11,565.2 11,936.2 11,962.4 12,981.1 12,988.0 14,353.7 15,178.6 17,124.2 17,940.3 18,053.1 19,178.8

Source: ONDCP, 2001. (Budget Summary for FY 2002, with Historical Funding by Function from FY
1992- FY 2002). FY= Financial Year.
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Appendix 3a
Federal Drug Control Spending by Function, FY 2001- FY 2003
(Budget Authority in Millions)
FY 2001
Final BA ($)

FY 2002
Enacted ($)

FY 2003
Requested ($)

FY 02-FY 03 Change
Dollars
Percent

3,587.5
19.1%
2,548.6
13.5%
9,513.1
50.5%
2,074.8
11.0%
1,098.8
5.8%

3,811.7
19.9%
2,473.4
12.9%
9,451.1
49.3%
2,289.7
11.9%
1,153.0
6.0%

224.2

6.2%

(75.2)

-3.0%

(61.2)

-0.6%

214.9

10.4%

54.2

4.9%

Percent

3,335.0
18.4%
2,578.7
14.3%
9,463.8
52.3%
2,054.9
11.4%
663.2
3.7%

Total

18,095.7

18,822.8

19,179.7

356.9

1.9%

Supply/Demand Split
Supply
Percent
Demand
Percent

12,182.0
67.3%
5,913.7
32.7%

12,686.7
67.4%
6,136.1
32.6%

12,894.6
67.2%
6,285.1
32.8%

207.9

1.6%

149.0

2.4%

Total

18,095.7

18,822.8

19,179.7

356.9

1.9%

Function
Treatment (w/Research)
Percent
Prevention (w/Research)
Percent

Dom. Law Enforcement
Percent

Interdiction
Percent

International

Source: ONDCP, 2002 (For FY 2003 Budget Summary p. 6). Detail may not add to totals due to
rounding. FY =Financial Year.
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Appendix 3b
Federal Drug Control Spending by Function, FY 2004- FY 2006
(Budget Authority in Millions)
FY 2004
Final BA ($)

FY 2005
Enacted ($)

FY 2006
Requested ($)

FY 05-FY 06 Change
Dollars
Percent

3,109.7
25.6%
1,969.5
16.2%
3,289.2
27.0%
2,662.9
21.9%
1,131.3
9.3%

3,251.1
26.2%
1,565.2
12.6%
3,359.0
27.0%
2,882.2
23.2%
1,373.6
11.0%

141.4

Percent

3,028.3
25.5%
1,962.8
16.5%
3,182.9
26.8%
2,534.1
21.4%
1,159.3
9.8%

Total

11,867.4

12,162.7

Supply/Demand Split
Supply
Percent
Demand
Percent

6,876.2
57.9%
4,991.1
42.1%

Total

$11,867.4

Function
Treatment (w/Research)
Percent
Prevention (w/Research)
Percent

Dom. Law Enforcement
Percentage

Interdiction
Percent

International

(404.4)

4.5%
(20.5%)

69.8

2.1 %

219.3

8.2%

242.2

21.4%

12,431.1

268.4

2.2%

7,083.5
58.2%
5,079.2
41.8 %

7,614.8
61.3%
4,816.2
38.7%

531.3
(262. 9)

(5.2%)

$12,162.7

$12,431.1

$268.4

2.2%

7.5%

Source: ONDCP, 2005. (For FY 2006 Budget Summary p. 7). Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. In
addition to the resources displayed in the table above, the Administration requested another $387.6 million in FY
2007 for Emergency Supplemental funding and $ 266.1 million in FY 2008 for Emergency Designations. These
resources were used in the counter drugs operations in Afghanistan. FY= Financial Year.
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Appendix 3c
Federal Drug Control Spending by Function, FY 2006- FY 2008
(Budget Authority in Millions)
FY 2006
Final ($)

FY 2007
Estimate ($)

FY 2008
Request ($)

Percent

2,941.9
22.6%
1,862.6
14.3%
3,474.7
26.7%
3,285.6
25.3 %
1,434.5
11.0%

2,943.0
22.4 %
1,859.0
14.2%
3,597.0
27.4%
3,372.9
25.7%
1,356.2
10.3%

3,042.7
23.5%
1,575.1
12.2%
3,652.2
28.2%
3,292.1
25.4%
1,399.3
10.8%

Total

12,999.2

13,128.1

Supply/Demand Split
Supply
Percent
Demand
Percent

8,194.8
63.0%
4,804.4
37.0%

Total

$12,999.2

FY 07-FY 08 Change
Dollars
Percent

Function
Treatment (w/Research)
Percent
Prevention (w/Research)
Percent

Dom. Law Enforcement
Percentage

Interdiction
Percent

International

99.9

3.4%

-283.9

-15.3%

55.2

1.5 %

-80.8

-2.4 %

43.1

3.2%

12,961.4

-166.7

-1.3%

8,326.1
63.4%
4,802.0
36.6 %

8,343.6
64.4%
4,617.8
35.6%

17.5

0.2%

-184.2

-6.6%

$13,128.1

$12,961.4

$ 166.7

-1.3%

Source: ONDCP, 2007 (For FY 2008 Budget Summary p. 9) Detail may not add to total due to
rounding). FY = Financial Year.
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Appendix 3d
Federal Drug Control Spending by Function, FY 2008- FY 2010
(Budget Authority in Millions)
FY 2008
Final ($)

FY 2009
Enacted ($)

FY 2010
Request ($)

Percent

3,255.2
24.5%
1,750.4
13.2%
3,544.1
26.7%
2,901.4
21.9 %
1,824.6
13.7%

3,415.9
23.0 %
1,791.4
12.1%
3,653.9
24.6%
3,836.2
25.8%
2,147.5
14.5%

3,566.0
23.7%
1,601.6
10.6%
3,737.2
24.8%
4,004.1
26.6%
2,160.2
14.3%

Total

$13,275.8

$14,844.7

Supply/Demand Split
Demand Reduction
Percent
Supply Reduction
Percent

5,005.6
37.7%
8, 270.1
62.3%

Total

$13,275.8

FY 09-FY 10 Change
Dollars
Percent

Function
Treatment
Percent
Prevention
Percent

Dom. Law Enforcement
Percentage

Interdiction
Percent

International

150.2

4.4%

-189.8

-10.6%

83.3

2.3%

167.9

4.4 %

12.7

0.6%

$15,069.1

$224.3

1.5%

5,207.3
35.1%
9,637.5
64.9 %

5,167.7
34.4%
9,901.4
65.6%

-39.6

-0.8%

263.9

2.7%

$14,844.7

$15,069.1

$ 224.3

1.5%

Source: ONDCP, 2009 (For FY 2010 Budget Summary p. 9) Detail may not add to total due to
rounding). FY = Financial Year.
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Appendix 4
Map of World Drug Majors in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009

Source: George W. Bush, Presidential Determination No. 2008-28, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major
Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2009,” September 16, 2008, at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/prsrl/ps/109777.htm

253

Appendix 5a
Interview Questions
Interview Protocol on Policy Advocacy Groups/Other Actors
Personal Introduction
Hello,
My name is Felix Kumah-Abiwu. I’m a doctoral student in the department of Political Science
at West Virginia University. I’m conducting this elite interview to gather data for my
dissertation. The interview is voluntary and any information given during the process will be
used only for the purpose of my dissertation and academic advancement of knowledge. Thanks
for your participation.
Research Background
Narcotics control policy of prohibition/criminalization has been the dominant narcotics policy
approach in the US for decades. This prohibition strategy has been extended to other countries
through the global narcotics regime under the control of the United Nations. However, questions
have been raised on the existing policy, which many believe, seems unchanging both in the
United States and across the world. The empirical question is whether policy change is occurring
with the US narcotics policy or not. In effect, the research seeks to investigate the broad patterns
of how policy change (radical or marginal) has occurred or occurring within the US narcotics
policy since 1993 (the scope of study is 1993-2009). The study seeks to also explore the
implications of policy change in the US on the global narcotics regime as a result of the US
influence on the regime. Policy change in this sense is whether there has been a shift with more
emphasis on criminalization or with decriminalization of illegal drugs. Your assistance in
answering these questions would be appreciated.
(The first, two questions are general demographic questions)
1a. Are you involved with any policy advocacy group/ activities aimed at shaping US narcotics
policy change? (1)____Yes
(2) ____No
1b. If yes, with which organization are you associated? Or activities are you engaged in?
2. How many years have you been involved with your organization? Or the US narcotics issues?
(Questions 3 to 10 are designed to determine whether change is occurring or not, and if
occurring, what is the nature of this change and the role of policy advocacy groups and other
actors in shaping US narcotics policy change).
3. The US narcotics policy which is based on prohibition/criminalization seems unchanging after
many years of implementation. To some, change is occurring with emphasis on criminalization,
while others believe that change is occurring towards decriminalization. Do you see change
occurring in any form with the US narcotics policy since 1993?
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4. If change is occurring with more emphasis on criminalization, how would describe the nature
(e.g change in policy goals, content, instruments) of this change?
5. If change is occurring with more emphasis on decriminalization, how would describe the
nature (e.g change in policy goals, content, instruments) of this change?
6. Policy change is sometimes driven by internal or external forces or both. Please identify some
of the major forces (internal or external) you consider as the main driving force for the US
narcotics policy change? Which of these forces would you consider as the main driving force in
US policy change? (1) Internal (2) External (3) Both forces
7. Partisan ideological policy differences between the two leading political parties (Democrats &
Republicans) do shape policy change. From your perspective, how would you describe US
narcotics policy change based on the partisan differences?
8. How would you explain the role/strategies of your advocacy organization and other agencies
including government agencies in shaping the US narcotics policy change?
9. In your opinion, would you say these policy changes are gradual or rapid?
10. How likely is it that there will be a drastic change of US narcotics policy towards a more
liberal (decriminalization of illegal drugs) approach within next few years?
(Questions 11 to 17 are designed to determine the role of the US in the global narcotics
prohibition regime and the likely implications of US policy change on the global regime)
11a. Prohibition and criminalization of narcotics drugs have been the underlying principle of
major UN conventions on illicit drugs. The US is the leading country that has consistently
pushed for the global adoption of the prohibition regime. How accurate is this statement?
11b. If not so accurate, how would you describe the US role?
12. How would you rate the US dominance of the global narcotics regime before and after the
end of the Cold War?
13. How would you generally describe the role of the US in the global prohibition regime?
14a. The US narcotics policy is based on the assumption that the supply of illicit drugs into the
US is generally outside the boundaries of the US, hence the country’s active role in the global
narcotics campaign. Is this assumption correct? (1)___Yes (2) ___No
14b. If no, how would you describe it?
15a. Would you describe the global narcotics prohibition regime as an extension of the US
narcotics policy both at the multinational and bilateral levels? (1)____Yes (2) ____No
15b. If no, how would you describe the role of the US?
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16a. The US is influential on the global narcotics prohibition regime under the UN as a result of
its hegemony status (dominant role) on the international stage. Do you share the view that US
domestic narcotics policy change (incremental or radical) is likely to have some implications
toward a similar policy change on the global narcotics regime? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not Sure
16b. If yes, in what way(s)?
17. Overall, how would you assess the changing nature of the existing global narcotics
prohibition regime? (1) Incremental/gradual (2) Radical/drastic (3) No change.
Thank you!
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Appendix 5b
Interview Protocol on the Global Narcotics Regime
Interview Questions
(The 1st 2 questions are general demographic questions)
1a. Are you familiar with the UN (global) narcotics policy issues?
(1)____Yes
(2) ____No
1b. With which organizations/units are you associated?
2. How many years have you been involved in working for your organization?
(Questions 3 to 8 are designed to determine the role of the US in the global narcotics
prohibition regime and the likely implications of US drug policy change on the global
narcotics regime)
3. Prohibition and criminalization of narcotic drugs have been the underlying principle of major
UN conventions on illicit drugs. The US is the leading country that has been advocating for the
global adoption of the prohibition regime. How accurate is this statement? And if not, how
would you describe US role?
4. If this statement is accurate, would you describe the role of the US as a dominant player in the
global narcotics regime?
5a. Would you also describe the global narcotics prohibition regime as an extension of the US
narcotics policy both at the multinational and bilateral levels? (1)____Yes (2) ____No
5b. If you do not consider the US as a dominant player on the regime, how would you describe
the role of the US in global narcotics control?
6. How likely will there be tensions in terms of change or resistance to change within the existing
global narcotics prohibition regime in the next few years? (1) Very Likely (2) Somewhat likely
(3) Neutral (4) Unlikely (5) Very unlikely.
7. If it is accurate that the US is influential on the global narcotics prohibition regime under the
UN as a result of its hegemonic influence, would you share the view that a policy change
(incremental or radical) within the US is likely to have some implications on the global narcotics
prohibition regime? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not Sure
7a. If yes, in what way(s)?
8. Overall, how would you assess the changing nature of the existing global narcotics prohibition
regime? (a) Incremental/gradual (b) Radical/drastic (c) No change
Thank you!
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Appendix 5c
List of Persons Interviewed

David C. Lewis, MD, Professor Emeritus of Community Health and Medicine, Donald G. Millar
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Alcohol and Addiction Studies, Brown
University Center of Alcohol and Addiction Studies.
Eric E. Sterling, J. D., President, The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation.
Grant Smith, Federal Policy Coordinator, Drug Policy Alliance.
Allen St. Pierre, Executive Director and a Member of Board of Directors, Norml Foundation.
Bill Fried, Director of Programs & Financial Administration, Law Enforcement Against
Prohibition.
Susan Everingham, Drug Policy Research Center, Rand Corporation.
Jeffrey Kahn, Rabbi, Executive Director of Interfaith Drug Policy Initiative.
Nora Callahan, Co-Founder and Director of the November Coalition Foundation.
Marie Nougier, Research and Communication Officer, International Drug Policy Consortium.
Don Wirtshafter, Chairman of the Board, Drug Sense.
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Appendix Six
Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP)
Available: at www.globalcommissionondrugs.org Retrieved in June, 2011.
The 19 Commissioners
Asma Jahangir, human rights activist, former UN Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary,
Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, Pakistan.
Carlos Fuentes, writer and public intellectual, Mexico.
César Gaviria, former President of Colombia.
Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil (chair).
George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece.
George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, United States (honorary chair).
Javier Solana, former European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Spain.
John Whitehead, banker and civil servant, chair of the World Trade Center Memorial
Foundation, United States.
Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ghana.
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, President of the
International Crisis Group, Canada.
Maria Cattaui, Petroplus Holdings Board member, former Secretary-General of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Switzerland.
Mario Vargas Llosa, writer and public intellectual, Peru.
Marion Caspers-Merk, former State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Health
Michel Kazatchkine, executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, France.
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve and of the Economic
Recovery Board.
Richard Branson, entrepreneur, advocate for social causes, founder of the Virgin Group, cofounder of The Elders, United Kingdom.
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Ruth Dreifuss, former President of Switzerland and Minister of Home Affairs.
Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Norway.
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